Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/18871
標題: 員工獎酬擬制性費用化對公司經營績效與企業價值之影響
The Links Between Pro forma Compensation Costs and Corporate Performance as well as Firm Values
作者: 葉宗樺
Tsung, Hua-Yeh
關鍵字: Employee Bonuses
員工分紅
Employee Stock Options
Compensation Costs
員工認股選擇權
獎酬費用
出版社: 會計學研究所
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摘要: 有關員工分紅與員工認股選擇權會計處理之新規定已於今年,民國97年1月1日,起開始適用。公司對於員工分紅之會計處理方式以後僅可採用費用化的方式,不能再列為保留盈餘的減項,而員工認股選擇權亦規定採用公平價值法處理。至於過去實務上員工分紅以盈餘分配處理的方式,以及員工認股選擇權採用內含價值法並揭露公平價值法之擬制資訊等皆已成為過去式而步入歷史。這些完全悖離會計精神的酬勞成本處理方式將從此消失於財務報表之中。因此,本研究主要係探討員工獎酬採用會計處理之新規定後對於公司經營績效與企業價值之影響。本研究係首度以整體員工獎酬為研究標的,包含現金紅利、股票紅利與員工認股選擇權,並還原股票紅利與員工認股選擇權之真實公平價值,進而同時探討其與企業未來經營績效與公司價值之關係。 實證結果發現:首先,員工獎酬費用對於公司未來之經營績效具有顯著正向關聯性。這表示企業以費用化為處理員工獎酬成本將有助於提昇企業未來之經營績效。其次,員工酬勞成本與企業價值亦呈現顯著正相關,說明公司將員工獎酬費用認列於損益表中,能提升企業之價值,亦更能表達公司之真實價值。易言之,投資人認為,員工獎酬費用化將有助於提昇財務報表之有用性。
The accounting treatments for employee bonuses and employee stock options (ESOs) in Taiwan are more defined since from January 1 2008. The new accounting regulation mandates companies to recognize the relevant compensation costs as an expense item. This leaves companies the only choice of adopting the Fair Value Method. In the past, employee bonuses were treated as a deduction from retained earnings. Firms usually use Intrinsic Value Method to recognize the value of the ESOs, accompanied by pro-forma data using the Fair Value Method. This has now gone into history. The previous treatments are completely against the spirit of fair value accounting. In this paper, the main research question is to investigate whether the new accounting regulation for employee compensation has any impact on management future performance and firm values. The study is the first of its kind that consider all relevant compensation costs, including cash bonuses, stock bonuses and employee stock options. The research design first create an ‘as-if' compensations costs under the Fair Value Method, then proceed to explore the association between the ‘as-if' compensation costs and future management performance as well as firm values. The empirical evidence finds several interesting results. First, the compensation costs have significant positive impact on management's future performance. This indicates that the new accounting regulation of treating employee bonuses as an expense item can enhance firms' future performance. Second, the compensation costs also have significant and positive association with firm values. This shows that rearrange the compensation costs to Income Statement would increase firms' values and could possibly reflect firms' true values. To sum up, these results implies that the investors would appreciate the new accounting treatment of recognizing employee bonuses as expenses, which would, hence, increase the reliability of financial reports and reduce the cost of different financial reports. Investors are expected to give adequate valuation to firms when managers adopt the new accounting regulations.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/18871
其他識別: U0005-1806200816045900
文章連結: http://www.airitilibrary.com/Publication/alDetailedMesh1?DocID=U0005-1806200816045900
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