Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/23128
標題: 初次公開發行與盈餘管理
Initial Public Offerings and Earninga Management
作者: CHANG, YU-CHEN
張裕昌
關鍵字: IPO
初次公開發行
earnings management
data
盈餘管理
理性預期
誘因條件
承銷價低估
國內外數
承銷價
投資人
條件
動機
出版社: 財務金融學系
摘要: The purpose of this paper is to explain why the investors would like to purchase the stocks of IPO firms. The prior studies show that those IPO firms often do earnings management to make their IPO process easier or get a better offering price. This phenomenon is not unusual. For the investors, therefore, there must be a motivation to buy the IPO stocks even if they have known the earning data and offering price of IPO firms are unreliable by any possibility. This paper use a rational expectation model with a output boundary to analyze the investors' behavior, and we find that, a) in order to reduce the cost of investment, the investors will restore the earnings management, the IPO firms won't be able to cheat them; and, b) when there is asymmetric information between the IPO firms and the investors, the offering price will be underpriced if the earnings management exists.
近年來的國內外數起公司金融弊案,引起了投資人對公司做盈餘管理的重視。而從初次公開發行的相關文獻,發現新上市公司更是普遍存在做盈餘管理的現象。由於新上市公司可能做盈餘管理,虛列公司的盈餘使公司可以上市,或是得到更高的承銷價,而投資人的背後一定有某種決策的動機,使得投資人願意去購買新上市公司股票。本文透過投資人的理性預期及產出門檻的設計,其結果發現,在滿足公司的誘因條件下,公司做盈餘管理的動作,會被投資人給還原,且投資人可以降低投資成本。此外,我們也發現,公司與投資人有資訊不對稱時,若公司做盈餘管理時,會有承銷價低估的現象。
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/23128
Appears in Collections:財務金融學系所

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