TAIWANESE IDENTITY AS RECOLLECTED, REINVOKED, AND REINVENTED: FINDINGS OF QUESTIONNAIRE INVESTIGATIONS ON TAIWANESE ELDERS, 1992-94

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1. FOREWORD

How do people in Taiwan conceive themselves in terms of nationality today? To what extent is their Taiwanese identity subsumed in their Chinese identity? How did the Taiwanese identity begin to take shape in historical perspective? Within what context was this Taiwanese identity reinvoked? How was this identity reinvented in postwar Taiwan? And, what was the nature of this Taiwanese identity as recollected? All these questions point to the dilemma of a Taiwanese identity.

This study proposes to examine a unique section of Taiwanese who survived the period of Japanese rule and continued to be active in localities, at least to be so remembered in the eyes of local people, even years after they retired. This study is primarily based on questionnaire investigations I conducted between November 1992 and February 1994 in Taiwan. The respondents were mostly elders aged between 70 and 90 who have involved themselves in local administrations or public services; the list selection is by and large based on an

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islandwide census conducted in 1990. I will devote a chapter to the methodology of the questionnaire investigations. Findings from these questionnaire investigations have forced me time and again to go back to the historical sources for more inspiration and probable interpretations.

In the process of this investigation, I began to perceive that the Taiwanese identity as we understand it is both a compromise and a dynamic factor in history making. The study will hopefully help shed some light on how Japanese rule was perceived in Taiwan, as well as on how Nationalist rule was perceived within this context of the colonial legacy.

2. METHODOLOGY

I became aware of--and interested in--this identity issue in January 1983, when I visited Japan for the first time. I stayed at the house of a relative in Tokyo for two weeks. One night, I invited several Japanese friends to the house for tea. I was deeply "impressed" ("embarrassed" is perhaps the more accurate word) by a conversation with my relative, who had tried very much in his life to become naturalized as a Japanese and ironically died in Japan as an alien several years ago just when he finally made up his mind to return to Taiwan. I remembered vividly the sincerity he showed when he said: "I was almost a Japanese, if not because of the Retrocession." My first reaction was one of shock and shame--why say such a thing in front of my Japanese friends?! It was not until later that I came to understand him within the context of this period of Japanese rule in Taiwan.

"Did you identify yourself as a Japanese?" This is a question that seems easy but is hard to answer. This was exactly what I "imposed" on the elders on my sixth questionnaire investigation on identity. Virtually every student of the history of Japanese colonial rule in Taiwan will have to become involved in this question one way or another, and I chose to confront it directly. For an islandwide
investigation, I decided on a style of open-ended questionnaire correspondence, just as I did in the past. (Cai, 1933a, 1993b; Ts'ai, 1994)

In this questionnaire, I began with the statement that some "Taiwanese" I know did possess "double identities" during the period of Japanese rule, but their "identity crisis" in general did not emerge until after--not before--the Retrocession of Taiwan from Japan to China. I cited my relative's case as an inviting remark on the topic. I asked the elders to briefly comment on this statement in two aspects:

1. Did you also possess double identities? Have you ever sensed it? Was it or is it a problem for you?
2. Are you fortunate enough to avoid the identity crisis? If so, how? Has family background had something to do with it?

Anonymity was a choice the elders were allowed to exercise in discussing the issue by correspondence. Anonymity was also a promise I made to them in future publications. This was done to encourage free and candid discussions in the questionnaires, for I know from field work in the past, a considerable number of the elders I interviewed remained politically sensitive to questions related to Japanese rule. There were deliberately no specific definitions as to what the terms "Taiwanese," "Chinese," "double identities," and "identity crisis" meant. This terms confusion of terms might have generated more questions than it answered--and that is exactly what this questionnaire investigation was expected to accomplish from the beginning. In other words, I made no definition of my own; the elders defined the identity issue as they saw it. Further study of this sort will allow us to look into the mentality of the prewar generation, in terms of both their expectations and frustrations.

This is an intriguing and vital aspect of the study of Japanese colonial rule in Taiwan in particular and that of colonialism in general. It is equally impor-
ant for the writing of history of the Nationalist government on the island and, in fact, has become a heated politicized issue deeply imbedded in the debate of the "China complex" (Zhongguojie) vs. the "Taiwan complex" (Taiwanjie) in Taiwan for the past decade. (1)

I was not surprised, therefore, that the response rate of this questionnaire investigation was roughly only one out of five (65 out of 350), a very low rate indeed if compared with my earlier questionnaires on the hoko (baojia), which produced over 200 responses out of 350 questionnaires. As I have explained in my 1993 preliminary report, the elders were a select group, semi-randomly selected from a 1990 census on local elders, but the list was finally decided largely on the factor of their age (over 75)—not so much on their occupations or levels of education. The raw response rate of the first questionnaire, which served as the base of information for later investigations, was again roughly one fifth of the questionnaires mailed in total, or 350 out of 1,800. (Cai, 1993a) That is to say, the identity questionnaire response rate is only about one twenty-fifth of the total elders targeted in the beginning.

