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標題: 公司治理與財務危機公司之盈餘管理
Corporate Governance and Earnings Management of Financial Distress Corporation
作者: 范美慧
Fan, Mei-Hui
關鍵字: 盈餘管理
出版社: 高階經理人碩士在職專班
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摘要: 本研究以五項公司治理指標(股權結構、董監結構、專業經理人角色、財務資訊透明度及經營層風險)探討公司治理是否影響財務危機公司之盈餘管理行為。選取1998至2007年之81家財務危機公司為觀察樣本,與162家財務正常公司為對照樣本。實證結果顯示,財務危機公司在股權結構、專業經理人角色、財務資訊透明度及經營層風險等四項因素經檢定結果均達顯著水準,說明該等因素對財務危機公司管理階層盈餘管理行為有正面的影響,而董監結構因素經檢定未達顯著水準,未能證實會影響其盈餘管理程度。以上結果仍能支持公司治理機制可以減緩財務危機公司的盈餘管理程度之假說。
This study uses five indicators of corporate governance (ownership structure, board structure, the role of professional managers, the transparency of financial information and risk characteristics of managerment) to investigate the impact of corporate governance on earnings management behavior of the financial distress corporation. During the period 1998-2007, a sample of 81 companies of financial distress and 162 healthy companies for matching is used in the analysis. The empirical results of ownership structure, the role of professional managers, the transparency of financial information and risk characteristics of managerment are obtained by the significant level. These four indicators have a positive impact on earnings management behavior of financial distress corporation. But board structure is less than significant level by the test, failed to establish that impact. These results can support the hypothesis that corporate governance mechanism could slow the extent of earnings management of financial distress corporation.
其他識別: U0005-3006200910355800
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