請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/20790
標題: 公司治理與授信條件關聯性之研究
The Relationship between Corporate Governance and Loan Terms
作者: 翁家鈞
Wong, Jia-Jyuan
關鍵字: corporate governance
公司治理
loan terms
agency problems
cost of debt capital
授信條件
代理問題
負債資金成本
出版社: 企業管理學系所
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摘要: Given the rise of incorporated firms, more and more enterprises switch business models to one that separates ownership and management. If managers and owners have similar goals, the owners will be more willing to offer extra resources which provide managers more flexible power. Furthermore, managers will also be more loyal to the corporation and make decisions which benefit the corporation. It's good for both managers and owners. However, if there are some conflicts between managers and owners, it will easily cause moral hazard and adverse selection problems. The risk of these problems is called agency risk. In addition, risk is the key factor in determining the loan terms when corporations apply loans from financial institutions. According to past research, improving corporate governance is one of the best solutions to reduce risk. Therefore this study will discuss whether or not the corporate governance affects loan terms. Primary results show that corporate governance definitely influences loan terms. Specifically, reducing ownership of the manager holdings, increasing ownership of the foreign institution holdings, enlarging the board size, and enhancing the information disclosures would help firms to obtain favorable loan terms.
隨著股份有限公司的興起,越來越多的企業朝向經營權與所有權分離的經營模式發展。倘若經理人與股東的目標一致時,股東更願意提供資源讓經理人能擁有更彈性發揮的空間,經理人也能無後顧之憂地利用本身的專業做出對企業最有利的決策,對公司的發展有正面的影響。但當經理人與代理人存在目標不一致時,企業容易有逆選擇、道德的問題發生,產生所謂的「代理風險」。然而風險的高低是決定企業向金融機構融資時,其授信條件好壞的關鍵因素。綜合過去許多學者的研究發現公司治理是有效降低風險的方法之一,故本研究將探討是否能夠透過改善企業的公司治理,幫助企業取得較佳的授信條件? 研究結果發現公司治理的良窳確實會對影響債權人所認知企業發生危機風險的高低,進而反映在授信條件上。其中以降低管理者的持股比率、提升外資機構的持股比率、擴大董事會的規模以及增加企業的資訊揭露評鑑等級,最有助於企業取得較佳的授信條件(低利率、高額度、低有擔保比率)。
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/20790
其他識別: U0005-0107200921260900
文章連結: http://www.airitilibrary.com/Publication/alDetailedMesh1?DocID=U0005-0107200921260900
顯示於類別:企業管理學系所

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