請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/20605
標題: 內部移轉計價與分權組織部門間績效:以時間為導向的ABC制為聯合成本分攤基礎觀點
Intrafirm Transfer Pricing and the Performance between Divisions in the Decentralization Organization:The Viewpoint of Time-Driven ABC System Joint Cost Allocation
作者: Li, Chi-Hoi
李奇鴻
關鍵字: Transfer Price
轉撥價格
Activity-Based Costing System
Time-Driven Activity-Based Costing System
Information Symmetry
Perfect Competition Market
作業基礎成本制
以時間為導向的作業基礎成本制
資訊對稱
完全競爭市場
出版社: 企業管理學系所
引用: 參考文獻 壹、中文部份 鍾慧貞。民國71年。「由行為觀點分析聯合成本分攤與轉撥計價」。國立政治大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。 陳惠玲。民國74年。「資訊不對稱情況下之轉撥計價」。國立政治大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。 郭運華。民國76年。「轉撥計價誘因問題之研究」。國立政治大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。 黃英紳。民國76年。「企業內部轉撥計價之研究」。私立東吳大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。 廖述忠。民國79年。「轉撥計價制度之理論與實務─中油公司之個案研究」。國立政治大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。 吳安妮、劉俊儒、張玉琳。民國82年。「作業基礎成本制之整體內容與未來研究 方向」。會計研究月刊,第96期。 李鴻標。民國83年。「作業楚管理制度之設計與運用-國內製藥廠之個案研究」。國立台灣大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。 張裕任。民國88年。「作業基礎成本制度與轉撥計價」。國立彰化師範大學商業教育學系研究所未出版碩士論文。 張瑜真。民國89年。「利潤中心制度下內部移轉計價方法對效績衡量之影響」。國立台北大學企業管理學研究所未出版碩士論文。 簡珍珍。民國90年。「製鞋業實施責任中心制度之研究-以個案公司為例」。私立中原大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。 林勁廷。民國94年。「時間導向作業基礎成本制度之規劃與設計-以精密鍛鑄業為例」。私立東海大學工業工程與經營資訊研究所未出版碩士論文。 貳、西文部份 Alles, M., and S. Datar, 1998, “Strategy Transfer Pricing,” Management Science, Vol.44, pp.451-461. Anctil, R. M., and S. Dutta, 1999, “Negotiated Transfer Pricing and Divisional versus Firm-Wide Performance Evaluation,” The Accounting Review, Vol.74, pp.87-104. Baldenius, T., 2000, “Intrafirm Trade, Bargaining Power, and Specific Investments,” Review of Accounting Studies, Vol.5, pp.27-56. Baldenius, T., N. D. Melumad, and S. Reichelstein, 2004, “Integrating Managerial and Tax Objectives in Transfer Pricing,” The Accounting Review, Vol.79, pp.591-615. Baldenius, T., S. Reichelstein, and S. A. Sahay, 1999, “Negotiated versus Cost-Based Transfer Pricing,” Review of Accounting Studies, Vol.4, pp.67-91. Brimson, J., 1991, Activity Accounting: An Activity-Based Costing Approach, New York, John Wiley & Sons Inc. Colbert, G. J., and B. H. Spicer, 1998, “Linking Activity-Based Costing and Transfer Pricing for Improved Decisions and Behavior,” Journal of Cost Management, Vol. 11, pp.20-26. Escles, R. G., 1985, The Transfer Pricing Problem: A Theory for Practice, Lexington Books. Escles, R. G., and H. C. White, 1988, “Price and Authority in Inter-Profit Center Transactions,” American Journal of Sociology, Vol.94, Supplement, pp.17-51. Harris, M., C. H. Kriebel, and A. Raviv, 1982, “Asymmetric Information, Incentives and Intrafirm Resource Allocation,” Management Science, Vol.28, pp.604-620. Hirshleifer, J. J., 1956, “On the Economics of Transfer Pricing,” Journal of Business, Vol.19, pp.172-184. Horngren, C. T., G. Foster, and S. M. Datar, 1996, Cost Accounting, A Managerial Emphasis. Ninth Edition. Prentice-Hall International, Inc. Kanodia, C., 1979, “Risk Sharing and Transfer Price Systems under Uncertainty,” Journal of Accounting Research, Vol.17, pp.74-98. Kaplan, R. S., and S. R. Anderson, 2003, Time-Driven Activity-Based Costing, Harvard Business School Press, Boston. Merchant, K. A., 1989, Rewarding Results: Motivating Profit Center Managers, Boston: Harvard Business School Press. Price Waterhouse, 1984, Transfer Pricing Practices of American Industry, New York. Shelanski, H. A., 1993, Transfer Pricing and the Organization of Intrafirm Exchange, Unpublished dissertation, U.C. Berkeley. Li, S. H., and K. R. Balachandran, 1997, “Optimal Transfer Pricing Schemes for Work Averse Division Managers with Private Information,” European Journal of Research, Vol.98, pp.138-153. Ross, S. A., 1973, “The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal’s Problem,” American Economic Association, Vol.63, pp.134-139. Vaysman, I., 1996, “A Model of Cost-Based Transfer Pricing,” Review of Accounting Studies, Vol.1, pp.73-108. ╴, I., 1998, “A Model of Negotiated Transfer Pricing,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol.25, pp.349-384. Wells, M. C., 1968, Profit Centers, Transfer Prices, and Mysticism, Abacus (December), pp.174-181.