When age was the primary consideration in the questionnaires, the fact that a majority of the interviewees did not respond at all might be attributed to health, death, migration, or simply apathy—as seen in most questionnaire investigations today. However, when an overwhelming ratio of the correspondents chose to reply to one issue (Japanese rule and wartime

1. The term "Taiwan complex," evolved from "Taiwan's historical complex" (Taiwan lishi qingjie) to "Taiwan complex" (Taiwan qingjie), and again to "Taiwan knot" (or tie, Taiwanjie). See Dai, 1994:20. "Taiwan complex" is, by the way, often confused with "Taiwanese complex" (Taiwanren qingjie); the latter involves more of an ethnic dimension.

9) As to "China complex," a new theory has recently been advanced by Dai Guohui; the "testicle theory" (gaowan liun). This theory is that of the theoretical construct of autonomy (or, self-help; zili) and symbiosis (gongsheng). Literally, this theory goes this way: 1) mainland China can be conceived as a man's body; 2) if so, Hong Kong and Macao will be one of the man's testicles, and Taiwan, his other testicle; 3) as a testicle, it is crucial to the reproduction capability of the body; 4) meanwhile, however, it cannot be taken into the body. (Dai, 1994:91-95; esp. 93-94)
mobilization in general, based on the topic of the *hoko* in the earlier questionnaires; or education, in this questionnaire) but not the other (identity, in this case), one wonders whether this kind of topic continues to be too disturbingly painful for the responders. Is it too politically sensitive to answer? Are they becoming bored with the questionnaire type of investigations? Or, did most of them think the discussion was realistically irrelevant to the present society?

To what extent these restrictions on methodology will affect my conclusion remains to be closely observed in a future study. However, the recollection of the elders in my sixth questionnaire investigation on identity and education does provide rich information with some insiders’ views on the issue of identity, along with their perception, anxiety, expectations, and frustration. It also reveals how their identities were shaped, reinvoked, and reinvented in the course of their lives—and for that matter, of their recollections.

3. RECOLLECTION: TAIWANESE IDENTITY

Defining Taiwanese identity is still a process at the stage of rediscovering a history comprised of a diverse array of components, but it has become a conscious project. We might relate it to Hobsbawm’s idea of “inventing traditions.” (Gold, 1994:64)

With regard to Taiwanese identity, the recollections of the elders fall into three categories:

1. Taiwanese identity as recollected;
2. Taiwanese identity as reinvoked;
3. Taiwanese identity as reinvented.

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2. Source material in this section is based on correspondence, including both questionnaires and letters, from the elders to my sixth questionnaire investigation, which was conducted between November 1993 and May 1994. See Cai, 1993, “Sixth Questionnaire Investigation of the *Hoko* System (1895-1945): Education and Identity” (November 11, 1993).
The Recollection of being an ethnic Chinese originally coming to Taiwan from mainland China is significant in explaining many of the elders' sense that their Taiwanese identity overlaps with their Chinese identity.

"People of the generation born before the Retrocession suffered a lot under Japanese rule. Although I was born at the time under Japanese rule, I definitely identified myself as a Chinese. It is a matter of course: being a Han Chinese, I certainly would not forget where my ancestors came from--what a question! Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] was the liberator of the Chinese people!" (3)

"Exposure to Chinese folk (history) stories allowed me to deeply understand that we Taiwanese are descendants of the Yellow Emperor and the Han people." (4)

"I do not have an identity problem. I have identified myself as a Chinese since I was young--thanks to the instructions of my parents." (5)

"I sensed I was a Chinese only after I entered kogakko (elementary schools set up especially for the Taiwanese). This was due to my parents' reminding me that our ancestors came from Tangshan (China) and because of all aspects of discrimination by the Japanese." (6)

"I did not think of myself as a Japanese. Each time when I fill out my c.v., I always take the trouble to note that I belong to the Fujian ethnic group. Nonetheless, only by means of the Japanese language can I fully express my feeling well; Taiwanese dialect just won't do it." (7)

"I did not identify myself as a Japanese. My parents often reminded us that we were Chinese from the 'Tang mountain' (China)." (8)

"My ancestors came from mainland China; thus I absolutely could not identify myself as a Japanese, although I respect the way the Japanese ruled Taiwan."

