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The manufacturer''s optimal product line design under revenue sharing mechanism
product line design
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Under the traditional contract, manufacturers sell products to retailers at wholesale price. Follow that, retailers decide the retail price to consumers. Revenue sharing mechanism has applied by lots of manufacturers. However, there were not many researches focused on this field in the past. Under revenue sharing contract, it can resolve double marginalization problem and increase profit for the whole channel. Related researches were mainly focused on a single product, and there was no discussion about production line designs. Thus, the research direction of this paper is in utilizing coordination effect from revenue sharing mechanism to improve cannibalization problem. This study is under the circumstance of a manufacturer and a retailer in a monopolized market exploring the manufacturer’s the optimal product line by implementing manufacturer and retailer revenue sharing mechanism. Among indirect channels, set up a revenue sharing rate, and the manufacturer decides the level of product quality first then the retailer decides its retail prices. The retailer considers that if he wants to purchase all the products from product lines and retail prices for consumers according to the fixed revenue sharing rate, designs and product qualities from product lines provided by the manufacturer. After consumers notice the qualities and prices of the products sold on the market, they make purchase decision under reviewing products with utility is non-negative. After calculation process, proceed with backward induction to obtain the manufacturer’s optimal product line designs. Studies have found some explanations as following: 1. Under Revenue sharing mechanism, the revenue sharing ratio of high-end products is higher than the ratio of low-end products for product line design. 2. Under Revenue sharing mechanism, when the importance of low-end consumers is lower, the quality of low-end products for revenue sharing is close to efficiency level. For quality of high-end products could be lower or higher than efficiency level. 3. When the importance of low-end consumers is in the lower or higher zone, manufacturers prefer to implement traditional product lines instead of revenue sharing. When the importance of low-end consumers is in middle zone, because of cannibalization, revenue sharing mechanism implemented by the manufacturer could effectively retard low-end products getting contorted. And also, it is able to make profits from high-end products. At this point, revenue sharing mechanism implemented by the manufacturer has more advantages than traditional product lines.
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