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標題: 建構盈餘管理模型-經濟動機導向觀點
Developing a cross-sectional discretionary accrual model-from an economic intentions point of view
作者: 林明慧
Lin, Ming-Hui
關鍵字: earnings management
economic intentions
discretionary accruals
出版社: 企業管理學系所
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摘要: Based on the traditional earnings management detecting model, accrual-based measures proposed by Healy (1985) and two-stage regression approach proposed by Jones (1991), we proposes a new cross-sectional discretionary accrual model, labeled the Economic Intention Model, to detect earnings management by considering common economic intentions of managers. This proposed model relaxes the assumption that there is no managed accrual within corporate. Contrast to traditional discretionary accrual model taking total accruals or working capital accruals as proxy of non-discretionary accruals, Economic Intention Model estimates working capital accruals directly and partitions it into two parts, unmanaged accruals and managed accruals. The economic intentions are the purposes of managing earnings for compensation plan, debt contract, political costs and equity offerings in order to influence contractual outcomes or mislead some stakeholders. This paper examines specification and power of tests based on the measures of economic intentions discretionary accruals, and makes comparison with traditional discretionary accrual model (cross-sectional Modified Jones Model). The empirical results show that Economic Intention Model enhances the of the first-stage regression. And in the part of research design, this paper takes corporate failure events as income-decreasing cases and restatement of finance reports as income-increasing cases to process the specification and power of tests. The empirical results also indicate that both discretionary accrual models are well specified when applied to income-decreasing cases. As for the income-increasing cases, the power of Economic Intention Model is more stable than that of Modified Jones Model, implying that considering more scopes of economic motivations hold by managers could help discover abnormal transactions and detect earnings manipulations. Based on the results, it is obvious that managers with performance intention tend to increase income and managers with political cost intention tend to reduce income. But for managers with debt contract intention and capital market intention, they do not show apparent states of upward or downward earnings management.
由於正確性與可靠性為公司財務報表之價值所在,若因財務報表提供者運用其自由裁量權介入財務報導而扭曲公司營運原貌,將會嚴重影響社會經濟之安定。本研究嘗試突破傳統裁決性應計項目模型中視總應計項目(或營運資金應計項目)為非裁決性應計項目之代理變數的做法,改以直接對總應計項目(或營運資金應計項目)進行估計,並同時考量管理者之經濟動機後,建構Economic Intention Model,為評量公司盈餘管理行為之依據。本研究於推估裁決性應計項目時,係採Healy(1985)之應計項目二分法觀念,並延續Jones(1991)之兩階段迴歸式估計程序,再利用統計分析與檢測模型預測準確率之程序,比較傳統橫斷面Modified Jones Model與新橫斷面Economic Intention Model之檢定力。研究結果顯示,Economic Intention Model之第一階段迴歸估計式具較高解釋力,且整體大於0之Adj-R平方值分佈也較為平均;另外模型檢定力檢測的部分,於向下盈餘管理事件中,兩模型檢定力相當,預測準確率均在六成六以上,其中以Economic Intention Model較能區別公司發生重大財務危機的可能性。而在向上盈餘管理事件,兩模型均有五成之預測準確率,若再將選樣範圍縮小至樣本公司獲利能力不佳之情況下,Economic Intention Model仍保有五成以上之預測準確率,而橫斷面Modified Jones Model之預測準確率有降低的情形,表示Economic Intention Model於偵測向上盈餘管理事件之能力較為穩定。
其他識別: U0005-0307200818093100
Appears in Collections:企業管理學系所



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