Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
|標題:||Do conflicts of interest really exist when lending banks are also stockholders?|
|關鍵字:||Conflicts of interest|
|引用:||王健安，2002。集團企業中的銀行角色之研究，台灣財務金融學會年會論文。 陳家彬與賴怡洵，2000，台灣地區銀行放款訂價：理論與新舊銀行之實證比較，管理學報，第十七卷第三期，415-440。 陳家彬與賴怡洵，2001。台灣地區銀行放款有無擔保之決定因素：Logit模型之實證分析，管理評論，第二十巻第一期，129-160。 賴怡洵、陳家彬與何加政，2008。台灣地區銀行進入企業董監事會之決定因素：代理成本與放款者利益衝突假說，管理學報，第二十五卷一期，1-30。 Berger, A. and G. Udell (1995), “Relationship Lending and Lines of Credit in Small Firm Finance,” Journal of Business, 68, 351-381. Berlin Mitchell, John Kose & Saunders Anthony (1996), "Bank Equity Stakes in Borrowing Firms and Financial Distress," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, 9(3), 889-919. Boot, A. W. A., A. V. Thakor and G. Udell (1991), “Credible Commitments, Contract Enforcement Problems and Banks: Intermediation as Credibility Assurance,” Journal of Banking and Finance, IS 605-632 North-Holland. Booth, J. R. and D. N. Deli (1999), “On Executives of Financial as Outside Directors,” Journal of Corporate Finance, 5, 227-250. Byrd, T. D. and M. S. Mizruchi (2005), “Bankers on the Board and Debt Ratio of Firms,” Journal of Corporate Finance, 11, 129-173. Ciarrama, E. S. (2006), “Monitoring by Affiliated Bankers on Board of Directors: Evidence from Corporate Financing Outcomes,” Working Paper. Cole, R. A. (1998), “The Importance of Relationships to the Availability of Credit,“ Journal of Banking and Finance, 22, 959-977. Degryse, H. and Van Cayseele, P. (2000), “ Relationship Lending within a Bank-Based System: Evidence from European Small Business Data,” Journal of Financial Intermediation, 9, 90-109. Dennis, S. A. and D. J. Mullineaux (2000), “ Syndicated Loans,” Journal of Financial Intermediation, 9, Issue 4, 404-426. Diamond, D. (1984), “Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring,” Review of Economics Studies, 51,393–414 . Diamond, D. (1991),” Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt,” Journal of Political Economy, 99, 689-751. Elsas, R., and J. P. Krahnen, 1998, “Is Relationship Lending Special? Evidence from Credit-File Data in Germany,” Journal of Banking and Finance, 22, 1283-1316. Fama, E. (1985), “What’s Different about Banks?” Journal of Monetary Economics, 15, 29-39. Harhoff, Dietmar and Korting, Timm (1998),” Lending Relationships in Germany -- Empirical Evidence from Survey Data,” Journal of Banking & Finance, 22, 10-11, 1317 Hoshi, T. (1994), “The Economic Role of Corporate Grouping and the Main Bank System,” In Masahiko Aoki and Ronald Dore, eds., The Japanese Firm: the Sources of Competitive Strength, Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press. Hoshi, T., A. Kashyap., and D. Scharfstein (1990), “The Role of Banking in Reducing the Costs of Financial Distress in Japan,” Journal of Financial Economics, 27, 67-88. Hoshi, T., A. Kashyap., and D. Scharfstein (1991), “Corporate Structure, Liquidity and Investment: Evidence from Japanese Industrial Groups,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106, 33-60. Hovakimian, A., T. Opler and S. Titman (2001), “The Debt-Equity Choice,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 36(1). James, C. (1995), “When Do Banks Take Equity in Debt Restructurings?” Review of Financial Studies 8, 1209–1234. Jensen, M. and W. Meckling (1976), “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Capital Structure,” Journal of Financial Economics 3, pp.305-360. John, K. and D. C. Nachman (1985), “Risky Debt, Investment Incentives, and Reputation in a Sequential Equilibrium,” Journal of Finance, 40(3), pp. 863-878. Kester, (1991) Carl W. Kester, Japanese Takeovers: the Global Contest for Corporate Control, Harvard Business School Press, Boston. Kracaw, W., and M. Zenner (1998), “Bankers in the Boardroom: Good News or Bad News?” (Unpublished Working Paper, Smeal college of Business Administration, Pennsylvania State University.) Krozner, R. and P. Strahan (2001), “Bankers on Borads: Monitoring, Conflicts of Interest, and Lender Liability,” Journal of Financial Economics, 62, 415-452. Morck, R., M, Nakamura and A. Shivdasani (2000), “Banks, Ownership Structure, and Firm Value in Japan,” Journal of Business, 73, No. 4, 539-567. Mahrt-Smith J., (2000), “Should Banks Own Equity? A Corporate Finance Perspective,” Working Paper, London Business Scholl. Park, S., (2000), “Effects of the Affiliation of Banking and Commerce on the Firm’s Investment and the Bank’s Risk,” Journal of Banking and Finance. 24, 1629-1650. Petersen, M.A. and R.G. Rajan (1994), “The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data,” Journal of Finance, pp.3-37. Rajan, R.G. (1992), “A Theory of the Costs and Benefits of Universal Banking,” Center for Research in Security Prices working paper No. 346,University of Chicago,IL. Rajan, R., (1992), “ Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm’s Length Debt,” Journal of Finance, 47, 1367-1400. Ramirez, C.G.