Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/18797
標題: 員工認股選擇權與企業未來經營績效及公司價值之關聯性
The Relationship of Employee Stock Options between Corporate Future Performance and Firm Value
作者: 陳智仁
Ren, Chen-Chih
關鍵字: Employee Stock Options
員工認股選擇權
Fair Value
Intrinsic Value
Modified Black-Scholes
Compensation Costs
公平價值法
內含價值法
修正式Black-Scholes
酬勞費用
出版社: 會計學研究所
引用: 參考文獻 一、中文部分 會計研究發展基金會-財務會計準則委員會財務會計問題研議小組,2003,員工認股選擇權解釋函-「員工認股選擇權之會計處理」,發文字號:(92)基秘字第04號。 會計研究發展基金會-財務會計準則委員會財務會計問題研議小組,2004,員工認股選擇權解釋函-「員工認股選擇權之會計處理疑議處理」,發文字號:(92)基秘字第205號。 劉正田。民國91年。「無形資產、成長機會與股票報酬關係之研究」。會計評論第35期。頁 1-29。 王文宇。民國87年。「員工認股選擇權配套制度與相關法規設計芻議」。會計研究月刊。第153 期。頁14-22。 潘奎佑(2002) 。企業中高階經理人現金紅利、股票紅利及認股選擇權之激勵效果研究—以積體電路產業為例。東吳大學企業管理學系未出版碩士論文。 洪玉婷(2001) 。高階經理人員工認股權的設計與評價。台灣大學財務金融學系未出版碩士論文。 葉京怡(2000) 。員工最適激勵契約設計—股票與股票選擇權之應用。政治大學國際貿易學系未出版碩士論文。 廖芝嫻。民國90年。「智慧資本與經營績效關聯之實證研究:以我國資訊電子業技術人力資本為例」。國立政治大學會計學系未出版碩士論文。 梁証揚。民國89年。「人力支出與價值攸關性之研究」。中原大學會計學系未出版碩士論文。 二、西文部分 Aboody, D., 1996, “Market Valuation of employee stock options,” Journal of Accounting and Economics , 22 ,pp.357-391. Anderson, M., Banker, R., and S. Ravindran, 2000, “Executive Compensation in the Information Technology Industry,” Management Science, Vol.46 (4), pp.530-547. Amir, E. and B. Lev., 1996, “Value-relevance of non-financial information: The wireless communication industry,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol.22 ,pp.3-30. Barth, M., and G. Clinch., 1998, “Revalued financial, tangible, and intangible assets : Associations with share prices and non market-based estimates,” Journal of Accounting Research,Vol.36(3) ,pp.199-233. Bell, T. B., W. R. Landsman, B. L. Miller, and Shu Yeh., 2002, “ The valuation implications of employee stock option accounting for profitable computer software firms,” The Accounting Review , 77(4), pp.971-996. Brian J Hall and Kevin J Murphy, 2000, “Optimal Exercise Price for Risk Averse Executives,” American Economic Review ,May ,pp.209-214. Black, F., and M. Scholes, 1973, “The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities,” Journal of Political Economy, pp.637-654. Bens, D. A., Nagar, V., Skinner, D. J., M H Franco Wong, 2002 ,“Real Investment Implications of Employee Stock Option Exercises Discussion” Journal of Accounting Research, Chicago, Vol. 40(2), pp. 359-394. Chen, Y. R., 2004, “Executive Stock Options, Risk Taking, and Performance,” Working Paper, Institute of Finance and Banking, National of Cheng Kung University. Cliffard W. Smith, JR. and Jerold L. Zimmerman, 1976, “Valuing Employee Stock Option Plans Using Option Pricing Models,” Journal of Accounting Research,Autumn, pp.357-364. Conyon, M. and R. Freeman, 2000, “Shared Models of Compensation and Firm Performance: UK Evidence,” Unpublished Working Paper, University of Pennsylvania and London School of Economics. Dechow P.M., and R.G. Sloan. “Executive Incentives and the Horizon Problem”, 1991, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 14,pp.51-89. Defusco, Richard. A., Robert. R Johnson and Thomas S.Zorn. 1990. The effect of executive stock option plans on stockholders and bondholders. The Journal of Finance:617-627. Griner, E. H., 1996 , “Stock option compensation, CEO pay, and corporate performance:A board-level perspective,” Journal of managerial issues, Vol.8 (2),pp.143-153. Huddart, S., and M. Lang, 1996, “Employee Stock Options Exercises:An empirical analysis,” Journal of Accounting and Economic, pp.5-43. Lamber, Richard A., David F Larcker and Robert E Verrecchia. 1991. Portfolio consideration in valuing executive compensation. Journal of Accounting Research 29(1),pp.129-149. Liang, Nellie, and Steven A. Sharpe, 1999, “Share Repurchase and Employee Stock Options and their implications for S&P 500 Share Retirements and Expected Returns” ,Essay from Federal Reserve Board. Lewellen, W., C. Loderer, K. Martin and G. Blum,1992, “Executive compensation and the performance of the firm,” Managerial and Decision Economics, 13,pp.65-74. Larcker, D.F. 1983, “The Association Between Performance Plan Adoption and Corporate Capital Investment,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 