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標題: 中國家族企業對債務資金成本之研究
The Impact of Family Business on the Cost of Debt in Chinese Listed Firms
作者: I-Yun Lin
關鍵字: Cost of Debt;Family Business;Political Connection;Legal Environment
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摘要: In the last three decades, China has been transformed planned economic system into market system. With the increase of the private-owned economy, the majority of state-owned enterprises also turn into private-owned enterprises. In China, most of the private-owned enterprises are mainly based on family capital and the ties of kinship. However, Chinese family businesses have difficulty in finance due to the financial institutions are restricted industry and mainly controlled by the Chinese government. Moreover, China's political system and the unequal development of legal environment also increase the difficulty of family businesses to obtain loans. In the view of this, the purpose of this paper is to investigate the relevance between family business and the cost of debt. Based on 5,664 observations from the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchange between 2004 and 2012, we find that the operation of family business can aligns management's benefits with the wealth of shareholders in this regard which reduce the agency cost and lower the cost of debt. However, political connection is not considered a key factor for creditor when assess its financing contract. Beside, the operation of family business under different legal environment has no relation with the cost of debt, which indicates that the degree of development of legal environment in China cannot improve the debt risk premium of family business.
文章公開時間: 10000-01-01
Appears in Collections:會計學系所



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