請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/55401
標題: R&D Outlay, Market Competition, Default Risk, and Executives Stock Options
研發支出、市場競爭、違約風險與經理人股票選擇權
作者: 林宜勉
關鍵字: 研發支出
R&D outlay
經濟學
市場競爭
董事會獨立性
盈餘管理
經理人誘因
違約風險
經理人股票選擇權
基礎研究
Market competition
Board independence
Default risk
Managerial incentive
Earnings management
Executive stock option
摘要: 有關R&D 支出的利益與風險之一直爭議不斷。有些研究指出,R&D 支出可增加股東財富,有些卻認為,R&D 支出的潛在利益是具有高風險的,並且這些風險比潛在利益更大。以往的研究在檢驗R&D 之風險和利益時,大多著重在股東財富效果或經營績效上。事實上,債券持有人對R&D 的反應未必與股東財富之變動呈同方向。股東為了自我利益,可能會因風險的增加而犧牲債券持有人之利益,因為股票是類似於標的物為公司價值的買權。而員工選擇權的給予通常會隨著公司前期營業績效及股價績效之增加而增加,所以經理人情緒為決定股票選擇權獎酬的因素之ㄧ。又對於現金較少的公司而言,一般傾向使用股票選擇權支付獎酬;而長期負債較多的公司,也因受制於債務契約的限制,如現金限制,故較偏好以股票選擇權作為經理人的績效獎酬。據此,本計畫具體之研究目的如下:(1) 本計畫將探討於考慮公司的董事會結構下,當公司的R&D 增加時,經理人是否同時藉由操縱盈餘方式,導致公司價值增加愈多,並使股票選擇權的價值增加呢?而當公司價值的增加時,是否使經理人獎酬中的股票選擇權的給予增加?(2) 在考慮公司的董事會獨立性下,於高股票報酬之後,亦即員工情緒較佳者,公司是否將給予經理人更多的股票選擇權當作績效獎酬?(3) 在控制R&D 與董事會結構下,現金限制愈大,即現金流量不足,若前期股價績效增加,公司是否仍傾向給予經理人股票選擇權作為績效獎酬。負債契約可減輕高成長公司的負債代理成本,以降低股東與債券持有人(或稱債權人)之間的衝突,同時在控制這些衝突時短期債務和限制性契約是可相互替代的。最初違約風險假說認為:公司的最初違約風險愈高,債券持有人由R&D增加所獲利益將愈多。契約假說則指出:當銀行負債愈多時,藉由銀行貸款契約的保護,R&D 的增加會使債權人免於受到傷害。因此,本文亦將探討:(1) 在考慮公司的董事會獨立性下,成長機會(R&D)較高的公司,若經理人誘因較高,公司是否偏向藉由長期銀行借款或發行公司債來融資?(2) 當公司最初違約風險愈大時,當期R&D 支出的增加,債權人是否會因受債權契約的保障,故其財富不會顯著移轉至股東?而於R&D 支出的增加後,若公司違約風險增加,若經理人持有較高比例的股票選擇權,是否將較易從事盈餘管理,以使債權人財富移轉至股東?另一方面,有關公司所面對的市場競爭對經理人誘因的影響,通常有不同的論點。若公司面對經理人的懈怠與高成本時,競爭的增加會提高公司被清算的可能性。在高清算威脅下,經理人會明顯地增加其努力,但這項努力也會與公司提供給經理人的誘因有關。為補償經理人所增加的期望效用損失,公司會提供較強的誘因以激勵其努力工作;為避免清算發生時經理人被撤換,公司會提供較弱的誘因以激勵其努力工作。因此,本計畫將進一步檢驗,當公司在產業中的競爭性愈強時,公司是否會增加R&D 支出,以擴充公司營運規模與市場佔有力?同時,當公司在產業中的競爭性愈強時,公司是否會給予經理人更高的股票選擇權,以激勵其努力工作?在台灣的高科技產業與美國的高科技產業,對於這些課題的實證結果之差異,亦為本計畫的研究內容。
Some prior studies suggest that R&D can increase shareholders wealth, but somestudies indicate the potential benefit of R&D outlays is highly risky, and this risk ishigher than the potential benefit. Prior studies focus on shareholders wealth effect oron operation performance in examining the benefit and riskiness of R&D. In effect, thereactions of bondholders to the increase R&D are inconsistent with the change inshareholders wealth. R&D may increase equity value by rising firm value but can alsorise equity value at the expense of bondholders wealth through an increase in firm riskbecause the equity is similar to a call option on the underlying firm value.Based on the employee sentiment hypothesis, the grants of stock optioncompensation are increasing in past stock price performance for the executives. Wemay regard executives' sentiment as a factor in option compensation. The firms withless cash tend to adopt stock option as a compensation for the manager, and the firmswith higher long-term debts, who are confined to the restrictions of debt covenants,also prefer it to cash compensation because options bear no cash outlay.Accordingly, this paper first examine whether the manager manipulate earningswhen an increase in R&D, to induce higher firm value and thus higher value of stockoptions under considering the structure of the board of directors. The paper furtherstudies how an increase of the firm value affects the grants of stock options for themanager. Under considering the