摘要: The purpose of this research is to investigate the decentralization enterprise. How are the transfer-out division and the transfer-in division affected by common operation cost and budgeted total activity time? How do the transfer-out division and the transfer-in division make an optimal transfer price, inducing division managements to work in the best of enterprise? In order to weigh the performance of every decentralization unit accurately and rationally. The model assume that the transfer-out division and the transfer-in division do not have situations of information asymmetry and final products which face the approximate perfect competition market each other, and division managers maximize one''s own division income, how to weigh the unit performance of the division by the correct transfer pricing model. In addition, in order to prevent from distorting cost allocation and this research also consider the way of time-driven cost allocation. With the linking of time-driven ABC system and transfer pricing can make the transfer-out division offer the relevant information to the transfer-in division. We investigate the transfer-out division and the transfer-in division how to encourage the transfer-out division to work hard by the correct joint cost allocation, and maximize the expected income of the transfer-out division and the transfer-in division. Relevant conclusions can be summed up as follows: (1)As regards the transfer-out division, overestimate the margin transfer-out division activity time, common operation cost or underestimate total activity time (namely the transfer-out division budgeted activity time pulsing the transfer-in division budgeted activity time), and make transfer-out division's transfer revenue increase and maximize transfer-out division's income. (2)As regards the transfer-in division, overestimate the margin transfer-in division activity time, common operation cost or underestimate total activity time (namely the transfer-out division budgeted activity time pulsing the transfer-in division budgeted activity time), and make transfer-in division's transfer payment decrease and maximize transfer-in division's income. (3)High volume products overestimate the margin transfer-out division activity time, the margin transfer-in division activity time or underestimate total activity time (namely the transfer-out division budgeted activity time pulsing the transfer-in division budgeted activity time), namely overestimating the rate of the budgeted time resources drivers, and make higher division's profit. (4)Low volume products underestimate the margin transfer-out division activity time, the margin transfer-in division activity time or overestimate total activity time (namely the transfer-out division budgeted activity time pulsing the transfer-in division budgeted activity time), namely underestimating the rate of the budgeted time resources drivers, and make lower division's profit. (5)If the transfer-out division and the transfer-in division, all for being bilateral while monopolizing, then high volume products overestimate the transfer-out division activity time, the margin transfer-in division activity time or underestimate total activity time (namely the transfer-out division budgeted activity time pulsing the transfer-in division budgeted activity time), namely overestimating the rate of the budgeted time resources drivers, and make higher division's profit. (6)If the transfer-out division and the transfer-in division, all for being bilateral while monopolizing, then low volume products underestimate the margin transfer-out division activity time, the margin transfer-in division activity time or overestimate total activity time (namely the transfer-out division budgeted activity time pulsing the transfer-in division budgeted activity time), namely underestimating the rate of the budgeted time resources drivers, and make lower division's profit.
本研究旨在探討在分權企業中,轉出部門與轉入部門如何受到共同作業成本與預計總作業時間影響,促使部門經理願意制定以利益極大化為依歸的生產和行銷決策,而精確且合理衡量各分權單位之績效。模式中假設轉出部門與轉入部門彼此之間並不存在資訊不對稱的情況且最終產品面臨一個接近完全競爭市場,以及部門經理極大化自己部門的所得,如何透過正確聯合成本分攤來衡量部門的單位績效。此外,為了避免成本分攤扭曲,本研究亦考慮以時間為導向的成本分攤方式。藉由以時間為導向的ABC制度與轉撥計價的連結,可使轉出部門提供攸關資訊給轉入部門。探討轉出部門與轉入部門如何透過正確聯合成本分攤來激勵轉出部門努力經營,進而極大化轉出部門與轉入部門期望所得。 相關結論可歸納如下: (1) 就轉出部門而言,高估轉出部門邊際作業時間、共同作業成本或低估總作業時間(即為轉出部門預計總作業時間加上轉入部門預計總作業時間),將使轉出部門的移轉收入增加,進而使轉出部門所得極大化。 (2) 就轉入部門而言,高估轉入部門邊際作業時間、共同作業成本或低估總作業時間(即為轉出部門預計總作業時間加上轉入部門預計總作業時間),將使轉入部門的移轉支付減少,進而使轉入部門所得極大化。 (3) 高產量產品高估轉出部門邊際作業時間、轉入部門邊際作業時間或低估總作業時間(即為轉出部門預計總作業時間加上轉入部門預計總作業時間),即高估預計時間資源的動因耗用費率,將產生較高的部門利潤。 (4) 低產量產品低估轉出部門邊際作業時間、轉入部門邊際作業時間或高估總作業時間(即為轉出部門預計總作業時間加上轉入部門預計總作業時間),即低估預計時間資源的動因耗用費率,將產生較低的部門利潤。 (5) 假若轉出部門與轉入部門皆為雙邊獨占時,則高產量產品會高估轉出部門邊際作業時間、轉入部門邊際作業時間或低估總作業時間(即為轉出部門預計總作業時間加上轉入部門預計總作業時間),即高估預計時間資源的動因耗用費率,將產生較高的部門利潤。 (6) 假若轉出部門與轉入部門皆為雙邊獨占時,則低產量產品會低估轉出部門邊際作業時間、轉入部門邊際作業時間或高估總作業時間(即為轉出部門預計總作業時間加上轉入部門預計總作業時間),即低估預計時間資源的動因耗用費率,將產生較低的部門利潤。
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/20605
其他識別: U0005-1406200620061700
文章連結: http://www.airitilibrary.com/Publication/alDetailedMesh1?DocID=U0005-1406200620061700
顯示於類別:企業管理學系所

文件中的檔案:
沒有與此文件相關的檔案。


在 DSpace 系統中的文件,除了特別指名其著作權條款之外,均受到著作權保護,並且保留所有的權利。