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Bank Monitoring and Borrowers' Earnings Management
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|摘要:||In this paper, we examine the corporate governance role of Taiwan''s financial institutions. The results show that Taiwan listed firms increase the amount of manipulation of earnings management behavior as the magnitude of a loan increase. Non-foreign financial institutions monitoring and syndicated loan can be reduce the company''s earnings management. No matter what monitoring good or bad, financial institutions play important role in the corporate governance. In other aspect, they may be more concerned about the level of earnings in terms of credibility for investor, so we also use view of investor to examine wheather earning management behavior is effect by the financial supervision and corporate characteristics. In particular, we find that loans to financial institutions in the higher amount, the firm will greatly beautify the book surplus.Investors should be vigilant. The text will do more detailed analysis for the impact of other variables.|
|Appears in Collections:||財務金融學系所|
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