Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/27709
標題: 影響國有土地標售價格因素之研究
A Study on Factors of Bidding Price in State-Owned Land
作者: 宋佳樺
Sung, Chia-Hua
關鍵字: auction
拍賣
winner's curse
independent private value
common value
贏家詛咒
私人價值
共同價值
出版社: 應用經濟學系所
引用: (一)中文部份: 1. 沈維民、李重君,1996,「競局理論的應用-以拍賣制度為例」,會計研究月刋,第122期,52-59頁。 2. 林慎福,2005,「台中市地價與股價關聯性之研究」,朝陽科技大學營建工程系碩士論文。 3. 財政部國有財產局,2003,「建立國有土地提供開發利用機制之研究報告」。 4. 財政部國有財產局,2007,「九十五年度業務年報」。 5. 殷章甫,2004,「土地經濟學」,五南圖書出版公司。 6. 許鈴佩,1997,「台灣公債標售與贏家詛咒之實證研究」,台灣大學財務金融研究所碩士論文。 7. 許易民,2005,「從美國不動產的警訊看台灣房地產的現況」,建華金融季刊,第30期,69-80頁。 8. 陳憶茹,2004,「拍賣制度、市場機制與法拍屋價格之分析」,政治大學地政學系碩士論文。 9. 曾炤人,2000,「第一價格密封競標之實證研究」,長庚大學管理學系管理組碩士論文。 10. 黃志雄,2003,「應用資料採礦分析線上拍賣市場之模式」,朝陽科技大學工業工程與管理系碩士論文。 11. 鄭民安,1990,「不動產估價理論與方法」,五南圖書出版公司。 12. 劉孟琪,2001,「共同價值之第一價值秘密競標模型」,高雄第一科技大學金融營運系碩士論文。 (二)英文部份: 1. Feldman, R. A. and Mehra, R., 1993. “Auctions Theory and Applications”. IMF Staff Papers, 40(3),pp.485-511. 2. Giliberto, S. M. and Varaiya, N. P., 1989. “The Winner’s Curse and Bidder Competition in Acquisitions:Evidence from Failed Bank Auctions”. The Journal of Finance, XLIV(1),pp.59-75. 3. Milgrom, P. R. and Weber, R. J., 1982. “A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding”. Econometrica, 50(5),pp.1089-1122. 4. McAfee, R. P. and McMillan, J., 1986. “Bidding for Contracts: A Principal-Agent Analysis”. The Rand Journal of Economics, 17(3), pp.326-338. 5. McAfee, R. P. and McMillan, J., 1987.“Auctions and Bidding”. Journal of Economic Literature, 25(2),pp.699-738. 6. Quan, D. C., 2002.“Market Mechanism Choice and Real Estate Disposition:Search Versus Auction”. Real Esatate Economics, 30(3),pp.365-384. 7. Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel and Timothy C. Salmon, 2004. “Bidder Preferences among Auction Institutions”. Economic Inquiry, 42(2),pp.223-236. 8. Salanie, B., 1997. “The Economics of Contracts: Primer”. The MIT Press. 9. Vickrey, W., 1961.“Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders”. The Journal of Finance, 16(1),pp.8-37. 10. Wolfstetter, E., 1999. “Topics in Microeconomics: Industrial Organization, Auctions, and Incentives”. Cambrigde University Press,pp.182-242.
摘要: 自2002年初,行政院大幅解除對國有土地的管制政策,開放財政部國有財產局對於都會區大面積國有土地的標售,因而吸引投資人競相參與競價以來,國有土地標售狀況儼然成為房地產業的景氣指標。國產局目前係採「第一價格密封競標」拍賣制度標售國有土地,為了解相關交易關係人之競標策略對競標價格之影響,本研究乃就該局位於台北市、台中市及高雄市在2005及2006年之標脫案例進行實證分析,探討競標人之競標策略及其結果,並據以檢定國有土地究屬「私人價值」或「共同價值」之假說條件。 本研究以Giliberto & Varaiya(1989)的實證模型為基礎,在考量影響國有土地價格之因素後加以修改,建立兩組實證研究模型。主要研究結果如下: 一、在共同價值模型假設下,台北市及高雄市之競標人並未顧忌贏家詛咒,台中市競標人的競價策略則較為保守,而且價值不確定性高時,三個都市之競標人為爭取得標,均採積極競標之策略。 二、根據統計分析結果,三個都市之競標價格均隨競標人數之增加而大幅增加,合乎私人價值模型之理論。 三、另外,「國有土地符合私人價值模型」之特性假說,亦為本研究的統計結果所支持。 四、競標人數與得標價格成正相關,與Giliberto & Varaiya實證結果相同,惟台中市在共同價值模型假設下之實證結果例外。另,價值不確定性與得標價格成正相關,此點則與Giliberto & Varaiya實證結果相左。
Since Executive Yuan had deregulated the regulations about state-owned land on the beginning of 2002, the National Property Bureau(NPB)at the Ministry of Finance launched the auctions that attracted a lot of investors participated in and competed for the state-owned land with large scale in three metropolitan areas in Taiwan. This made the winning bids of state-owned land become the proxies of industrial index of the real estate. The NPB adopts “first price sealed bids” auctions system to dispose the state-owned land at present. In order to help the stakeholders to understand how the bidders' strategies effect on bidding price, this study examines the auctioned objects of the NPB in Taipei, Taichung, Kaohsiung branches over the period 2005 and 2006, and if the state-owned land characterizes as the “independent private value” or the “ common value” will be tested . Based on the empirical model derived by Giliberto & Varaiya (1989), this study revised and constructed two sets of functions to consider the factors of influencing the price of state-owned land. The major results are as follows: 1. Under the circumstances that the common value model is assumed, the bidders in Taipei and Kaohsiung cities didn't concern about the winner's curse. The competitive strategies of bidders in Taichung were conservative comparatively. When the degree of value uncertainty is high, the bidders in all cities adopt aggressive bidding strategies to acquire objects. 2. The number of bidders of three cities increased, the competitive bid soar significantly under the theory of the private value model. 3. Statistical results also support the hypotheses that the state-owned land is accord with the characteristic of “independent private value”. 4. The number of bidders is correlated positively with winning price, which is consistent with the findings in Giliberto & Varaiya work, but the outcomes for Taichung case in the common value model is in vague. Value uncertainty is correlated negatively with winning price, this result fails to agree with Giliberto & Varaiya'a statistical results.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/27709
其他識別: U0005-0108200717520100
文章連結: http://www.airitilibrary.com/Publication/alDetailedMesh1?DocID=U0005-0108200717520100
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