Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/18812
標題: 信用評等與董事會成員特性之關聯性
Relationship between Credit Rankings and Board Member Characteristics
作者: 王宣堡
Wang, Hsuan-Pao
關鍵字: credit rankings
信用評等
board quality
political connection
Ordered Probit
董事會品質
政治連結
Ordered Probit
出版社: 會計學研究所
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摘要: 本研究旨在探討董事會成員特性與公司信用評等是否具有關聯性。綜合過去相關董事會特性等文獻變數,形成單一綜合指標作為董事會品質替代變數,並採用台灣企業信用風險指標(TCRI)予以衡量公司整體信用評等。本研究預期董事會品質越高,公司信用評等越佳;另外特別加入政治連結關係,探討具政治連結關係的董事會,並預期與公司信用評等呈正相關。 本文研究對象是台灣2006年至2010年之上市櫃公司(不含金融保險業)及資料不全之樣本,使用敘述性統計分析、單變量分析、相關性分析和排序性常態機率(Ordered Probit)迴歸進行實證分析。實證結果發現,具有較高品質的董事會與公司信用評等呈顯著負相關及具政治連結董事會與公司信用評等呈顯著正相關,並且模型之整體Likelihood ratio χ2皆達到1%的顯著水準,故整體模型解釋力尚可。表示具有較高品質的董事會及不具政治連結董事會,公司信用評等表現較佳。 本研究發現董事會成員特性與董事會結構皆會影響整體董事會品質,政治連結關係更是未來值得考量董事會品質之研究變數。本研究支持,當我國具備本論文定義之高品質董事會及不具政治連結關係時,確能使公司獲得較佳的信用評等。本研究之發現,可提供主管機關未來訂定相關法令規範時之參考,以強化公司治理環境,提升我國整體競爭力。
The purpose of this paper is to empirically whether the board member characteristics associated with the corporation's credit rankings. We summarize the literature about the board's characteristics to integrated a single indicator to measure the board quality. This paper adopt “Taiwan Corporate Credit Risk Index”(TCRI) to measure the corporation's credit rankings. We predict the board quality is more higher, the credit rankings is more better. Specifically, we consider the connection with political, and predict it's positive related to credit rankings. This study uses data of listed firms in Taiwan for year 2006 to 2010, excluding financial and insurance industries and incomplete data samples. And adopt descriptively statistic analysis, univariate analysis, correlation analysis, and Ordered Probit regressions. The results show that the quality of the board is significantly negative related to credit rankings, and the board have the connection with political is positive related to credit rankings. The model of Likelihood ratio χ2 is significant, so have a fair persuasion in the result. These evidences indicate that if the board with high quality and haven't the connection with political, the credit rankings will be better. This study finds that the board member characteristics and the composition will influence the board quality, and the connection with political will be an important variance in the future to study the board quality. Our empirical evidence support that in Taiwan, the board have high quality and don't have the connection with political, the credit rankings will be better. Results of this study can provide reference for authorities in stipulating relevant laws and regulations in the future to strengthen firm government environment and enhance the overall competitiveness of our nation.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/18812
其他識別: U0005-0806201215292500
文章連結: http://www.airitilibrary.com/Publication/alDetailedMesh1?DocID=U0005-0806201215292500
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