4. Reply from Mr. Peng (Dongshi, Taizhong), in Cai, 1993b.
6. Reply from Mr. Chen (Erlin, Zhanghua), in Cai, 1993b.
8. Reply from Mr. Li (Baoshan, Xinzhu), Mr. Zeng (Guangxi, Taidong), Mr. Chen (Yuli, Taidong), and Mr. Huang (Hualian City), in Cai, 1993b.
"While on the surface I did not dare to say that I was a Chinese, in my heart I did not consider myself a Japanese. The Taiwanese are a people who identify and worship their ancestors." (10)

"I was reminded by the elder generations of my family that I was a Chinese. Being born at the time under Japanese occupation and having received Japanese education, however, I cannot but look with favor on Japan." (11)

"I was forced to change my name when I served as a secretary for military services (heiyaku shoki). Deep in my heart, though, I still identified myself as a Chinese, as this was what my grandfather and parents had instructed me." (12)

"During the period of Japanese rule, I did not think of myself as a Japanese. I am of the Chinese Han people: this was so recorded in the household registration at that time. Besides, every spring and fall in this locality people of different sub-ethnic groups congregated at their local temples [to worship their ancestors], and the elders always reminded us of this fact. The Japanese discriminated against us in various ways--this was a matter of course since we were the colonized!" (13)

"I myself absolutely did not identify myself as a Japanese during the period of Japanese rule. Only those Japanese running-dogs changed their names and catered to the Japanese; this amounts to identifying thieves as fathers. These people were opportunists or they were favored by the Japanese. We have a spirit of our own. We are descendants of the Yellow Emperor and we belong to the Han people--this we shall not forget until death." (14)

"During the Japanese era, I considered myself both a Chinese Taiwanese and a Japanese subject. Both before and after the Retrocession, I considered myself a Taiwanese. My parents did not receive Japanese education. They told us..."
children that we were of Chinese origin from Fujian Province; thus I considered myself a Han Taiwanese. Later when I served as a hoko secretary, the pay was good and my life was happy, so I did not think of overthrowing the government. After the Retrocession, I served in various positions at the Linnei county government, and my family has always been happy. I received three years of Chinese private tutoring. While on the surface Taiwanese were Japanese subjects under Japanese rule, their hearts remained Chinese Taiwanese." (15)

(2)

Such recollections may be reinvoked by the Japanization movement (kominka), which in most cases constitutes a negative factor in confirming the elders' Taiwanese identities as opposed to their Japanese identities.

"I did consider myself a Japanese of a different national and ethnic group (zuxi). Here are the reasons: 1) educational indoctrination; 2) the fact that at that time the Japanese empire consisted of three zuxi (Japanese, Chinese, Koreans, and their ethnic groups). Before the war, the Japanese did discriminate against the Taiwanese, but after 1940, everyone was a subject of the Japanese emperor; little discrimination could be discerned. Thus were we moved to fight for the survival of the state." (16)

"At the time of kominka, only three or four of the social elite in this locality had their names changed. I was only twenty or so, not yet married, and possessed no conspicuous social status; thus I had no special recollections about this period. However, I came from a poor tenant family, and [rural] reactions against national identity did not function as sharply as those of urban people." (17)

"Rural people in general did not have [Japanese] identity. During wartime, governmental employees had to follow up the policy of name change, and newborn children had to be registered in Japanese names with hoko shoki (hoko

16. Reply from Mr. Lu (Shuishang, Jiayi), in Cai, 1993b.
19. Reply from Mr. Wu (Qingshui, Taichung), Cai, 1993b.
secretaries). One, nevertheless, would not identify oneself as a Japanese." (18)

"I knew the fact that I was a Chinese when I entered kogakko, so I did not have 'double identities'." (19)

"Did I identify myself as a Japanese? It was true that I was appointed as a cadre of kominka (Japanization Movement), and my family was known as a Japanese-speaking family. However, I have never had my name changed." (20)

"I considered myself a Chinese. I did not change my name [into Japanese] during the war. I insisted on no name change at all." (21)

"I did not identify myself as a Japanese. For example, many people (mostly elite intellectuals) adopted Japanese names, while I would not do it. They later changed their names back after the Retrocession--what a lot of trouble!" (22)

