Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/25152
標題: 營收分享機制下,製造商之最適產品線設計
The manufacturer''s optimal product line design under revenue sharing mechanism
作者: 林嘉洋
Lin, Chia-Yang
關鍵字: 營收分享
game theory
產品線設計
產品競蝕
賽局理論
revenue sharing
product line design
出版社: 高階經理人碩士在職專班
引用: 一、中文部分 王楨媛(2009),通路競爭與營收分享合約下之最佳定價與訂購量。中央大學。 李彥璁 (2010),當供應商面臨一個風險趨避的零售商在營收分享合約下所達成的通路協調。中央大學。 莊淑珍 (2012) ,考量零售商可調整產品品質下,製造商之最適產品線設計。中興大學。 二、 英文部分 Balachander, S., & Srinivasan, K. (1994). Selection of product line qualities and prices to signal competitive advantage. Management Science, 40(7), 824-841. Cachon、Lariviere (2001) Turning the supply chain into a revenue sharing chain. Cachon、Lariviere (2005) Supply chain coordination with revenue sharing contracts. Int. J. Production Economics 89 131-139 Cai、Dai、Zhou(2011) Exclusive channels and revenue sharing in a complementary goods market. Marketing Science, Articles in Advance, pp. 1-16 Chen、Cheng、Chien (2008) PROFIT-MAXIMIZATION MODELS FOR A MANUFACTURER-RETAILER CHANNEL UNDER. Journal of the Chinese Industrial Engineers, Vol. 25, No. 5, pp.413-422 Dana、Spier (2001) Revenue and vertical control in the video rental industry. THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, 0022-1821, volume XLIX Dobson, G., & Kalish, S. (1998). Positioning and pricing a product line. Marketing Scienc, 7(1), 107-125. Gilbert, R., & Matutes, C. (1993). Product line rivalry with brand differentiation. Indust F, conom, XLI(3), 223-239. Hou、Zeng、Zhao(2009) Achieving better coordination through revenue sharing and bargaining in a two-stage supply chain. Computers & Industrial Engineering 57 (2009) 383-394 Katz, M. L. (1984). Firm specific differentiation and competition among multiproduct firms. Journal of Business, 57(1), 149-166. Koulamas (2006). A newsvendor problem with revenue sharing and channel coordination. Decision Sciences; 37(1), pg. 91 Kunter (2012) Coordination via cost and revenue sharing in manufacturer-retailer channels. European Journal of Operational Research 216, 477-486 Moorthy, K. S. (1984). Marketing segmentation, self-selection., and product line design. Marketing scienc, 3(4), 288-305. Moorthy M., & Png, I. P. L. (1992). Market segmentation, cannibalization, and the timing of product introductions. Management Science, 38(3), 345-359. Mortimer, J.H. (2008). Vertical contracts in the video rental industry. Review of Economic Studies 75, pp. 165-199. Mussa M., & Rosen, S. (1978). Monopoly and product quality. Journal of Economic Theory, 18, 141-168. Oren, S., Smith, S., & Wilson, R. (1984). Pricing a product line. Journal of Buiness, 57(1), 73-100 Pasternack, B.A. (2002). Using revenue sharing to achieve channel coordination for a newsboy type inventory model. In: J. Geunes, P. .Pardalos and H.E. Romeijin, Editors, Supply Chain Management: Models, Applications and Research Directions, Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 117-136. Qin、Yang (2008) Analysis of a revenue-sharing contract in supply chain management. A Leading Journal of Supply Chain Management, 11:1, 17-29 Reibstein, D., & Gatignon, H. (1984). Optimal product line pricing: The influence of elasticities and cross elasticities. Journal of Marketing Research, 21, 259-267. Villas-Boas J. M. (1998). Product line design for a distribution channel. Marketing Science, 17(2), 156-169 Yao、Leung、Lai (2008) The effectiveness of revenue-sharing contract to coordinate the price-setting newsvendor products’ supply chain. Supply Chain Management: An International Journal 13/4, 263-271 Zenor, M. (1994). The profit benefits of category management. Joumal of Marketing Research, 31, 202-213.
