Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/18886
標題: 在不同生命週期下董事會組成特性對公司經營績效之影響
The Relationship between Characteristics of Board Directors and Firm's Performance : A Test of the Life Cycle Hypothesis
作者: 劉力維
Liu, Li-Wei
關鍵字: Life cycle
生命週期
Characteristics of board directors
Agency theory
Stewardship theory
Resource dependence theory
董事會組成特性
代理理論
管家理論
資源依賴理論
出版社: 會計學研究所
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摘要: 本研究探討在不同的生命週期下,董事會組成特性對公司經營績效是否有不同程度上的影響,以1996年到2007年間台灣上市櫃公司資料進行實證觀察。本文參考Anthony and Ramesh ( 1992 ) 的方法,將銷貨成長率、資本支出率、公司成立年度以及綜合指標做為生命週期判斷因子。 實證結果顯示,企業處於成長階段,董事長兼總經理對公司績效有正向影響,但在成熟與衰退階段,則會不利於公司績效。外部董事比率對於處在成長期之公司績效影響為負向,但並不明顯,而對處於成熟期與衰退期的公司績效則有明顯提升效果。董事規模在各生命週期階段對公司績效均產生不利的效果,尤其在成長期時,負向影響公司績效的情況更為明顯。董事持股比率與公司績效具正向關聯性,在成熟期與衰退期階段,提升公司績效之效果較為明顯。
This study is to investigate the relationship between characteristics of board directors and firm's performance for a differential stage in a firm's life cycle, and the data was collected from various industries listed in the Taiwan stock exchange during 1996-2007. According to the firm's life cycle of Anthony and Ramesh (1992), we use sales growth rate (SG), capital expenditures rate (CEV), establishment years (AGE), and composite score as life cycle descriptors. The empirical results show that the firm's performance is better when the chairman of the board is the CEO in the stage of growth, but in the stage of mature and decline, the chairman of the board is the CEO will harm firm's performance. The external director rate is negatively related to the firm's performance in the stage of growth, but in the stage of mature and decline, which can promote firm's performance significantly. In any stage, the board size is negatively related to the firm's performance, and it has much influence in the stage of growth than in the stage of mature and decline. Finally, the share ownership of directors is positively associated with firm's performance, and in the stage of mature and decline, the effect of promoting firm's performance is more conspicuous.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/18886
其他識別: U0005-2406200922475100
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