board independence, we attempt to find the evidencethat the firm pays more stock options as a performance compensation for theexecutives after higher previous stock return or better employee sentiment. In this case,this paper also examines whether the firm with higher cash flow shortfall or more cashconstraints tend to grant stock option compensation to the executives.The debt covenant can mitigate the agency cost of debt for higher growth firmsto reduce the conflicts between shareholders and bondholders. The short-term debtcan substitute for restricted covenant in a setting of controlling their conflicts. TheInitial Default Risk hypothesis suggests that bondholder gets more benefit from R&Dincreases if the firm has higher initial default risk. The Covenant hypothesis indicatesthat the bank loan agreement can protect the bondholders from harm if the bank debtis higher.Hence, this paper also examines the following issues: (1) The firm with highergrowth opportunity (R&D) tends to adopt long-term bank debt or issue bond to financecapital if the executive has higher managerial incentive in a setting of considering theboard independence. (2) Under higher initial default risk, an increase of current R&Doutlays cannot induce the wealth transfers from bondholders to stockholders becauseof the protection of debt covenants. (3) After R&D increases, the manager performsearnings management to induce wealth transfers from bondholders to stockholders ifthe firm has higher default risk and/or its executives have higher holdings of stockoption.On the other hand, prior papers predict an ambiguous relation betweencompetition and managerial incentives. An increase in competition increases thelikelihood of liquidation if the firm faces managerial slack and high costs. If thethreat-of-liquidation effect is high, managerial effort increases significantly, but thisincreased magnitude depends on the degree that incentives were provided to themanagers. To compensate the managers for the increased expected utility loss, firmsprovide stronger incentives to motivate managers to work harder. To avoiding themanagers will be fired, firms provide weaker incentives to managers that aremotivated to work harder to keep their jobs. This paper therefore examines whether afirm increases R&D to expand market size and share under the competition is high inan industry, and whether the firm grants more executive stock options as acompensation to motivate the manager to work harder when the competition is higher.This paper also investigates the difference of empirical studies about above issues forhigh-tech companies in Taiwan and US.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/55401
其他識別: NSC98-2410-H005-023
文章連結: http://grbsearch.stpi.narl.org.tw/GRB/result.jsp?id=1888119&plan_no=NSC98-2410-H005-023&plan_year=98&projkey=PF9807-2688&target=plan&highStr=*&check=0&pnchDesc=%E7%A0%94%E7%99%BC%E6%94%AF%E5%87%BA%E3%80%81%E5%B8%82%E5%A0%B4%E7%AB%B6%E7%88%AD%E3%80%81%E9%81%95%E7%B4%84%E9%A2%A8%E9%9A%AA%E8%88%87%E7%B6%93%E7%90%86%E4%BA%BA%E8%82%A1%E7%A5%A8%E9%81%B8%E6%93%87%E6%AC%8A
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