請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/18829
標題: 企業生命週期與法人說明會之關聯性
Firm Life Cycle and Conference Calls
作者: 蔣承哲
Chiang, Cheng-Tse
關鍵字: Conference calls
法人說明會
Firm life cycle
Seasoned equity offerings
Operating cash flow
Analysts'forecasts errors
企業生命週期
營業活動現金流量
現金增資
分析師預測誤差
出版社: 會計學研究所
引用: 金成隆、紀信義和林裕凱,2005,「強制性財務預測與法人說明會關聯性之研究」,管理學報,第22卷第5期,頁629-651。 金成隆、林美鳳和梁嘉紋,2008,「公司治理結構和法人說明會之關聯性」,管理學報,第25卷第2期,頁221-243。 曹壽民、連威豪和劉奕孜,2010,「從企業生命週期探討應計項目異常現象」,會計評論,第51期,頁107-142。 Abarbanell, J. S., W. N. Lanen, R. E. Verrecchiab. 1995. Analysts’ forecasts as proxies for investor beliefs in empirical research. Journal of Accounting and Economics 20(1): 31-60. Adams, R. B., H. Almeida, and D. Ferreira. 2005. Powerful CEOs and their impact on corporate performance. Review of financial studies 18(4): 1403-1432. Anderson, R. C., and D. M. Reeb. 2003. Founding-family ownership and firm performance: evidence from the S&P 500. The Journal of Finance 58(3): 1301-1328. Anthony, H. J., and K. Ramesh. 1992. Association between accounting performance measures and stock prices. Journal of Accounting and Economics 15(2-3): 203-227. Ashbaugh-Skaife, H., D. W. Collins, and R. LaFond. 2006. The effects of corporate governance on firms’ credit ratings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 42(1-2): 203-243. Baik, B., and H. J. Nam. 2009. The effect of regulation fair disclosure on conference calls: the case of earnings surprises. Journal of Financial Studies 38(6): 801-829. Barron, O., C. O. Kile, and T. B. O’Keefe. 1999. MD&A quality as measured by the SEC and analysts’ earnings forecasts. Contemporary Accounting Research 16(1): 75-109. Barton, J., and M. Mercer. 2005. To blame or not to blame: analysts’ reactions to external explanations for poor financial performance. Journal of Accounting and Economics 39(3): 509-533. Beasley, M. 1996. An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud. The Accounting Review 71(4):443-465. Beyer, A. 2008. Financial analysts’ forecast revisions and managers’ reporting behavior. Journal of Accounting and Economics 46(2-3): 334-348. Bhattacharya, N., E. L. Black, T. E. Christensen, and R. D. Mergenthaler. 2007. Who trades on pro forma earnings information? The Accounting Review 82(3): 581-619. Black, E. 1998. Life-cycle impacts in the incremental value-relevance of earnings and cash flow measures. Journal of Financial Statement Analysis 4(1): 40-56. Boone, A. L., L. C. Field, J. M. Karpoff, and C. G. Raheja. 2007. The determinants of corporate board size and composition: an empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 85(1): 66-101. Borokhovich, K. A., K. R. Brunarski, M. S. Donahue, and Y. S. Harman. 2006. The importance of board quality in the event of a CEO death. The Financial Review 41(3): 307-337. Bowen, R. M., A. K. Davis, and D. A. Matsumoto. 2002. Do conference calls affect analysts’ forecasts? The Accounting Review 77(2): 285-316. Bradshaw, M. T., S. A. Richardson, and R. G. Sloan. 2006. The relation between corporate financing activities, analysts’ forecasts and stock returns. Journal of Accounting and Economics 42(1-2): 53-85. Brown, S., S. A. Hillegeist, and K. Lo. 2004. Conference calls and information asymmetry. Journal of Accounting and Economics 37(3): 343-366. Bulan, L., N. Subramanian, and L. Tanlu. 2007. On the timing of dividend initiations. Financial Management 36(4): 31-65. Butler, M., A. Kraft, and I. S. Weiss. 2007. The effect of reporting frequency on the timeliness of earnings: The cases of voluntary and mandatory interim reports. Journal of Accounting and Economics 43(2-3): 181-217. Bushee, B. J., D. A. Matsumoto, and G. S. Miller. 2003. Open versus closed conference calls: the determinants and effects of broadening access of disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Economics 34(1-3): 149-180. Bushee, B. J., D. A. Matsumoto, and G. S. Miller. 2004. Managerial and investor responses to disclosure regulation: the case of Reg FD and conference calls. The Accounting Review 79 (3): 617-643. Call, A. C., S. Chen, and Y. H. Tong. 2009. Are analysts’ earnings forecasts more accurate when accompanied by cash flow forecasts? Review of Accounting Studies 14(2-3): 358-391. Chan, H., R. Faff, Y. K. Ho, and A. Ramsay. 2006. Asymmetric market reactions of growth and value firms with management earnings forecasts. International Review of Finance 6(1-2): 79-97. Chen, S., D. Matsumoto, and S. Rajgopal. 2011. Is silence golden? An empirical analysis of firms that stop giving quarterly earnings guidance. Journal of Accounting and Economics 51(1-2): 134-150. Choi, J. H., L. A. Myers, Y. Zang, and D. A. Ziebart. 2011. Do management EPS forecasts allow returns to reflect future earnings? Implications for the continuation of management’s quarterly earnings guidance. Review of Accounting Studies 16(1): 143-182. Claessens, S., S. Djankov, J. P. H. Fan, and L. H. P. Lang. 2002. Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings. Journal of Finance 57(6): 2741-2771. Clement, M. B., J. Hales, and Y. Xue. 2011. Understanding analysts’ use of stock returns and other analysts’ revisions when forecasting earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 51(3): 279-299. Cohen, D. A., A. Dey, T. Z. Lys, and S. V. Sunder. 2007. Earnings announcement premia and the limits to arbitrage. Journal of Accounting and Economics 43(2-3): 153-180. Cohen, D., R. Mashruwala, and T. Zach. 2010. The use of advertising activities to meet earnings benchmarks: evidence from monthly data. Review of Accounting Studies 15(4): 808-832. Coles, J. L., N. D. Daniel, and L. Naveen. 2008. Boards: Does one size fit all? Journal of Financial Economics 87(2): 329-356. Dahya, J., O. Dimitrov, and J. J. McConnell. 2008. Dominant shareholders, corporate boards, and corporate value: a cross-country analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 87(1): 73-100. DeAngelo, H., L. DeAngelo, R. M. Stulz. 2010. Seasoned equity offerings, market timing, and the corporate lifecycle. Journal of Financial Economics 95(3): 275-295. Duchin, R., J. G. Matsusaka, and O. Ozbas. 2010. When are outside directors effective? Journal of Financial Economics 96(2): 195-214. Fama, E. F., and K. R. French. 1993. Common risk factors in the returns of stocks and bonds. The Journal of Financial Economics 33(1): 3-56. Fich, E. M., and A. Shivdasani. 2006. Are busy boards effective monitor? The Journal of Financial 61(2): 689-724. Francis, J., J. D. Hanna, and D. R. Philbrick. 1997. Management communications with securities analysts. Journal of Accounting and Economics 24(3): 363- 394. Francis, J., K. Schipper, and L. Vincent. 2002. Expanded disclosures and the increased usefulness of earnings announcements. The Accounting Review 77(3): 515–546. Frankel, R., M. Johnson, and D. J. Skinner. 1999. An empirical examination of conference calls as a voluntary disclosure. Journal of Accounting Research 37(1): 133-150. Freeman, R. E. 1984. Strategic management: a stakeholder approach. Boston: Harper Collins. Griffith, J. M. 1999. CEO ownership and firm value. Managerial and Decision Economics 20(1): 1-8 Griffith, J. M., L. Fogelberg, and H. S. Weeks. 2002. CEO ownership, corporate control, and bank performance. Journal of Economics and Finance 26(2): 170-183. Hermalin, B. E., and M. S. Weisbach. 2003. Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: a survey of the economic literature. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Policy Review 9(1): 7-26. Hu, A., and P. Kumar. 2004. Managerial entrenchment and payout policy. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 39(4): 759-790. Jawahar, I. M., and G. L. Mclaughlin. 2001. Toward a descriptive stakeholder theory: an organizational life cycle approach. Academy of Management Review 26(3): 397-414. Jensen, M., and W. H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3(4): 305-360. Kim, O., and R. E. Verrecchia. 1997. Pre-announcement and event-period private information. Journal of Accounting and Economics 24(3): 395-419. Kim, W., and M. S. Weisbach. 2008. Motivations for public equity offers: an international perspective. Journal of Financial Economics 87(2): 281-307. Matsumoto, D. A. 2002. Management''s incentives to avoid negative earnings surprises. The Accounting Review 77(3):483-514. Morck, R., A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny. 1988. Management ownership and market valuation: an empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 20: 293-315. Morellec, E., and N. Schurhoff. 2011.Corporate investment and financing under asymmetric information. Journal of Financial Economics 99(2): 262-288. Myers, S. C., and N. S. Majluf. 1984. Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have. Journal of Finance Economics 13(2): 187-221. Raheja, C. G. 2005. Determinants of board size and composition: a theory of corporate boards. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 40(2): 285-306. Rees, L., and W. Thomas. 2010. The stock price effects of changes in dispersion of investor beliefs during earnings announcements. Review of Accounting Studies 15(1): 1-31. Ruland, W., S. Tung, and N. E. George. 1990. Factors associated with the disclosure of managers’ forecasts. The Accounting Review 65(3): 710-721. Seppänen, H. J. 2000. Discretionary disclosure and external financing in a relationship financing environment. Working Paper. Soffer, L. C., S. R. Thiagarajan, and B. R. Walther. 2000. Earnings preannouncement strategies. Review of Accounting Studies 5(1): 5-26. Su, D. 2004. Corporate finance and state enterprise reform in China. China Economic Review 16(2): 118-148. Tasker, S. C. 1998. Bridging the information gap: quarterly conference calls as a medium for voluntary disclosure. Review of Accounting Studies 3(1-2): 137-167.
