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標題: 公司治理對投資策略之影響
The Impact of Corporate Governance on Firm's Investment Policy
作者: 陳品劭
Chen, Ping-Shao
關鍵字: Corporate governance
institutional holding
出版社: 財務金融系所
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摘要: 本研究以1980年至2010年期間,在美國上市公司為主要研究樣本,探討公司治理對公司投資策略的影響。根據Richardson(2006)所建立的非預期投資模型,計算過度投資與投資不足的大小。再分別以Gompers et al.(2003)所建構的公司治理指標(G-Index)作為公司治理內部機制變數,衡量公司經理人受保護的程度,當公司經理人受到的保護程度愈高時,將濫用資源、不當投資,過度投資的情形更加嚴重;以機構法人持股穩定性變數作為公司治理外部機制變數,分別為法人持股標準化比率、法人非零持有期間和法人保持持有股數期間,衡量公司團隊受到監督的水平,能夠有效抑制過度投資的情況。最後同時考慮公司治理指標與機構法人持股穩定性變數,實證結果發現在公司處於過度投資的情況時,除了法人持股標準化比率之外,公司治理機制內部的保護力量和公司治理外部機制的監督力量仍起作用;在公司處於投資不足的情況時,法人持股標準化比率、法人非零持有期間和公司治理指標的影響互相消除,而法人保持持有股數期間依然會抑制公司的投資支出。
The study analyzes the impact of corporate governance and institutional investors on firm's investment policies by using the U.S. public firms from 1980 to 2010. Following the approach in Richardson(2006), we estimate the unexpected investment and free cash flows simultaneously. In addition, we measure the corporate governance by G-Index in Gompers et al.(2003) and the stability of institutional ownership in Elyasiani and Jia(2010). On the one hand, we use G-Index to proxy the protection of managers, which is a measure of internal corporate governance mechanism. On the other hand, we utilize the monitoring function of institutional ownership as the external corporate governance mechanism. Our empirical evidence shows that the unexpected investment increases with G-Index, which implies that over- or underinvestment is more serious problems in the firms with better protection for their managers. Moreover, controlling the effect of free cash flows on unexpected investment, the result in institutional ownership also provides similar evidence with G-Index. Higher institutional ownership offers better monitoring mechanism and alleviates the problem of unexpected investment. Finally, some measures of institutional ownership, such as maintain-stake-points duration, and G-Index still perform the significant role in corporate governance on the firm's investment policies after we take both factors into account simultaneously.
其他識別: U0005-1307201116032200
Appears in Collections:財務金融學系所



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