5,pp.3-30. Lev, B., and T. Sougiannis, 1996, “The capitalization, amotization and value relevance of R&D,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol.21, pp.107-138. Mehran, H., 1995, “Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance,” Jounal of Financial Economics, Vol.38 (2), pp.163-184. Ohlson, J. A, 1995, “Earnings, book values, and dividends in security valuations,” Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol.11, NO.2, pp.661-687. Ofek, E., and D. Yermack, 1999, “Taking Stock: Equity-Based Compensation and Evolution of Managerial Ownership,” Working Paper. Sesil, J., Kroumova, M., Kruse, D., and J. Blasi, 2000, “Broad-Based Employee Stock Options in the U.S: Company Performance and Characteristics,” Unpublished Working Paper, Rutgers University. Wayne, John, E.C., R.G., 2001. Stock option plans for non-executive employees. Journal of Financial Economics Amsterdam 61(2), pp.253-287. Weygandt, Jerry J., 1977, “Valuation of Stock Option Contracts,” The Accounting Rewivw, Vol. LLI, No. I. Yermack, D., 1995, “Do corporations award CEO stock options effectively?” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 39 (2), pp. 237-269.
摘要: 員工認股選擇權價值費用化之會計處理,已於民國93年1月1日開始適用,其可選擇之會計方法有「公平價值法」與「內含價值法」。惟選擇「內含價值法」之企業須額外揭露採「公平價值法」處理之擬制性資訊。在實務上,絕大多數的企業皆以「內含價值法」處理,係因發行人募集與發行有價證券處理準則規定與績效考量之動機,使得員工認股選擇權的價值為零,而酬勞費用亦為零,此明顯違反一般公認會計原則之精神。因此,本研究乃選擇以「公平價值法」為處理員工認股選擇權相關交易的方法,並以修正式 Black-Scholes模型評估員工認股選擇權的價值。本文在現存文獻上係首度以國內有發行員工認股選擇權之上市上櫃公司為研究對象,依公平價值法推算其員工認股選擇權價值並攤銷其酬勞費用,以探討員工認股選擇權之價值與經營績效及企業價值之關聯性。 實證結果發現:首先,員工認股選擇權之價值與企業未來經營績效具有顯著正向相關性。這表示投資人與員工認為企業將員工認股選擇權價值費用化有助於提昇企業未來的經營績效。再者,員工認股選擇權價值與企業價值亦呈顯著正向相關,表示投資人認為員工認股選擇權為企業之無形資產,可為企業創造更高的市場價值。最後,本研究之評價模型分別比較採用「公平價值法」與採用「內含價值法」且不揭露員工認股選擇權相關資訊兩種會計處理方法,其對公司價值的影響。結果顯示員工認股選擇權以「公平價值法」處理,其權益帳面值對企業價值更具有解釋力。
The accounting treatments for Employee Stock Options (ESO) in Taiwan have clearer regulations since from January 1 2004. Companies have choices between either adopting ‘Fair Value Method' (FVM hereafter) or the ‘Intrinsic Value Method' (IVM hereafter), firms adopting the latter one are required to disclose pro forma information under the FVM accounting treatments. In practices, most enterprises employ the IVM, however, due to the ‘Regulations Governing the Offering and Issuance of Securities by Securities Issuers' and the consideration of earnings performance, the values of ESO are usually zero, so are the compensation costs. This obviously violates the regulations in the GAAP. Therefore, this paper attempts to revert the IVM used commonly in practice for the publicly traded companies in Taiwan by replacing the accounting method with FVM, and further examines its impact on corporate future performance and firm values. The values of the options are calculated by the modified Black-Scholes Valuation Model. This paper is so far the first one among the extant literature to investigate the relation between ESO under FVM and corporate performance as well as firm values. The empirical results indicate that, first of all, the value of ESO is significantly and positively associated with corporate future performance. This suggests that investors and the employees of companies consider accounting for ESO under the FVM, i.e., expensing the value of ESO, can greatly enhance companies' future earnings. Moreover, the study also finds that the values of ESO are significantly and positively related to firm values. The result indicates that investors consider the value of ESO a form of intangible assets, and hence is able to create higher market values in the future. Finally, this paper compares the effect of different accounting methods on firm values - the FVM and the IVM without disclosing ESO relevant information. The empirical result shows that the book values have higher explanatory power on firm values under the FVM accounting treatments.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/18797
其他識別: U0005-1107200621245100
文章連結: http://www.airitilibrary.com/Publication/alDetailedMesh1?DocID=U0005-1107200621245100
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