Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/25153
標題: 營收分享機制對雙占廠商均衡通路策略之影響
The Impacts of Revenue Sharing on the Equilibrium Channel Strategies of Duopoly Firms
作者: 陳佳麟
Chen, Jia-Lin
關鍵字: 雙重邊際化
double marginalization
營收分享
替代效果
直接通路
間接通路
雙重通路
雙占通路
revenue sharing
substitution effect
direct channel
indirect channel
dual channel
duopoly channel
出版社: 高階經理人碩士在職專班
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摘要: 市場競爭是越來越激烈,每個產品都希望能銷售越多越好,在競爭的過程中,常會有上下游出現雙重邊際化(double marginalization)的狀況;營收分享(revenue sharing)在銷售通路策略中,可以讓整個通路垂直整合順利,上下游間更能夠達成利潤分享的均衡結果。因此營收分享有助於通路協定的達成,製造商可以透過與經銷商訂定營收分享合約,來達成彼此間的利潤最佳化,也較不會發生與經銷商相互競爭的情形。 本論文研究主要考慮一個兩階層的通路管道,運用賽局理論建構一個動態賽局,於模型中假設兩個競爭製造商及一個經銷商,並考量到產品間的替代性與通路間的替代性效果。任一製造商可以有三種通路策略選擇:直接通路、間接通路及雙重通路策略,在排列組合下,兩個競爭製造商可能的通路策略組合則共有九種。有別於過去研究常使用的訂價模式(亦即製造商訂定批發價而零售商訂定零售價),本研究則是考慮營收分享機制,探討在此機制下,對競爭製造商的通路策略選擇會有何種影響。 本研究得到以下的結果:一、與傳統的訂價模式相比,在營收分享機制下,可能出現的通路策略組合更為多元。二、在傳統的雙占通路下,雙重通路策略的均衡是出現在產品間的替代效果夠小時,但在有營收分享機制下時,均衡是出現在產品替代效果要夠大時,與其剛好相反。三、雙重通路策略的均衡是出現在直接通路與間接通路的需求差距要夠大時。
Market competition is becoming increasingly fierce; each manufacturer hopes to get the most sales of their product. During the competition process, there are often to show a double marginalization condition between upstream and downstream companies. Therefore, revenue sharing can contribute to help companies to reach the channel coordination. Through the revenue sharing contract agreement between manufacturer and distributors it can reach the optimize profit and the price competition between distributors will not occur. In this study, we mainly consider a two-level supply chain. We construct a dynamic game theory basic model. In our model, we assume that two competing manufactures and one retailer, as well as we consider the product substitution effects and channel substitution effects. Any manufacturer can choose from three channel strategies: direct channel、indirect channel and dual channel strategy. Under permutations and combinations, two competing manufacturers can choose channel strategies of a combination of nine different choices. Differ from past studies commonly used pricing models (i.e., manufacturers set the wholesale price and retailers set retail price). In this study, it focuses on the revenue sharing mechanism. We are exploring the revenue sharing mechanism to see its influence on competitive manufacturer''s channel strategy. The results of this research are the following: 1. Comparing the traditional price structure, revenue sharing mechanism can create more channel strategies and more diversified. 2. Traditional duopoly channel that the equilibrium of dual-channel strategy is to appear in minimum substitution effect between the products. In the contrast, under revenue sharing mechanism, equilibrium of dual-channel strategy is to appear in maximum substitution effect between the products. 3. Dual channel strategy equilibrium that appears in the demand for direct channel and indirect channel gap to be large enough gap
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/25153
其他識別: U0005-0307201300041300
文章連結: http://www.airitilibrary.com/Publication/alDetailedMesh1?DocID=U0005-0307201300041300
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