"Everyone knew at the time of Japanese rule that we were Chinese--not a soul wanted to be a Japanese." (23)

"I acted in opposition to the Japanese at that time. The Japanese police abused their power. I refused to carry out all festival activities related to Japan." (24)

"I did not consider myself a Japanese during the period of Japanese occupation. This was because I did not have my name changed [into Japanese]. My ancestors came from Zhangzhou, Fujian. I served as a hosei as early as fifteen years of age; the Japanese called me 'child hosei.' They trusted me because I was honest. I would not serve as a Japanese running dog." (25)

"Even with the speeding up of the Japanization Movement during wartime, it remained impossible for me to identify myself as a Japanese." (26)

"This is a very difficult question to answer. In dealing with the Japanese, we had to think of ourselves as being Japanese, but when no need to deal with
the Japanese, we were then again Chinese. If I spoke Japanese to my parents, they would say that it was a barbarian language, and that they could not understand it. Thus I absolutely had no way to identify myself as a Japanese. Even for people of official ranks, they on the surface identified themselves as Japanese, but remained Chinese behind the scenes. Few Chinese identified themselves as Japanese, I think."

"I never identified myself as a Japanese during the Japanese era. In fact, few people had an identity crisis; those who did were mostly people who held public positions. Due to the nature of alien rule, the 'little people' as a matter of course had no such thing as an identity crisis--it did not have to do with one's family background." (27)

"[I hate] those who have double identities. Many of them changed their names or abused their power." (28)

"I miss--and like--the Japanese spirit, but I do not identify myself as a Japanese." (29)

"Having served as a policeman under the Japanese, I deeply felt the abuse of power by the Japanese." (30)

"I did not identify myself as a Japanese. Persuaded by others to have my name changed, I only laughed them off." (32)

"I am a Taiwanese. Japanese would not have identified Taiwanese as Japanese." (33)

"I did not identify myself as a Japanese at that time, but I liked the Japanese in general, except for the Japanese police. This was because the Japanese were honest people. They were hard working. Rank-promotion in the Japanese govern-

27. Reply from Mr. Xue (Xiyu, Penghu), in Cai, 1993b.
28. Reply from Mr. ? (Fenyuan, Zhanghua), in Cai, 1993b.
29. Reply from Mr. ? (Xuejia, Tainan?), in Cai, 1993b.
30. Reply from Mr. Lin (Lugu, Nantou), in Cai, 1993b.
31. Reply from Mr. Lin (Ligang, Pingdong), in Cai, 1993b.
32. Reply from Mr. Li (Luzhu, Taoyuan), in Cai, 1993b.
33. Reply from Mr. Chen (Daya, Taizhong), in Cai, 1993b.
34. Reply from Mr. Yang (Houbi, Tainan), in Cai, 1993b.
ment required no "red envelopes."" (34)

"I entirely think that it was not an honor to convert oneself from a Taiwanese to a Japanese; thus I never had my name changed at the time of the Japanization Movement. This had something to do with my family and educational background." (35)

"I did not convert my name [again into Chinese] at the time of the Retrocession—and you can judge whether I identified myself as a Japanese or not! As a matter of fact, on the surface, I could not but identify myself as a Japanese [during the period under Japanese rule]. This was because I came from a household where my elder brother was a hoko secretary, my younger uncle was a kogakko teacher, and my cousin on my father's side was a student who registered at the highest level of teacher's colleges on the island. However, immediately after I graduated from the [Tainan] teacher's college, I came to notice for the first time, when filling out my c.v., that I had to identify my ethnic group in the form—which left a deep impression in my mind. The Japanese government's discrimination against the Taiwanese was something that I cannot forget until today." (36)

(3)

In the course of recollection, a Taiwanese identity can be reinvented.

"Rather than 'identity,' it is more appropriate to term it as 'fate' (mingyun) or 'realization' (juewu). What was so-called 'identity,' in reality, is something out of one's control. This is because the one who had the [Japanese] 'identity' had in return to 'admit' that it was done only on the surface. In terms of objective or mental conditions, there were certainly gaps between expectation and reality. I myself, however, did not identify with the Japanese. No, I have never had 'double identities'—this was not a question for me, either before or after the

35. Reply from Mr. Xu (Fenglin, Hualian), in Cai, 1993b.
36. Reply from Mr. Gao (Madou, Tainan), in Cai, 1993b.
37. Reply from Mr. Jian (Dalun, Jiayi), in Cai, 1993b.
38. Reply from Mr. Yang (Xiho, Zhanghua), in Cai, 1993b.
"Retrocession!" (37)