摘要: 本文以公司召開法人說明會作為資訊揭露管道,探討在不同企業生命週期下,分析師預測誤差和現金增資融資政策與法人說明會召開頻率的關聯性,並檢視近來日益頻繁的海外法人說明會對投資人的影響。實證結果顯示,自行召開法人說明會與受邀及召開海外法人說明會的累積異常報酬值差異並不顯著,亦即公司受邀及自行於海外召開法人說明會時對投資人的影響並未高於公司在國內自行召開,其中成熟公司受邀及召開海外法人說明會對國內股價波動的影響程度高於成長期公司。當成長期公司的營業活動現金流量愈小,其召開法人說明會的頻率愈多,而成熟期公司營運狀況較穩定且營業活動現金流量較平穩,較不需經由召開法人說明會來獲取資金。公司內部的董事會規模愈大、獨立董事的比例愈高和機構法人持股愈多,則不論公司處於何種生命週期階段,皆會增加召開法人說明會的頻率,以提高公司的資訊透明度。 另外,分析師於當年預測誤差較大時,成熟期公司之法人說明會召開次數較多,故分析師對於年底盈餘預測可較準確於年初對公司的預測,但沒有證據支持分析師能於成長期公司所召開的法人說明會中擷取相關訊息以降低年底的預測誤差。而成熟期公司欲藉由現金增資籌措資金時,較會藉由法人說明會來說明公司的營運狀況和融資政策,但並無證據顯示成長期公司在現金增資前較會召開法說會。最後,當董事會規模愈大、獨立董事席次愈多和機構投資人持股愈多時,公司在現金增資前較會召開法人說明會對外說明公司的相關政策。
This paper uses conference calls as a voluntary disclosure arrangement to explore how the frequency of conference calls is related to analysts' forecast accuracy and seasoned equity offerings under different stages of organizational life cycle. We also examine if there are different effects on stock returns between domestic and overseas conference calls. For overseas conference calls, we consider both the conference calls held voluntarily by the firms and the ones firms are invited to join. The findings are that there are no significant differences in cumulative abnormal returns between domestic and overseas conference calls. However, among those firms who hold overseas conference calls or are invited to join ones, the firms in their maturity stage have larger stock price volatility than the firms in their growth stage. In addition, for firms in their growth stage, the frequency of holding conference calls is negatively related to the operating cash flow. In contrast, firms in their maturity stage are firmly established and have stable operating cash flow so that they have less need to capture capital through holding conference calls. The firms with larger board size, higher independent director ratio, and larger shareholdings of institutional investors, regardless of the stages of the firm's life cycle, are more likely to increase the frequency of holding conference calls to improve information transparency of the firm. Moreover, when the analysts' earnings forecasts have larger errors at the beginning of the year, the firms in their maturity stage would hold more conference calls to help analysts issue more accurate earnings forecasts at the year end. This finding, however, does not apply to the growth firms. We also find that firms in their maturity stage tend to hold conference calls to disclose their policy of operation and financing when they raise additional funds via seasoned equity offerings, but no evidence to support the same arrangement for the growth firms. Finally, the firms with larger board size, higher independent director ratio, and larger shareholdings of institutional investors, tend to hold conference calls to disclose relevant information before SEO.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/18829
其他識別: U0005-1306201109525700
文章連結: http://www.airitilibrary.com/Publication/alDetailedMesh1?DocID=U0005-1306201109525700
顯示於類別:會計學系所

文件中的檔案:
沒有與此文件相關的檔案。


在 DSpace 系統中的文件,除了特別指名其著作權條款之外,均受到著作權保護,並且保留所有的權利。