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The Association between Nontradable Share Reform and Financial Reporting Quality in China
Key words: Full Circulation Reforms(FCR)
Quality of Accounting Information
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|摘要:||本研究主要目的想瞭解中國股權分置改革是否會影響上市公司的會計資訊品質。中國近20年來中國經濟發展快速，為了募集市場資金與改善國有企業的體質，在1990年起中國開始建立證券市場，同時進行國有企業私有化改革，將部分中大型國有企業透過證券市場方式上市，因中國政府是統治化集權國家，採用的是計畫額度管理，把上市公司的股票區分為為不可流通股(non-tradable shares)與流通股(tradable shares)，此即為「股權分置」措施。這種對公司「股權分置」的獨特安排，一般經濟學人稱為「社會主義的市場經濟」。
然而，中國與先進的歐美國家相比其體制尚未成熟亦不夠完善，且中國的占地廣大，各地區域發展不一致性，地方政府往往能夠控制地方經濟、資本市場和法律環境。此外，國有政府的股份在股權改革後，在市場上的流通仍受阻，亦即國有企業並未完全的私有化而持續控制在政府(中央或地方政府)或委任的官僚體系手中，而過去國有企業與地方政府官僚互相勾結、官官相護情形嚴重，無法藉由股權分置改革達到改善公司治理的情況。因此，本研究探討中國股權分置改革(Reforms of Nontradable Shares，簡稱RNS)對於公司會計資訊的品質(價值攸關性、盈餘品質)是否有顯著的影響? 同時深入探討，上市公司的內部治理結構與各省份所處組織環境，在改革前後，是否也會對公司的會計資訊品質有不同程度的影響?並能進一步建議中國政府當局在進行股權分置改革後，也能推定完善的法律組織及推動國有企業私有化。
China's stock market has seen rapid progress in recent years. In the start 1990 when the securities market was just established in China, conditions for public trade of all equity shares of listed companies on stock exchanges were immature, due to issues relating to equity shares owned by state-owned enterprises. The pre-2005 Chinese capital market is characterized with a unique feature of having two classes of shares with the same voting and dividend rights coexisting with one class being tradable and nontradable. The split share structure evolved during China's transition from a regulatory economy to a market economy where the government raised capital to finance expansion through the privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOE) but retained control of the SOE by introducing non-tradable shares. The “socialist-market economy”, is a mixture of free enterprise and state planning and control. However, the presence of the split share structure created valuation and liquidity problems for the semi-government owned publicly listed companies undermining the development of the Chinese capital market. The split share structure also distorts the valuation mechanisms with non-tradable shares based on net asset value (NAV) while tradable shares are based on market determined share price. Therefore, the split-share structure of listed companies has caused many adverse consequences to China's securities market, i.e., the lower price of non-tradable shares, the conflicts between non-tradable and tradable shareholder, and anomalies of IPOs underpricing and cash dividend paying behavior.To address these concerns, Chinese government launched full circulation reforms of non-tradable shares (RNS) of listed companies on 29 April 2005.Until new, about 99% listed companies have reformed to their non-negotiable shares. However, the institutional features of China, for instance, a state-dominant shareholding structure, dominant government power over external monitoring and market, and inadequate legal system, also give rise to distorted corporate behavior. Furthermore, after the FCR reforms, the authorities do not float state-owned shares on the market and still control the trading of the equity shares of state-owned enterprises. If government is still interfering with capital market, it is doubtful whether the FCR reform can be effective in improving Quality of Accounting Information. We will investigate if the FCR reform has significant impacts on accounting Information value-relevant and earnings quality. In addition, we will also examine if a firm's internal governance structure and external environment has differential influence on quality of accounting information in the pre- and post-FCR periods. The empirical result is divided into two parts.For the value relevance ,the value relevance usually increase after the split share structure reform, but the different shareholders have different effects on the control.Generally speaking, the value relevance of Corporations is better than the state-owned enterprises,the central government-controlled companies is superior to the local Government-controlled companies.When institutional features is better, the higher of the value of relevance. After the split share structure reform, the magnitude of earnings management has increased. For the earnings quality, earnings quality of the Corporations and state-owned enterprises both declined after the split share structure reform; the central government-controlled company earnings quality is better than the local government-controlled company; The earnings quality is poor when institutional features is better.
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