Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/92378
標題: 中國上市公司政治關係對公司價值之影響
The Effect of Political Connection on Firm Value
作者: Hung-Yi Lu
呂泓毅
關鍵字: 政治關係
中國市場
公司價值
Connection
China Market
Firm Value
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摘要: 本文以 2008 年至 2012 年中國上海證券交易所上市 A 股為樣本,目的在探討各種政治關係對於公司價值的影響。本文以 Tobin's Q 作為衡量公司價值的變數,並將政治關係細分為人大代表、政協委員、政府官員以及中國共產黨黨幹部。並利用固定效果模型進行迴歸分析,發現高管的政治關係可以替公司價值帶來正面的幫助。 本文並透過一些標準將樣本進行分割 探討政治關係在不同情況下的影響力。, 結果發現: (一)高管曾任政府官員或黨幹部,對民營公司之價值可發揮正面的影響力。 (二)董事長曾任政府官員或黨幹部,與公司價值有正相關的影響。 (三)在經濟競爭力較弱的環境中,高管曾擔任人大代表、政府官員或黨幹部 皆可對公司價值發揮正面的影響力。
This essay uses the data of public traded corporation of Shanghai Stock Exchange between 2008 and 2012. The purpose of this dissertation is to study the effect of political connection on firm value. This dissertation uses Tobin's Q as the index of firm value. We classify top executive political connection into People's Congress, The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, administrative officers and Chinese Communist Party cadres. This essay uses fixed-effect models to conduct regression analysis, and then find out that top executives' political connection is positively associated with firm value. The dissertation has the following main results: I. Administrative officers and Chinese Communist Party cadres have significant positive effect on private firm value. II. The CEO who had being administrative officer or Chinese Communist Party cadre is positively associated with firm value. III. In less developed region, the top executive who had being deputy to the People's Congress, administrative officer or Chinese Communist Party cadre can bring positive effect on firm value.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/92378
其他識別: U0005-0206201511473500
文章公開時間: 10000-01-01
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