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標題: 公司治理機制與智慧資本之關聯性研究
A Study on the Relationship between Corporate Governance and Intellectual Capital
作者: 劉威寰
Liu, Wei-Huan
關鍵字: Corporate governance
Intellectual capital
Ownership structure
Independent director
出版社: 會計學研究所
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摘要: 近年來,國際社會上逐漸提高對公司治理機制的重視,主要原因係亞洲金融風暴與各國知名企業財務舞弊案所暴露企業在內部控制與報表表達具有嚴重的缺陷,進而發現公司治理機制為改善公司經營與未來發展的重要關鍵策略。此外,隨著時代的演進,經濟型態也從過去著重於勞力、土地、資金等傳統有形資產而漸漸轉向重視無形的知識資產,因此,智慧資本成為公司的重要資源在知識經濟時代。在全球如此競爭激烈的環境下,公司若想繼續保持競爭優勢,必須更妥善運用、管理與發展智慧資本以創造更高的公司價值。 一般關於公司治理的研究多著重於治理環境與公司價值和績效之探討,鮮少 討論其與智慧資本之間的關係,而智慧資本卻是公司未來生存發展的關鍵。本研究主要探討股權結構、董事會特性與經營層風險等公司治理特色與智慧資本之關聯,並採複迴歸分析法分析。為更深入瞭解公司治理與智慧資本對公司之影響,本研究另採用結構方程式進行分析。複迴歸與結構方程式的實證結果皆指出外部大股東持股比率、機構投資人持股比率與獨立董監席次比率與智慧資本呈現顯著正向相關;內部人持股比率和董事長兼任總經理與智慧資本則呈現顯著負向相關,表示公司治理機制確實與智慧資本存在顯著正向關聯性。強化公司治理不只可以增加智慧資本,且有助於提升競爭力,並求創造公司長期價值之增長。
As the financial scandals broke out all over the world, the international community has placed a greater weight on the importance of corporate governance in recent years. Corporate governance plays a key role in improving business performance and the future business developmental strategy which leads all countries in the world to start to take strengthening corporate governance as their top priority. In addition, the economic structure has been evolving from focusing on labor, land, capital and traditional tangible assets to intangible knowledge assets. Therefore, intellectual capital has become an important resource for companies in knowledge-base economic era. In the globally competitive environment, the companies should use, manage and develop intellectual capital properly in order to create greater corporate value and to maintain its competitiveness. For the past few decades, there have been plenty of research on corporate governance that place more emphasis on governance mechanism, firm value and performance, rarely has been discussed on the relationship between intellectual capital and corporate governance. Nonetheless as intellectual capital is the key to companies' success, it is vital to investigate at the relation between corporate governance and intellectual capital. This study employs both multiple regression and structural equation model to analyze their association. Empirical results indicated that block holders, institutional investors and independent director have significant positive correlation with intellectual capital, whereas insider shareholding and dual roles of chairman and CEO has significant negative correlation with intellectual capital. Our research suggests that corporate governance is indeed associated with intellectual capital, and that strengthening corporate governance not only enhance intellectual capital, but also reinforce their competitiveness and enhance firm value in the long term.
其他識別: U0005-1806200900112500
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