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標題: Relationship Banking -Evidence from Global Countries
作者: Chen, Hsiao-Chi
關鍵字: 銀行往來關係
Relationship lending
Multiple- banking
出版社: 企業管理學系所
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摘要: In the era of the globalization, the influence among countries is getting higher and butterfly effects happen all the time. The financial health of a country is closely related to economic stability and this is exactly the reason why financial institutions are strictly controlled by government authorities. This paper is aimed to discuss the effects of nation-wide evidence for the development of politics, finance and economics in view of the opaque information channels between small firm and commercial bank during 1996-2004. Meanwhile, we analyze why firms choose single banking or multiple banking. Finally, we evaluate the competition influences on relationship lending. The empirical results show that: (1) the relationship lending is influenced by the quality of the government management and how many restricts on banking. (2) While concentration of bank industry is getting higher, the company will choose multiple banking; and when the ratio of direct finance is ascending, banks will select relationship lending so that they can make more profit. (3) As a country is threatened by the systemic banking crisis, the economic of a country is too unstable to fund small firms with opaque information channels, and the opportunity of single banking relationship is rising. (4) Small firms prefer to build relationship with few banks so that they can get loan from bank if required. (5) Firms with the primary bank in financial distress are more likely to resort to multiple banking for better protection; however, they probably only care about low interest cost yet ignore the bankruptcy risk of primary bank of BKROEPRIM10%.
其他識別: U0005-0707200616285300
Appears in Collections:企業管理學系所



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