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標題: 中國上市公司新股發行折價和股利政策之研究:以中國股權分置改革論析
The Research on Initial Public Offer Underpricing and Dividend Policy of Listed Companies in China : The Analysis of Reform of Nontradable Shares
作者: 林政良
關鍵字: Reforms of Non-tradable Shares
Institutional Features
IPO Underpricing
Dividend Policy
出版社: 會計學研究所
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摘要: 從1990年起中國開始建立證券市場,同時進行國有企業私有化改革,將部分中大型國有企業透過證券市場的方式上市,但因中國政府對國有企業股份發行採取的是計畫額度管理,將這些公司的股票區分為非流通股與流通股;而持有非流通股票的股東通常為國有公司或一般法人組織,他們的股票並不允許在證券市場上買賣,因此本研究主要目的欲檢驗中國股權分置改革是否會影響上市公司初次公開發行IPO價格及股利政策。由於「股權分置」扭曲了資本市場的定價機制與流動性,同時大部份上市公司的控制權仍然掌握在國家,故缺乏好的公司治理結構導致私有化後的公司績效普遍不佳。此外,「股權分置」的措施也造成了市場上一些特殊的現象,例如股票初次公開發行IPO價格折價幅度過高或非流通股價格無法正確反映公司績效或非流通股比例較高的上市公司傾向發放較高現金股利以補償控制股東的報酬或管理階層侵佔公司資產等。為了解決股權分置造成證券市場可能缺陷的問題,中國證監會(CSRC)於2005 年9 月4 日發佈了「上市公司股權分置改革管理辦法」(The Measure for the Administration of Full Circulation Reform of Listed Companies),將非流通股票(國有股與非流通法人股)透過法定的程序,給予流通的權利。據中國證監會指出截至目前,完成股權分置改革公司市值佔全體上市公司的比例已達99%。中國政府期望能透過此項改革恢復資本市場的功能,同時解決上述所指市場的缺陷。 由於中國法律環境制度與歐美國家相比並非完善,且中國各省份間的組織環境具有差異性,地方政府往往能夠控制地方的經濟、資本市場和法律環境。此外,國有公司的股份在股權改革後,在市場上的流通仍然受到政府的控制,亦即國有公司尚未完全私有化(total privatization),仍然持續控制在政府(中央或地方政府)或所委任的官僚體系手中,故上市公司能否透過股權分置改革(RNS),達到改善公司治理的情況,實乃一值得深入探究的問題。因此,本研究將探討中國股權分置改革對於公司初次公開發行股票IPO折價和股利政策是否有顯著的影響;同時,進一步深入探討,上市公司的內部治理結構與各省份所處組織環境,在改革前後,是否也會對公司IPO折價和股利政策有不同程度的影響? 實證結果,主要分為兩部分進行探討。股票IPO折價方面,股權分置改革後,整體市場之股票IPO折價幅度有普遍降低,國有公司股票IPO折價幅度也比股權分置改革前來得低。公司股利政策方面,股權分置改革後,整體市場現金股利發放比率確實有下降趨勢,國有公司發放現金股利比率則高於一般法人,而國有公司股利發放比率在股權分置改革後比股權分置改革前來得高。
This research will examine the impact of the reform of nontradable shares on initial public offer (IPO) underpricing and dividend policy of listed companies in China. Nontradable shares (NTS) are an unparalleled feature of the ownership structure of Chinese listed companies and represented a major hurdle to domestic financial market development. Under the split share structure, more than 60% of the share capital is non-tradable shares. Because non-tradable shareholders are not like non-tradable shareholders to be more price conscious, it results in a divergence of interest between non-tradable shareholders and tradable shareholders. Due to the lack of common interest in share price performance between tradable and non-tradable shareholders and the latter still retaining control of the company, these companies are usually poorly governed. In addition, the split share structure also distorts the valuation mechanism with non-tradable shares based on net asset value (NAV) while tradable shares are calculated by market determined share price. Therefore, the split-share structure of listed companies has caused many adverse consequences to China’s securities market, i.e., the lower price of non-tradable shares, the conflicts between non-tradable and tradable shareholder, and anomalies of IPO underpricing and cash dividend paying behavior. After some failed attempts, in 2005 the Chinese authorities have launched a structural reform program aiming at eliminating NTS. Until the end of 2007, about 99% listed companies have reformed to their non-negotiable shares. The authorities expect that the sole aim of RNS reforms is to improve corporate governance at listed firms and the intermediary function of the stock market by giving equal rights to non-tradable and tradable shares. Due to the institutional features in China, i.e., a state-dominant shareholding structure, control government power over external monitoring, and market and legal failures also distort the incentives of corporate behavior (as mentioned above) in capital market. Furthermore, post-RNS, the authorities do not float state-owned shares on the market. If government power still be interfering with capital market, lack a sound legal system or non-negotiable shares remain in the hands of the state even after RNS reforms, we argue that there cannot possibly have any improvement on corporate governance or the intermediary function of the stock market. In order to understand the above notion, we will examine the relationship between the pre- and post- RNS reforms periods and corporate behavior. We will also explore the marginal effect varying across the institutional features or ownership structure and corporate behavior in the pre- and post- RNS reforms periods? The empirical result is divided into two parts. For shares initial public offer (IPO),discount of shares usually decrease after the split share structure reform in capital market,state-owned enterprises (SOE) discount of shares initial public offer (IPO) usually lower than before the split share structure reform。For cash dividend paying behavior,cash dividend paying actually decrease after the split share structure reform in capital market,cash dividend paying of state-owned enterprises (SOE) higher than corporation,state-owned enterprises (SOE) cash dividend paying after the split share structure reform usually higher than before the split share structure reform.
其他識別: U0005-1706201118180000
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