(1995), ” Did J.P. Morgan’s Men Add Liquidity? Corporate Investment, Cash Flow and Financial Structure at the Turn of the Twentieth Century,” Journal of Finance, 50, 661-678. Sharpe, S. (1990), “Asymmetric Information, Banking Lending, and Implicit Contracts: A Stylized Model of Customer Relationships,” Journal of Finance, 45, 1069-1087. Scott, J. A. and W. C. Dunkelber (1999) “Bank consolidation and small business lending: a small firm perspective” Journal of Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Mar, 328-361. Smith, R.G. (1980), “The Contract Net Protocol: High-Level Communication and Control in a Distributed Problem Solver,” IEEE Transactions on Computers, 29(12), 1104–1113. Titman, S. and R. Wessels (1988), “ The Determinants of Capital Structure Choice,” Journal of Finance, 43(1). Weinstein, D. E. and Y. Yafeh (1998) “On the Costs of a Bank-Centered Financial System: Evidence from the Changing Main Bank Relations in Japan,” Journal of Finance, 53, 635-672. Wenlian, Gao (2007),”Bankers as Lenders and Shareholders : Evidence from Japan ,” Pacific-Basin Finance Journal.|
|摘要:||The main purpose of this study is to discuss whether or not there exist the conflicts of interest when the lending banks are also stockholders, and how the loan terms or the payout yields react to such conflicts of interest. We intend to figure out the way of the lending banks in reducing the conflicts of interest and find out the certain type of lending banks which the conflicts of interest drive from by the observation of the changes of loan terms and payout yield. We include the companies included in S&P500 between 1996 and 2006 as the sample of this study. We differentiate between the boards with banks and those without banks, and whether the lending bankers on board or not. We would like to find the effect of each type of banker on loan terms. The results show that, the companies with the banker on board could obtain relatively better loan terms, and the companies who have the lending banker on board could get the lower loan spread rate.
We further aim at the lending banker on board by comparing their equity stakes and debt claims to probe the probability of the existence of the conflicts of interest and its effect on the loan terms. The results reveal that the probabilities of the collateral increases, the loan size decreases and the payout yield increases when the equity stakes are larger than debt claims (E>D). On the other hand, the spread rate decreases when the equity stakes are less than debt claims (E<D). Therefore, the conflicts of interest could derive possibly from the lending banker on board whose equity stakes are larger than debt claims. That is, this kind of lending bankers will easily neglect the responsibility as a creditor and harm the creditor's right. And the lending bankers with larger equity stakes will try to adjust loan terms to make up for the cost arising from conflicts of interest.
In addition, we differentiate between two types of bankers on boards according to the initial time of the lending relationship between the company and the bank. One type is (i) that the bank enters the board first, and lend to the company afterwards (Board_before_lend); the other type is (ii) that the bank makes a loan to the company first, and enters the board afterwards (Lend_before_board). These two different types of bankers might help find out the effect of the timing on loan terms. Compared to the case (ii), case (i) would be associated with the increase in the spread rate and the probabilities of the presence of the collateral. As a result, the banks of the case (i) would possibly encounter more conflicts of interest.|
本研究的主要目的即在探討銀行持有借款企業股份進入其董監事會時，是否會遭遇到利益衝突，並如何將利益衝突反應在授信條件或是股利收益率上，並透過觀察企業授信條件、股利收益率的變化進一步說明放款銀行對抗利益衝突的彌補方法與發現何種類型的放款銀行為利益衝突主要來源。 我們使用S&P500上市公司為研究樣本，區分有無銀行進入企業董監事會、有無放款銀行進入企業董監事會對於企業授信條件的影響，來探討哪一類的銀行董事對於企業授信條件影響最大。結果顯示，公司為有銀行進入企業董監事會者，可獲得較佳的授信條件。而放款銀行進入企業董監事會者可得到較低的放款加碼利率。 我們進一步針對放款銀行進入企業董監事會者，比較其持股進入企業董監事會之股權比例與貸款給企業的債權的比例，以探討此衝突存在的可能性及其對企業授信條件的影響。結果發現，當放款銀行的股權持有比例大於放款債權比例時，使得擔保機率增加、融資額度下降，並且股利收益率上升。反之當放款銀行的股權小於債權時，則會降低放款加碼利率，而在融資額度、擔保機率及股利收益率方面則不顯著。故顯示利益衝突來源可能是來自於股權大於債權的放款銀行，即當放款銀行著重於股東角色時，容易忽略銀行債權人的責任與傷害銀行債權的價值，此時股權持有比例大於債權比例的放款銀行將會透過授信條件的制定，或分享借款企業的盈餘來對抗利益衝突所產生的成本。 並且我們將放款銀行區分為先借款再進入企業董監事會(先借後進者)及先進入企業董監事會再借款(先進後借者)兩類，以探討放款銀行進入企業董監事會的時點對於企業授信條件的影響。結果顯示，相較先借後進的放款銀行，先進後借的放款銀行會提高加碼利率、擔保機率，但先借後進的放款銀行會減少擔保機率，故先進後借放款銀行可能較會面臨利益衝突。 同時，我們將放款銀行的持股比率與其進入企業董監事會的時點作交乘，產生先進後借且股權大於債權、先進後借且股權小於債權、先借後進且股權大於債權及先借後進且股權小於債權四項交乘項，此四項交乘將可充分代表放款銀行進入企業董監事會的各種形式，以直接觀察此四種放款銀行進入企業董監事會的形式對於授信條件及股利收益率的影響。
|Appears in Collections:||企業管理學系所|
Show full item record
TAIR Related Article
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.