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標題: Optimal return policies for manufacturer and retailer in a indirect channel
作者: 林思伃
Lin, Szu-Yu
關鍵字: 退貨政策
return policy
product quality
price discrimination
game theory
出版社: 企業管理學系所
引用: 參考文獻 一、中文部份 全國電子網站,退貨政策相關內容,擷取日期:2011年02月28日, 燦坤網路商店,退貨政策相關內容,擷取日期:2011年02月28日, 順發量販網站,退貨政策相關內容,擷取日期:2011年02月28日, 大買家網路站,退貨政策相關內容,擷取日期:2011年02月28日, 名人3C量販網,退貨政策相關內容,擷取日期:2011年02月28日, 二、英文部份 Che, Y-K. (1996), “Customer return policies for experience goods”, Journal of Industrial Economics, 44(1), 17-24. Chu, W., E. Gerstner, and J. Hess (1998), “Managing Dissatisfaction”, Journal of Service Research 1(2), 140-155. Davis, S., E. Gerstner, and M. Hagerty (1995), “Money back guarantees in retailing: Matching products to consumer tastes”, Journal of Retailing 71(1), 7-22. Davis, S., M. Hagerty, and E. Gerstner (1998), “Return policies and the optimal level of hassle”, Journal of Economics and Business, 50(5), 445-460. Eccles, R. (1985), The transfer pricing problem: A Theory for Practice, Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books. Garvin, D. A. (1984), “What does product quality really mean”, Sloan Management Review, 26, 25-43. Gerstner, E. and J. Hess (1991), “A theory of channel price promotions”, American Economic Review, 81(4), 872-886. Gerstner, E. and J. Hess (1995), “Pull Promotion and channel coordination”, Marketing Science, 14(1), 43-60. Grossman, S. (1981), “The informational role of warranties and private disclosure about product quality”, Journal of Law and Economics, 24, 461-483. Hess, J. D., Chu, W., & Gerstner, E. (1996), “Controlling Product Returns in Direct Marketing,” Marketing Letters, 7(4), 307–317. Jeuland, A. and Shugan, S. (1983), “Managing channel profits”, Marketing Science, 2, 239-272. Lau, A.H.L., Lau, H.s. (2000), “Manufacturer’s pricing strategy and return policy for a single-period commodity”, European Journal of Operational Research, 116, 291-304. Marvel, H.P. and J. Peck (1995), “Demand uncertainty and returns policies”, International Economic Review, 36(3), 691-714. Messinger, P. R. and Wujin C. (1993), “Product Proliferation, slotting allowances, and informational sources of retailer clout”, mimeo, Washington University, St. Louis. Moorthy, S. (1987), “Managing channel profits: Comment”, Marketing Science, 6, 375-379. Moorthy, S. (1988), “Product and price competiton in a duopoly”, Marketing Science, 7, 141-168. Monahan, J. P. (1984), “A quantity discount pricing model to increase vendor profits”, Management Science, 30(6), 720-726. Moorthy, S. and K. Srinivasan (1995), “Signaling quality with a money-back guarantee: The role of transaction costs”, Marketing Science 14(4), 442-466. Pashigian, B. (1988), “Demand uncertainty and sales: A study of fashion and markdown pricing”, The American Economic Review 78(5), 936-953. Padmanabhan, V. and I.P.L. Png (1995), “Returns policies: make money by making good”, Sloan Management Review, 65-72. Padmanabhan, V. and I.P.L. Png (1997), “Manufacturer’s returns policies and retail competition”, Marketing Science, 16(1), 81-94. Padmanabhan, V. and I.P.L. Png (2004), “Reply to do returns policies intensify retail competition”, Marketing Science, 23(4), 614-618. Shulman, J. D., Coughlan, A. T. and Savaskan, R. C. (2009) ,“Restocking fees and information provision”, Manufacturing and Service Operations Management, 11(4), 577-594. Shulman, J. D., Coughlan, A. T. and Savaskan, R. C. (2010), “Optimal reverse channel structure for consumer product returns”, Marketing Science, 29(6), 1071-1085. Su, Xuanming (2009), “Consumer returns policies and supply chain performance”, Manufacturing and Service Operations Management, 11(4), 595-612. Tsay, A. A. (2001), “ Managing retail channel overstock: Markdown money and return policies”, Journal of Retailing, 77(4), 457-492. Wang, H. (2004), “Do returns policies intensify retail competition”, Marketing Science, 23(4), 661-613.
摘要: 本研究利用賽局理論探討間接通路中,製造商與零售商的最適退貨政策。由過去多探討直接通路下,廠商對消費者提供退貨政策的情況轉為討論間接通路中,製造商與零售商皆可提供退貨政策的狀況。另外,本研究將產品品質視為內生變數來探討產品品質與退貨政策之間的關係。結果得到產品品質與退貨政策的慷慨程度為非線性關係。 在基本模型當中,本研究設定僅有零售商有提供退貨政策的情況。結果顯示,製造商有誘因誘使零售商提供退貨政策以使低端消費者會因為產品不合用來退貨,但高端消費者不會來退貨以達到差別取價的效果。進一步還可促進整體通路協調。 而在延伸模型的部份,本研究加入了製造商也可提供退貨政策的假定。結果顯示,間接通路中,製造商提供退貨政策所獲得的利潤有可能高於不提供退貨政策的情況。換言之,在滿足某些條件下製造商較有誘因提供退貨政策予零售商以獲取大部分的通路利潤。
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the manufacturer and retailer's optimal return policies in an indirect channel. In the literature of return policy, most studies focus on the case of direct channel. In the thesis, I consider the case of indirect channel. In other words, the manufacturer can decide to offer his return policy to the retailer or not, and then the retailer can decide to offer her return policy to consumers or not. Further, the product quality is endogenous in the model. One interesting finding is that the relationship between product quality and refund amount is non-monotonic. In the basic model, only the retailer can offer her return policy to consumers. I find that the manufacturer has an incentive to induce the retailer to offer her return policy. In the equilibrium, the low-valuation consumers will return the products if it is misfit, but the high-valuation consumers will never return. As a result, the return policy has the effect of price discrimination and then facilitates the channel coordination. In the extended model, the manufacturer can also offer his return policy to the retailer. I find that the manufacturer may have more profits when he offers the return policy. It means under certain conditions, the manufacturer is optimal to offer the return policy to extract most channel profits.
其他識別: U0005-0407201115542500
Appears in Collections:企業管理學系所



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