Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/21859
標題: 兩岸談判之研究-重新檢視雙層賽局的分析架構及其應用
The Study of Cross-Strait Negotiation-Reviewing Two-Level Game Framework and Its Application
作者: 阮剛猛
Ruan, Gang-Meng
關鍵字: cross-strait relation
兩岸關係
two-level game
win-sets
international negotiation
political indifference curve
雙層賽局
國內獲勝集合
國際談判
政治無異曲線
出版社: 國家政策與公共事務研究所
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摘要: 中共自建立中華人民共和國後,即與在台灣的中華民國,隔著台灣海峽形成兩個互不隸屬的獨立政體。初期,兩岸關係呈現緊張的軍事對峙的局面,隨時有發生戰爭的可能。然而,從軍事對峙、拒絕三通到和緩交流,自1980年代後期,隨著台灣開放大陸探親之後,兩岸交流益趨熱絡,以戰爭方式解決兩岸衝突已不再是唯一的手段,這種機率也變得愈來愈低,相反的,取而代之的是協商談判的方式。本研究嘗試從兩岸談判的互動中,由某以一種國際合作的面向,探究兩岸關係的變化,作為本研究的主軸,此亦為本文最主要的研究目的。 長期以來,利用談判的方式解決具爭議性的跨國事務,已成為國際間普遍的法則。雖然,相較於國內事務的處理,主權國家對於涉外爭議的處理具有較高的自主性,但是隨著民主化浪潮及公民社會的崛起,涉外事務談判受國內因素影響的程度已逐漸擴大。當國內與國際之間的界線變得逐漸模糊之際,國際紛爭究竟是「國內影響國際」或「國際影響國內」已不再重要。因為國際與國內因素的彼此互動,才是探究國際談判成敗與否的主要框架。 藉由1988年Robert D. Putnam提出「雙層賽局」(the two-level game) 的國際談判分析框架,打破「國內」、「國際」二元論的結構,提供給國際談判研究者新的視角。Putnam雙層賽局最大的貢獻,在於他提出「獲勝集合」(win-sets)的概念。這個集合是國內利害關係人透過一種民主機制的運作所獲致的共識區間,並依此形成與他國談判時可能獲致協議的範圍(zone of potential agreement),進而對國際談判的結果提出解釋。此外,Putnam的另一項主要貢獻乃在於他所提雙議題談判的「政治無異曲線」(political indifference curve for two-issue negotiation),這種議題聯結式的談判模式也正符合當今大多數國際談判的現狀。對於上述雙層賽局的兩項創新概念,本研究嘗試予以進一步釐清。首先,獲勝集合是所有國內政治行為體互動的產物,但如果僅強調其對談判結果的影響,則可能因為過度簡化而忽略了其它可能影響因素。其次,本研究認為雙贏的談判模式不應只限於雙議題的聯結,只要能創造出額外利益或價值的多議題談判,亦可視為一種雙贏的談判模式。本研究並無創建新理論的意圖,只是嘗試在Putnam雙層賽局的基礎上,針對上述疑問嘗試修改其原有結構,以增強該框架對於事實現象的解釋力。本研究將先從Putnam雙層賽局中歸納出「國家代理人的角色」、「從零和到非零和」和「國內政治因素」三個核心內涵進行分析,而後再增列個人層次之「認知」(cognition)變項,進而在原來「國際—國內」雙層互動上,增加「國際—談判代理人」和「國內—談判代理人」二個雙層互動,以導出改善型雙層賽局的國際談判分析框架。 為了展開本研究論述架構,首先,提出本研究的研究動機、背景、研究目的和研究問題。其次,藉由文獻回顧理解國際談判要素、兩岸談判歷史,並概括雙層賽局談判模式的基本論述及其內涵,而後對其可能遭受的質疑和瓶頸予以說明,並分析改善之道。第三,依據戰略三角國際結構類型所區分之兩岸談判時期,提出本研究改善的分析框架。第四,分析各時期兩岸談判的結果。第五,綜整比較各談判時期的「共同利益」、「協議區間」和「談判時間」的差異,以進一步理解兩岸關係的變化。最後,提出本文對兩岸談判的策略性思維與結論。本研究發現,改善之雙層賽局框架更能精確解釋國際談判是否能達成協議,而且在輔以動態賽局模式展開後,本研究也發現兩岸談判最優策略選擇,除了考量各方的利益價值與認知外,也會受到談判時間長短的影響。
After the Chinese Communist party founded the People''s Republic of China (PRC) in Mainland, and the Nationalists retreated to Taiwan. Since then there have been two independent political powers on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. The relationship between the cross-Strait has been staying at the same stage of war. Until the later stage of 1980, the relationship between the cross-Strait has gone through confronted military conflict, refused Three Direct Links (shorthand for direct links of trade, mail, and air and shipping services across the Taiwan Strait), and communicated gradually. The exchange of cross-Strait became more and more frequent after Taiwan government permitted veterans to go back to Mainland in 1987. From this moment, the probability of war between PRC and Taiwan has turned into little. Instead of military force, bargain and negotiation are main ways to solve problems between the cross-Strait. From an international cooperation perspective, the paper attempts to study the negotiation between the cross-Strait in order to understand the shift of which the relationship between the cross-Strait is our main purpose in this study. Having been long time, using international negotiation has become a main method to solve controversial affairs between state and state. Compared to deal with domestic affairs, sovereign state processes higher autonomy to deal with foreign affairs through international negotiation, but the more developing of the democratization and civil society, the more affected by domestic factors. Because the framework of interaction between international factors and domestic factors is an effective approach, when the boundary between international line and domestic line become blurred, it is not important no matter what domestic factors affect international factors (inside-out) or international factors affect domestic factors (outside-in). By adopting the two-level game approach to analyze international negotiation, Robert D. Putnam has successfully linked domestic factors with international ones in the study of international negotiation in 1988. The approach suggests two convincing concepts, which are “win-sets” and “political indifference curve for two-issue negotiation,” however, two things still not clear. Firstly, although win-sets are the outcome of compromising among domestic political actors, win-sets themselves definitely are not the only determinants for the outcome of international negotiation. Without taking other factors into account, it is difficult to explain the outcome of international negotiation. Secondly, unlike Putnam says that two-issue linkage can only create win-win negotiation, in fact, by using multi-issue linkage strategy; both sides of negotiators can also work out win-win solution. Based on Putnam's two level game hypotheses, this paper intends to consider seriously about the role of statesmen's (or negotiators') cognition in the process of international negotiations. In fact, this paper tries to integrate both “international-domestic,” (static game model) and the “individual- domestic,” or “individual-international,” (dynamic game model) to a better interpreting international negotiation framework. In order to develop the paper, the first of all is to address background, purposes, and questions of this study. The second part is to understand the elements of international negotiation, the history of cross-Strait negotiation, and the core concepts of two-level game approach by investigating relative literature. The third part is to build the framework which is modified by two-level game theory. The fourth part is to analyze the outcome of each cross-Strait negotiation's period which is divided by the international structure of strategic triangle. The fifth part is to compare the common interest, zone of potential agreement and negotiation time of all cross-Strait negotiation's period. The last parts are strategic thinking of cross-Strait negotiation and conclusion. The findings of this study are the modified two-level game framework provided better explain of the cross-Strait negotiation, and using the extensive form of game theory, the preference strategic choice of cross-Strait negotiation have to consider interest, cognition, and negotiation's time.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/21859
其他識別: U0005-2507201116242900
文章連結: http://www.airitilibrary.com/Publication/alDetailedMesh1?DocID=U0005-2507201116242900
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