Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/20652
標題: A Study on the Relationship among Ownership Structure and Risk-taking Behavior and Firm Value
所有權結構與風險承擔行為及公司價值關係之研究
作者: 林湛凱
Lin, Jua-Kai
關鍵字: 公司治理股權結構
Corporate Governance
獨立董監事
公司價值
Ownership Structure
Independent Director
Independent Supervisor
Firm Value
出版社: 企業管理學系所
引用: 一、國內文獻 王玉珍,(2002),「股權結構、董事會組成、資本結構與企業績效關係之研究」,中央大學企業管理研究所未出版碩士論文。 洪麗芳,(2004),「股權結構、財務決策與公司績效關聯性之研究」,中原大學會計學系未出版碩士學位論文。 陳勝勇,(2002),「台灣上市電子企業股權結構、員工紅利與企業治理之研究」, 國立台灣科技大學研究所未出版碩士論文。 陳志榮,(2001),「我國運輸類上市公司股權結構與經營績效相關性之研究」,國立海洋大學航運管理研究所未出版碩士論文。 鄭國鴻、吳成豐,(2006),「公司治理與組織績效-台灣中小企業之研究」,台灣金融財務季刊,第七輯第一期,1-28頁。 蔡佩真,(2000),「企業成長、資本結構與企業績效之研究─以臺灣上市企業為例」,國立清華大學研究所未出版碩士論文。 葉銀華、李存修、柯承恩,(2002),公司治理與評等系統,台北;商智文化。 賴村名,(2005),「獨立董監事機制對公司財務績效影響之研究-以我國上市、櫃IC電子產業為例」,中華大學科技管理所未出版碩士論文。 劉康建、張秋政,(2005),「論臺灣金融控股公司之監理」,台灣銀行季刊,第五十六卷第四期,1-15頁。 中華民國證券櫃檯買賣中心網站www.tse.com.tw 台灣證券交易所網站www.otc.org.tw 台灣證券交易所之公開資訊觀測站www.newmops.tse.com.tw 全國碩博士論文資訊網http://datas.ncl.edu.tw/theabs// 中華公司治理協會www.cga.org.tw 證期會www.sfc.gov.tw 二、國外文獻 Beasley, M. S.(1996), An Empirical Analysis of the Relation Between the Board of Director Composition and Financial Statement Fraud, Accounting Review, 71, 433-465. Conners, N.(1989), Outside Board Member: A Breath of Fresh Air,” CFO: The Magazine for Chief Financial Officers, 5, 48-49. Grace, E. (2004), Contracting Incentives and Compensation for Property-Liability Insurer Executives, The Journal of Risk and Insurance,7, 2,285-307. Erik, L., S. Warning, and J. Weigand. (2004), Governance Structures, Multidimensional Efficiency and Firm Profitability, Journal of Management and Governance, 8, 279-304. Fama E. F. (1980), Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, Journal of Political Economy, 88, 288-307. Gregory, E. S., Eli, T. and J. S. Wallace. (2006), An Examination of Multiple Governance Forces within Bank Holding Companies, Journal of Financial Serves Reserves, 29, 105-123. Galai, D. and R. Masulis. (1976), The Option Pricing Model and the Risk Factor of Stock, Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 53-83. Hill, C. and S. Snell. (1988), External Control, Corporate Strategy, and Firm Performance in Research Intensive Industries, Strategic Management Journal, 9, 577-590. Jan,M.(2005), The Interaction of Capital Structure and Ownership Structure, The Journal of Business.78,3,787-814 Jian, C. (2001), Ownership Sturcture as Corporate Governance Mechanism: Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies, Economics of Planning, 34, 1-2, 53-70. Jensen, M. C. and R. Ruback. (1983), The market for corporate control: The scientific evidence, Journal of Financial Economics, 11, 5-50. Jensen, M. C. and W. H. Meckling.(1976), Theory of the Firm : Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics , 3, 305-360. Lauterbach, B. and A. Vaninsky.(1999), Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: Evidence from Israel, Journal of Management and Governance, 3, 189-201. Monsen, R., J. Chiu, and D. Cooley. (1968), The Effect of Separation of Ownership and Control on the Performance of the Large Firm, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 82, 435-451. Pearce, J. A., and S. A., Zahra.(1992), Board Composition from a Strategic Contingency Perspective, Journal of Management Studies, 29, 53-58. Seok, W. L.(2002), Insider Ownership and Risk-taking Behaviour at Bank Holding Companies, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 29(7)&(8), 989-1005 Steen, T. and P. Torben.(2000), Ownership Structure and Economic Performance in the Largest European Companies, Strategic Management Journal, 21, 689-705. Yoser, G. and A. A. Mohamed. (2003), Ownership Structure and Risk: A Canadian Empirical Analysis, Quarterly Journal of Business & Economics, 42, 1-2, 19-36.
