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標題: The Impact of Controlling-Minority Shareholder Incentive Conflicts on Directors' and Officers' Insurance Purchases
作者: 紀信義
關鍵字: 董事暨重要職員責任保險
Directors'and officers'liability insurance
litigation risk
摘要: This proposal examines whether Directors' and Officers' insurance (hereafter referred to as“D&O insurance”)purchases is related to managerial opportunism role arising from theincentive conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders in Taiwanesepublicly-owned corporations. In order to enhance transparency of corporate governance,Taiwan securities regulator, Taiwanese Securities and Futures Bureau (hereafter referred to asTSFB) required listed companies to disclose available more information on the D&Oinsurance purchases since it is a part of the managers' compensation package. This publiclyavailable data provides us with a setting to investigate purchase of D&O insurance purchasesarising from managerial incentives in Taiwan. The related research questions are as follows:(1) Ceteris paribus, firms with more acute controlling-minority shareholder incentiveconflicts are more likely to consider purchasing D&O insurance than other firms.(2) Ceteris paribus, the greater the voting rights or degree of cash flow rights and votingrights divergence, i.e., more opportunistic incentives result in high litigation risk, the moreD&O insurance coverage will be purchased by controlling shareholders
本研究計畫在檢測「董事暨重要職員責任保險」(D&O)之購買行為,是否來自於控制股東與小股東間利益衝突所引發管理當局投機行為。為了加強台灣上市公司治理透明度,證券主管機關「證期局」要求上市公司揭露購買D&O保險之資訊。由於此一公開之資料能夠提供我們檢測管理當局購買D&O保險的動機。相關研究議題包括:(1) 當控制股東與少數股東間利益衝突較大時,較可能購買D&O保險。(2) 當控制股東投票權或現金流量權與投票權偏離程度較大時,意謂著受到小股東訴訟風險較高,其購買D&O的保額較高。
其他識別: NSC99-2410-H005-013
Appears in Collections:會計學系所



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