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標題: 個人高等教育投資決策之理論模型-實質選擇權之應用
A Theoretical Model of Individual Higher Educational Investment Decision: Real Options Approach
作者: 黃玟儀
Hwang, Wei-Yei
關鍵字: real option
human capital
educational returns
tertiary education
出版社: 應用經濟學系所
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摘要: 人力資本累積對經濟發展的重要性不容置喙,已開發和開發中國家同時面臨國際化競爭與全球接軌以取得知識經濟優勢的情勢,近年來無不致力於教育資源的抑注,已開發國家並將擴充高教容量及高教品質提升,視為重要政策目標,惟肇因於全球化趨勢與產業外移所造成的高階勞動跨國性競爭與國內就業需求成長緩慢,導致國內就業容量稀釋;然而,為達成教育普及的政策目標,台灣近年卻大幅擴充培育高教容量,造成高等勞動市場的供需失衡,勞動條件的惡化因而導致「文憑效果」下降,將藉由人力資本投資決策準則,影響個人的升學意願。有別於傳統人力資本的投資模型,建構在淨現值法之評估準則,本文則提出整合實質選擇權概念的評估模式,協助個人進行人力資本的投資決策,目的則在反映教育投資具有不確定性及遞延性的特質;並藉由實質選擇權概念說明學歷敘薪差異的文憑效果,透過實質選擇權價值的估算,說明文憑效果對人力資本投資決策的影響,並整合部門移動均衡的概念,試圖解釋近年來臺灣大學生起薪低落情形,以及多數已開發國家面臨的高學歷高失業的矛盾現象。 建構在實質選擇權概念的人力資本投資模型,界定重考缺口及失業缺口的形成及其變化,由本文的比較靜態分析結果發現,為解決重考缺口及失業缺口的問題,除了透過逐年報備審查招生簡章作業以控管碩士培育人數之機制外,政府亦可藉由教育直接成本(訂定學雜費收費標準)、教育補貼(提供獎助學金)、所得稅率(薪資扣繳的所得稅率)等措施,影響大學畢業生繼續升學意願。 在提升受教率的普世價值下,擴充高教容量的開放教育政策,透過縮小勞動市場文憑效果的機制,抑制大學畢業生的升學意願,此舉固然有效地縮小體系內重考缺口,避免社會資源的浪費,但由於政策擴充的碩士培育量,無法全數被勞動市場所吸納,勢必衍生後續失業缺口的情況更趨惡化;然而,若政府著眼於解決失業問題,因而採取減招或限招的緊縮性教育政策,雖可疏緩碩士失業缺口,以降低社會資源配置無效率,但卻可能導致碩士供應量減少、碩士就業人員的敘薪條件獲致改善,造成總體就業容量稀釋,而勞動市場文憑效果的擴大,更誘發體系內的升學意願提高,加劇重考缺口之規模,反而有社會資源浪費之虞。 由本文比較靜態分析得知,教育政策的調整不應執著在人才培育的數量思維,可藉由學雜費調整、教育補助、所得稅、產學合作計劃等相關的制度設計方式,影響體系內的升學意願,以期有效解決失業或重考缺口的問題。
Of the requisites for economic development, human capital plays the most pivotal role. In order to align with the international trend by intensive knowledge-based economy to gain advantage, OECD countries and developing countries inject volumes of resources into educational system in past several decades. The most of OECD countries regard higher education and talents nurture as the important purposes of administration. Owing to the trend of globalization of industry the higher human labor faced transnational competition and the sluggish growth of domestic employment capacity resulting in a serious unemployment, besides, higher education capacity enlarge rapidly for the sake of school attendance rate raise, overall, excess labor supply deteriorate wage level and lead to diploma effects reduction. Using the real option that conquers two shortcomings, reversible and undeferrable, existing in static human capital model. The real options take place of the net present value to evaluate individual decision of educational investment that uncertainty and irreversibility appear on human capitals accumulation. The real options logic looks at strategic decisions in terms of the options they create and values these options. It implies that there are ways to hedge against risk and to reduce uncertainty. This paper introduces real option concepts to specify sheepskin effects in wage margin; furthermore, combining with derived labor demand functions to explain contradictive phenomena of unemployment and high education levels in most of developed countries. This approach tries to illustrate sheepskin effects impacting on educational decision with value of real options in this approach, and integrating movement equilibrium concepts explain the phenomenon of bachelor freshmen downcast starting pay. The more talent development, the higher rate of unemployment; and further, we explain relationship between the gap of unemployment and the gap of reexamination and to realize scales of the gaps with the modified model with real option value. The comparative static analysis of economics shows that administration solve reexamination and unemployment problems by way of graduated schools' enrollment rates, charges for tuition, educational subsidies and income tax rates to influence the individual aspirations for higher education. Expanding higher educational capacity policy suppress the willingness for entering higher education of bachelor degree undergraduate through sheepskin effects subtraction to avoid wasting social resources on enlargement of the reexamination gap, nevertheless, the extension of talent development made master labor market incapable of complete absorbability so that aggravation of master unemployment gap. The administration has in mind for moderation of unemployment to adopt the educational policy of restraint on enrollment rates that leads to improve the location efficiency on social resources, however, the master labor supply curtailment results in reexamination scale deterioration with result that squander on social resources.
其他識別: U0005-2101200914345300
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