"I am a Taiwanese, not a Japanese, and not a Chinese. I, nonetheless, feel inclined toward China." (38)

"No Taiwanese identified with the Japanese. Taiwanese are Taiwanese; how could they become Japanese?" (39)

"I did not identify myself as a Japanese. I preferred to think of myself as a Taiwanese--both before and after the war. I have never had any identity crisis." (40)

"I was still young during the Japanese era. At that time, I had no idea at all what China was, not to mention who the Chinese were. I only knew that I was a Taiwanese, ruled by the Japanese." (41)

"Being born at the period of Japanese occupation, having received Japanese education, and having served at the Japanese government (Penghu prefectural government), I did identify myself as a Japanese at that time. However, my father and grandfather's generations did miss the time when Taiwan was ruled by the Qing and they felt repulsed by the oppression of the Japanese government. It was only after the retrocession--and after learning more about Chinese culture--that I came to understand China and to be proud of being a Chinese." (42)

"During the period of Japanese occupation, I considered myself a Taiwanese. I did not know of the fact that I am a Chinese. Having received Japanese education, I have never had any identity problem at all." (43)

"Born at the time of Japanese rule, I hardly ever thought of the question as to what my identity was. I only came to understand colonial policies gradually." (44)

"A Taiwanese is always a Taiwanese; it is not to be identified as a Japanese.

40. Reply from Mr. Chen (Puyan, Zhanghua), in Cai, 1993b.
41. Reply from Lin (Daxi, Taoyuan), in Cai, 1993b.
42. Reply from Mr. Guo (Magong, Penghu), in Cai, 1993b.
43. Reply from Mr. Lu (Taizhong City), in Cai, 1993b.
44. Reply from Mr. Zhang (Yanshui, Tainan), in Cai, 1993b.
But during wartime, this situation seems to have been changed somewhat, at least for some people. The hoko agents and the people [who did change their identities] seemed to feel embarrassed if confronted with the question of identity with the Japanese." (45)

"I identified myself as a Taiwanese. Taiwan was a Japanese colony, but the difference was only discrimination, and even this was ended during the war. The Japanese promoted governmental employees by ability and loyalty; I understood this very well since I served in the prefectural government at that time." (46)

"Some Taiwanese had double identities at that time. But, identity crisis as a term was never heard of around the Tainan area. The term 'Taiwanese,' by the way, should be corrected to 'islanders' (hontōjin)." (47)

"I considered myself a Taiwanese ruled by the Japanese." (48)

"I consider myself a Taiwanese. We were not called Chinese at that time." (49)

"Both in the Japanese era and in the Nationalist era, I have consistently felt that 'I am a Taiwanese.' This was due to governmental policies of two different periods. Household registers [of the Japanese era] recorded origins of ancestors, and this unintentionally implied to me that I was from China. The Japanese discriminated against us, but after the Retrocession, the Chinese also despited us as having received enslaved education. Was that a mistaken conception?" (50)

"I never considered myself a Japanese during the Japanese era and, for that reason, I never changed my name [into Japanese]. I lived a Taiwanese-style life at home, and spoke Japanese at work. There were few Japanese around (only

45. Reply from Mr. Xue (Yichu, Jiayi), in Cai, 1993b.
46. Reply from Mr. Lin (Wuri, Taizhong), in Cai, 1993b.
47. Reply from Mr. Chen (Shanshang, Tainan), in Cai, 1993b.
48. Reply from Mr. Chen (Zhunan, Xinzhu), in Cai, 1993b.
49. Reply from Mr. He (Taizhong City), in Cai, 1993b.
50. Reply from Mr. Zeng (Jiaxian, Gaoxiong), in Cai, 1993b.
51. Reply from Mr. Huang (Hualian City), in Cai, 1993b.
two) : thus I had no conscious awareness of Japanese (naichijin) vs. Taiwanese. I was glad to see the retrocession of Taiwan from Japan. However, since January 1946, I began to feel victimized. I hate the mainlanders." (51)

"The problem of 'double identities' was not particular—everyone had that problem at that time, even the Japanese. This had to do with one's occupational and educational opportunities, and had nothing to do with one's nationality or personality. By the way, there was no such a term as 'double identities,' and identity crisis refers to confrontation with China, not Japan! This was, after all, a contributing factor of the February Twenty-eighth Incident!" (52)

"I grieve over the disorder of today's Taiwan. Discrimination against the Taiwanese was greatly ameliorated during wartime. Today's Taiwan lags behind Japan a lot!" (53)

