Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/92551
標題: 中國家族企業對公司績效之研究
The Impact of Family Business on the Performance in Chinese Listed Firms.
作者: Shih-Yu Wang
王詩瑀
關鍵字: Family business
Firm performance
Political connections
Legal environment
家族企業
公司績效
政治關聯
法律環境
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摘要: Recently, China's economic is development very fast and as a important position in the world. With the increase of the private-owned economy, the majority of state-owned enterprises also turn into private-owned enterprises. Otherwise, because of the unique traditional culture China have, family business is a mainly form of China's private enterprise. This paper investigates how family business affects firm performance in China. And we also measure if political connections and legal environment of family firm can affect firm performance. The samples are collected from the China A-share listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchange between 2003 and 2011. My empirical results show that family business has a negative firm performance in China. In addition, the relationship between family business and government, and the different levels of legal environment in each region of China is not affected the firm performance. Key words:Family business , Firm performance , Political connections , Legal environment
中國自改革開放以來,經濟發展十分快速,位居世界重要地位,故本研究選擇中國為研究對象。中國經濟的起飛,使民營企業由原本高比例的國有企業中開始崛起,而由於中國的傳統文化及特有的政治型態,使其民營企業的組織型態又以家庭企業為主。國外的文獻對於家族企業與公司績效之間的關係皆有正反兩面的說法,故本研究以中國上市 A 股公司作為研究對象,研究期間為 2003 年至 2011年,採用 OLS 迴歸模型探討中國家族企業對公司績效的影響,且額外納入政治聯結性與法律制度環境發展等因素,以深入了解中國家族企業的特色。 實證結果發現,中國家族企業對公司績效產生不利的影響,但在加入政治連結性與法律制度環境等因素後,中國家族企業與公司績效並沒有顯著的關係,本研究認為期可能原因除了目前所能收集到之樣本數太少外,亦可能係由於家族企業本身即存在許多對公司績效造成影響的因素,使得政治關聯性與法律制度環境等因素對其之影響較不顯著。 關鍵字: 家族企業、公司績效、政治關聯、法律環境
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/92551
文章公開時間: 10000-01-01
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