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標題: 會計穩健性與董事會特性之關係
The Role of Accounting Conservatism and Board of Director Characteristics
作者: 蔡青曲
Tsai, Ching-Chu
關鍵字: 會計穩健
accounting conservatism
board independence
出版社: 高階經理人碩士在職專班
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摘要: Basu et al.(2005)研究臺灣企業會計穩健性與盈餘認列時效性,其指出臺灣企業所遵循的會計準則、審計準則原則上是追隨美國的,其效率性與美國企業相同,但臺灣企業的型態大都以家族企業為主,控制權及所有權結構明顯與美國不同,這樣的差異造成臺灣企業會計穩健性比美國低。近年來,我國主管機關積極推動獨立董事制度及強化董事會職能,以健全公司治理功能,確保股東之權益。本研究擬探討董事會特性是否影響企業會計穩健程度,亦即探討當董事會具備較強的監控功能時,企業是否採用較保守的會計政策,使得會計穩健性隨之增加。 本研究以2007年至2009年國內上市公司為研究樣本,控制了法人持股、公司規模、負債比例、成長機會、現金流量、審計品質,參考Beaver and Ryan(2000)市場基礎衡量模式,以市價淨值比衡量會計穩健性,探討非條件穩健與董事會特性之關係。本研究發現董事會獨立性與會計穩健程度呈顯著正向關係,董事會規模及董事長兼任總經理則無顯著正向關係。代表當公司董事會獨立性愈高,愈有助於督促經理人採用較保守的會計政策,使得會計穩健性的程度愈高。
Basu et al.(2005) find Taiwanese firms’ earnings exhibits less conservatism in their application of GAAP. The ownership structure of listed firms in Taiwan has been associated with the presence of controlling owners who play an active role in management. In order to improve corporate governance and protect shareholders’ equity, the Authority has been undertaken to introduce the concept of the independent director that aims to enhance the strength of board governance. The purpose of this study is to investigate whether a stronger effectiveness of boards will monitor the accounting policies applied by the firms, which promotes greater conservatism. Using a sample of firms listed on the Taiwan stock exchange between 2007 and 2009, this study examines the relation between board characteristics and accounting conservatism. To measure unconditional conservatism, this study employs the market-value based measure of conservatism, market-to-book ratio, based on Beaver and Ryan(2000). After controlling for institutional ownership, firm size, leverage, growth opportunities, cash flows from operations, audit quality and unobservable firm characteristics that are stable over time, the empirical results show that the percentage of independent directors is positively related to accounting conservatism, whereas board size and CEO/chair duality is unrelated to accounting conservatism. Overall, the evidence shows that the higher the board independence, the more likely they will monitor managers to adopt more conservative accounting policies and therefore a higher level of accounting conservatism is reached.
其他識別: U0005-2108201212433400
Appears in Collections:高階經理人碩士在職專班



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