"I have never identified myself as a Japanese; neither did my parents. Even if one did wish to be a Japanese, the Japanese would not have accepted him. ... Taiwanese are Taiwanese. I can never identify myself as a Chinese." (54)

"During the period of Japanese rule, I identified myself as a Chinese : this was what I was taught at home. While in school, I was suspected by the Japanese as being politically and intellectually subversive. After the Retrocession, I was regarded by the mainlanders as an enslaved foreigner, politically unreliable and intellectually inferior. How sad for the Taiwanese!" (55)

"It is no use to talk about this now! How happy were we at the time of the retrocession! And now see the disorder and corruption of the society [today]! See how we earned our way to victory and how it turned out now! See how the defeated stood up again today!" (56)

"Japanese discriminated against Taiwanese, so it is hard to say that [I] identified with the Japanese. Then did I identify with the Chinese? The answer is

52. Reply from Mr. ? (Jiadong, Pingdong?), in Cai, 1993b.
53. Reply from Mr. Lai (Tongluo, Miaoli), in Cai, 1993b.
54. Reply from Mr. Cai (Fangliao, Pingdong), in Cai, 1993b.
55. Reply from Mr. ? (? , Taipei), in Cai, 1993b.
56. Reply from Mr. Zhang (Gukeng, Yunlin), in Cai, 1993b.
'No!' China has been in disorder for the past hundred years and, like the Japanese, they are not like us. Certainly Taiwanese will identify themselves as Taiwanese, so long as they have a chance to become their own masters in the future. After several hundred years of struggle, Taiwanese have developed their own unique national characteristics, culture, and ethnic group.” (57)

4. FROM REINVOKED TO REINVENTED

In the past decade, a more open political environment has contributed to an ever-increasing interest in the history of Taiwan. These developments, in turn, began to challenge earlier scholarship, generating interpretations of a complex and often contradictory nature, including evaluations of the Nationalist government and, by extension, of the issue of national identity. (Phillips, 1994:2)

The strong and persistent concern over the future of Taiwan was basic to my discussion of the identity issue. This problem is most acute in the political dimension, but in more specific areas--from literature and arts, to political culture, moral values, and daily lives--every aspect of Taiwan's culture reflects the uncertainty and anxiety of Taiwan's political culture today (Harrell and Huang, 1994:4):

Taiwan's legal and national status is a good starting point, for if Taiwan is beyond question legitimately the territory of Nationalist China, then there is little point in discussing the issue further. ... The precise status is still unclear. China's position was strengthened by the Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943, which inaccurately stated that "All territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China." This was a declaration of intent, and was not legally binding. Yet nothing has ever been done since to make it legal in terms of international law. The Potsdam Proclamation of July 26, 1945, confirmed that the terms of the Cairo Declaration would be implemented. The occasion on which the problem should have been settled was the signing of the Japanese Peace

57. Reply from Mr. ? (Taizhong City?), in Cai, 1993b.
Treaty at San Francisco in 1951. But neither Communist nor Nationalist China signed this treaty. In any case, the treaty did not specifically transfer title of the island to China. It merely renounced Japanese sovereignty over Taiwan. (Uhalley, 1969:164, 169)

This kind of political flux poses questions on "what Taiwanese meant." The historical disruption after 1895 inevitably resulted in the tension between cultural identity and political identity in Taiwan. Since modern Chinese nationalism involved both cultural identity and political identity, this would mean that Postwar Taiwan has been constantly situated in a tension of two diametrically opposed forces. (Huang, 1994:3, 9, 17, 22)

The emergence of a distinctly Taiwanese national consciousness in the postwar years has thus raised the question of a "Taiwanese nationalism." (Meisner, 1963:91) Much of the discourse on Taiwanese nationalism, however, depends upon the belief in cultural distinctiveness:

The argument that cultural difference equals ethnic difference equals national difference goes virtually unchallenged, disputes about cultural difference implicitly or explicitly turn into disputes about political unity or separation. But more than that, such disputes are an integral part of "Taiwan’s Quest for Identity." (Harrell and Huang, 1994:13)

The quest for a unique "Taiwan identity," and for that matter also for a "Taiwanese identity," began in the mid-1970s, stepped up in response to the increased diplomatic isolation of Taiwan, and developed simultaneously with the rise of the non(-KMT) party (dangwai) movement.