摘要: Jensen and Meckling( 1976) indicated that although firm could pursue company operation efficient by professional manager, it still would conflict among the risk-taking behavior and remuneration because of information asymmetry in separate from power of management issue; thus, ownership structure, risk-taking behavior and firm value became a important focus in academia. In recently, the financial scandal case of Enron and Li-Ba had triggered popularity to pay close attention to company topic of inside independent director and supervisor, accountant, lawyer and inside monitor mechanism of the firm. For helping company setting up good company control system, SEC had announced that the stock applying to be listed had to set up independent director and supervisor and engaged more than two seats independent directors of and more than one seat independent supervisor otherwise would be forbidden to be listed on February 20, the 91st. . This research use electronic industry and traditional industry''s company as the research object and all samples come from TEJ. The companies disclose information from 2001 to 2005 and we use regression to do the statistic analysis. In result, institution shareholding ratio presents positive correlation to beta value, tobin value, return of the assets and return on equity but not apparent with the fluctuating rate of the assets remuneration. This may because institution investors prefer high risk- high remuneration so that they want to pursue selfish behavior. In result of the seats of director, it presents negative correlation with tobin value and positive correlation to return of the assets and return on equity and neutral in beta value and fluctuating rate of assets remuneration. This result shows that it could improve the performance and decline of company''s risk behavior through independent director and supervisor monitoring the company and doing their's own specialty and obligation by introducing independent director and supervisor. Finally, this research undertakes the related discussion among the risk-taking behavior, firm value and ownership structure and integrates independent mechanism of director and supervisor. We hope to offer a referral to follow-up researcher, enterprises and government institution.
Jensen and Meckling(1976)在所有權與經營權分離此議題中,認為雖然可藉由專業經理人讓公司運作的更有效率,但也可能會因資訊不對稱而在風險承擔行為與報酬之間產生衝突;因此,股權結構、風險承擔行為與公司價值之關係即成為學者在理論及實務研究上的焦點。前幾年美國安隆(Enron)公司爆發的財務醜聞案,與最近的國內力霸集團的掏空案;引發各界對於獨立董監事、會計師、律師及企業內部監控機制等議題之高度重視。為了協助上市上櫃公司建立良好之公司治理制度,證期會於民國91年2月20日宣佈即日起,凡申請上市、上櫃的股票公開發行公司,要求必需強制設立獨立董監事,聘請二席以上獨立董事及一席以上獨立監察人,否則不准上市上櫃且不溯及既往。 本研究以台灣證券交易所掛牌上市電子產業及傳統產業公司為研究對象,實證資料皆來自台灣經濟新報資料庫(TEJ)。公司公開資訊資料來源自2001年至2005年,統計方法則為迴歸檢定分析。在實證結果方面,機構法人持股比例與Beta值、帳面市價比、資產報酬率與股東報酬率呈顯著正相關,但與資產報酬波動率則不顯著。此可能為機構投資人為追求自利行為,傾向高風險高報酬之偏好所致。在董監事席次實證結果方面,與帳面市價比為負相關,與資產報酬率與股東報酬率呈顯著正相關,而在Beta值與資產報酬波動率則為不顯著。此結果顯示藉由引進獨立董監事,讓獨立董監事來監督公司,善盡本身專業與義務,能有助經營績效的提升和公司風險行為的下降。最後,本研究藉由股權結構、風險承擔行為與公司價值間關聯性探討,並將獨立董監事機制彙整,以供後續研究學者、企業以及政府機關作參考。
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/20652
其他識別: U0005-2306200710484800
文章連結: http://www.airitilibrary.com/Publication/alDetailedMesh1?DocID=U0005-2306200710484800
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