摘要: 在傳統契約下製造商以批發價將產品賣給零售商,零售商再決定零售價賣給消費者。而營收分享機制已經被很多廠商應用,但是過去研究卻比較少集中在這個領域。事實證明營收分享合約,可以解決雙重邊際化的問題,並使整個通路利潤增加。但是相關的營收分享研究也只是針對單一產品討論,並無產品線設計的論文。因此本論文利用營收分享機制具有通路協調之作用,來改善產品線競蝕問題,為論文研究方向。 本研究考慮一個獨佔市場,存在一家製造商與一家零售商的情況,探討製造商與零售商採用營收分享機制下,製造商之最適產品線設計。在間接通路中,給定營收分享比例,製造商先決定產品品質的程度,而零售商決定零售價。針對給定的營收分享比例和製造商所提供的產品線設計與產品品質,零售商進一步考慮是否進貨所有產品線上的產品,並決定銷售給消費者的零售價格。消費者看到市場上所販賣產品的品質和價格後,在檢視產品所帶來的效用非負下制定購買決策。計算過程以後向歸納法進行,來求出製造商的最適產品線設計。 研究後發現以下結果: 1. 營收分享機制下,只有當高端產品的營收分享比例大於低端產品的營收分享比例時,才有可能出現產品線設計。1 2. 營收分享機制下,當低端消費者重要性較低時,低端產品品質可以更接近效率水準。而高端產品品質可能低於或高於效率水準。 3.當低端消費者重要性過低或過高時,製造商在傳統契約下可獲得比較高的利潤。當低端消費者重要性增加到大小適中時,因為產品競蝕問題,製造商推出營收分享,能有效減緩低端產品受到扭曲,同時也能從高端產品獲利,這時製造商推出營收分享機制會比傳統產品線有更高獲利。
Under the traditional contract, manufacturers sell products to retailers at wholesale price. Follow that, retailers decide the retail price to consumers. Revenue sharing mechanism has applied by lots of manufacturers. However, there were not many researches focused on this field in the past. Under revenue sharing contract, it can resolve double marginalization problem and increase profit for the whole channel. Related researches were mainly focused on a single product, and there was no discussion about production line designs. Thus, the research direction of this paper is in utilizing coordination effect from revenue sharing mechanism to improve cannibalization problem. This study is under the circumstance of a manufacturer and a retailer in a monopolized market exploring the manufacturer’s the optimal product line by implementing manufacturer and retailer revenue sharing mechanism. Among indirect channels, set up a revenue sharing rate, and the manufacturer decides the level of product quality first then the retailer decides its retail prices. The retailer considers that if he wants to purchase all the products from product lines and retail prices for consumers according to the fixed revenue sharing rate, designs and product qualities from product lines provided by the manufacturer. After consumers notice the qualities and prices of the products sold on the market, they make purchase decision under reviewing products with utility is non-negative. After calculation process, proceed with backward induction to obtain the manufacturer’s optimal product line designs. Studies have found some explanations as following: 1. Under Revenue sharing mechanism, the revenue sharing ratio of high-end products is higher than the ratio of low-end products for product line design. 2. Under Revenue sharing mechanism, when the importance of low-end consumers is lower, the quality of low-end products for revenue sharing is close to efficiency level. For quality of high-end products could be lower or higher than efficiency level. 3. When the importance of low-end consumers is in the lower or higher zone, manufacturers prefer to implement traditional product lines instead of revenue sharing. When the importance of low-end consumers is in middle zone, because of cannibalization, revenue sharing mechanism implemented by the manufacturer could effectively retard low-end products getting contorted. And also, it is able to make profits from high-end products. At this point, revenue sharing mechanism implemented by the manufacturer has more advantages than traditional product lines.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/25152
其他識別: U0005-0107201320093000
文章連結: http://www.airitilibrary.com/Publication/alDetailedMesh1?DocID=U0005-0107201320093000
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