Claiming that Taiwan did indeed have an identity different from that of the rest of China which extended beyond the usual dialect, cuisine, folkways, etc., opened the Pandora’s Box of the island’s political future; that is, if Taiwan was not just another Chinese province, then what legitimacy did the mainlander-KMT regime have to continue to maintain two distinct governments for one island, monopolizing power over the much stronger "central" government? Likewise, what right did the PRC have to claim the island? And, by extension, could either regime claim Tibet, Sinking (Xinjiang), Mongolia, or other regions with potential separatist tendencies? By implication, if it could be shown that Taiwan had
a distinct identity, then the island's political structure should be overhauled to reflect this. · · · This began to occur as people on Taiwan became aware of their own strength vis-à-vis the increasingly inhibited and vulnerable KMT party-state, of Taiwan's fragile international existence and of the vast difference between Taiwan's historical experience and that of the rest of China. As millions of islanders--Taiwanese and mainlanders--began to visit the mainland after 1987, the concept of a Taiwanese identity began to expand. (Gold, 1994:59)

In this way, the identity issue places the Japanese legacy into the context of constant academic debate and political justification. It could be turned into a tool of criticism or transformed into an issue of legitimacy.

If the people of Taiwan still considered themselves Chinese in 1895, as studies of most of the early Republic of Taiwan come to conclude (Meisner, 1963:93-94), then it was the half-century of Japanese rule that prepared the road for the divorce of political identity from cultural identity in the postwar era. Japanese rule and its legacy, however, did not entirely invalidate the Chinese claim. The mainlanders who came to take the place of the Japanese after World War II consequently formed an entire superstructure of government. It was this political structure that changed the picture of postwar Taiwan tangibly as history evolved.

For one thing, the distinction between the mainlanders and Taiwanese was greatly sharpened by the fifty years of Japanese rule in Taiwan.

In ruling Formosa the Japanese played very much the same role that European colonial regimes played in other areas of Asia in the era before the Second World War. The period of Japanese colonial rule saw the establishment of an effective centralised administration for the first time in Formosa's history, the creation of an economic structure that was significantly different from that on the mainland, the disintegration of the older forms of communal social life and the emergence of a Formosan middle class. (Meisner, 1963:95)

But the Japanese contribution to Taiwan--and to the distinction between Taiwan and mainland China--is not to be measured in economic terms alone.
Thanks to the Japanese, Taiwan emerged also as China's most literate province. ... This is a significant distinction, but it is perhaps less crucial than the psychological gulf that had developed. This gap was caused primarily by Taiwan's isolation from the momentous development of Chinese nationalism which was occurring on the mainland in the twentieth century. ... Taiwan was protected from a headier appreciation of these positive psychological developments by its Japanese colonial rulers. Of course, the Taiwanese were also spared the tortured travail of China--the chaos and confusion of the warlords, the civil war, the worst of the war of resistance, and the results of the stagnation and corruption of the once revolutionary Nationalist government that lost its elan, vigor, and purpose in World War II. Thus, even though Taiwan may have been more advanced economically and in terms of literacy than the mainland, it was decidedly less nationalistic, at least as far as a significant portion of the population was concerned. ... This would prove to be a practiced quality of mind that would be required long after the Japanese left the island. (Uhalley, 1969:167-168)

Taiwan was in this way beginning to emerge as a cultural entity; at least by the 1920s, Taiwan as a geographical term was becoming identical with Taiwan as a political term. (Wu, 1992:5) Wu Micha of Taiwan University has argued that wartime mobilization and the Japanization Movement both served to help build a kind of paradoxical national building" (nishuo di guomin chuangzao), in the same way the Sino-Japanese War did to China. (Wu, 1992:6) This is a good point await further explication; Dai Guohui of Rikkyō University also deliberated on the historical evolution of this paradoxical identity." (Dai, 1994: 22-28) Wu went further to conclude that:

Japanese colonial rule and, moreover, the discriminating policies carried out by the Government-General, served to pave the way for the formation of a "self-group identity ready to accept challenges" (yingzhan shi di wozu rentong), which was fundamental to the development of a responsive nationalism. (Wu, 1992:5)
5. CONCLUSION

Even though the Japanese language is remembered and used, to a degree, the Japanese way of life and thought, if it was ever instilled, seems to have passed. There remains a rather nostalgic memory of the good old prewar colonial days. ... This memory seems largely a product of wistfulness for the uncomplicated days of one's youth, when Taiwan was as remote from the cold war as it was from the day's headlines.

This was a field report written by Willard A. Hanna of American Universities Field Staff in 1956. (Hanna, 1956:8) Nearly forty years later, Dai Guihui commented:

We often see problems and the world via the "Japanese language" and "Japanese-style way of thinking"--this is what needs to be self-examined and soul-searched. (Dai, 1994:112)

A harsher remark came from Patricia Tsurumi, author of a classic work on education in colonial Taiwan (Tsurumi, 1977):

Ultimately the damage is greater when the rift appears less formidable; acceptance of the values of the colonizer is far more dangerous than exclusion from them. In short, as Alastas has said, colonialism's most deadly gift may be the "captive mind." During the heyday of formal colonialism this mentality both weakened the will to resist foreign rule and shaped the anti-colonial struggles. Cultural imperialism became exceedingly powerful when those who fought against colonialism not only negotiated and collaborated with the enemy but, unconsciously or otherwise, actually emulated the enemy. (Tsurumi, 1980:2-3)

All of these comments are simply observations or interpretations of historical events; they fail to grasp the complexity of the mental and post-colonial dimension of the colonized, even though Tsurumi did mention the "mental captivity" (or the "captive mind.")

Indeed, most Taiwanese did not always think too unkindly of their departing Japanese rulers, although many a Taiwanese did not find it difficult to muster
A few Taiwanese people possess Japanese mentality; quite many favor Japanese rule, in comparison with Nationalist rule. Such a mentality exerted influences of various degree toward the February Twenty-eighth Incident, Taiwan Independent Movement, and political development in the past four decades in Taiwan. Besides, in the course of the long anti-Japanese past, some of the Taiwanese people have cultivated a strong "Taiwan consciousness" (Taiwan yishi), which is combative and subjective in nature. The unpleasant mainland experience of a minority of them also contributes to the formation of the so-called "orphan mentality" (guer yishi)—without reliance or dependence, an orphan can not but become independent. These two factors in a certain degree helped to shape the convergence of a Taiwanese consciousness and the development of the Taiwan Independent Movement. ... Hencewith, historical experience has once and again been enhanced by political contestations, thereby repeated and spread it widely. This then is interacting with political, social, and cultural changes of the reality, forcing the Taiwanese people to confront their identity crisis. (Yin, 1988:45)

This "orphan mentality" pretty much catches and reflects the complexity and interaction of a Taiwanese identity.


Political complaints are most often couched in terms of economic hardship or social discrimination rather than purely "democratic" aspirations. (Mendel, 1964:15)

This statement contains some grain of truth, of course. For a people of improved economy and living standards, however, political awareness and aspirations remain high on the "democratic" agenda.

This leads my discussion to the targeted question: did the Taiwanese ident-
ity remain the same before and after the colonial period? How did historians apply an identity concept (or model) to the history of Taiwan? Harry J. Lamley of Hawaii University has just begun to study this issue. (Lamley, 1994)

Finally, the elders would evaluate the postwar Nationalist government based on the criteria of the Japanese colonial era.

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VOCABULARY

baojia 保甲
dangwai 黨外
gaowan lilun 習丸理論
gongsheng 共生
guer yishi 孤兒意識
heiyaku shoki 兵役書記
hoko 保甲
hontōjin 本島人
hosei 保正
juewu 覺悟
kōgakko 公學校
kominka 皇民化
mingyun 命運
naichijin 內地人
nishuo di guomin chuangzao 逆說的國民創造
Taiwan lishi qingjie 台灣歷史情結
Taiwan yishi 臺灣意識
Taiwanjie 臺灣結
Tangshan 唐山
wofen yishi 我奮意識
yingzhan shi di wozu rentong 應戰式的我族認同
Zhongguojie 中國結
zili 自立
zuxi 族系
台灣認同 - 回憶、籲求、與編造：
台灣耆老問卷調查分析(1992-94)

中文摘要

蔡慧玉

中文關鍵字：台灣認同、記憶、問卷。
英文關鍵字：Taiwanese identity、recollection、questionnaire。

本文研究的對象是自日本時代走過來而仍活躍於地方基層的一群特定台灣人。此研究主要係根據我在一九九二年十一月到一九九四年二月間所做的問卷調查結果而分析的。受訪者大多是在七十到九十年齡層的耆老，這些人或多或少曾經（或仍然）置身於地方行政或從事地方公務。問卷名單基本上是根據一九九0年台灣省文獻委員會所編的一份全島性（台北市和高雄市除外）耆老名冊。

今日的台灣人民如何認同他們自己？他們的台灣認同究竟如何切入中國認同？台灣認同以何種方式翻譯轉化？又如何被喚起？甚或再編造？

台灣認同是歷史創造上的一項妥協，但也是一個原動力。

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