請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/92561
標題: 客戶議價能力與供應商現金持有之關係: 會計穩健性與公司治理的干擾效果
The Relationship between Customer Bargaining Power and Supplier's Cash Holdings: The Moderate Effect of Accounting Conservatism and Corporate Governance
作者: Kar-Mun Hooi
許嘉雯
關鍵字: Bargaining power
Cash holdings
Accounting conservatism
Corporate governance
Precautionary motive
議價能力
現金持有
會計穩健性
公司治理
預防性動機
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摘要: This study first examines how bargaining advantages of major customers to affect the cash holdings of suppliers. After considering the accounting conservatism of the suppliers, this study also examines whether the relationship between bargaining power of major customers and cash holdings is influenced by the accounting conservatism. After that, we investigate whether the accounting conservatism of suppliers can be replaced by corporate governance to explain the relationship between bargaining power of major customers and cash holdings. Finally, this study uses the differences of corporate governance to examine how they affect the bargaining power of major customers and cash holdings of the suppliers. The empirical results show that the suppliers with lower accounting conservatism holds more cash. This study uses three different ways to measure the bargaining power of the suppliers' major customers, and the results show that when a supplier's customers have greater bargaining power, the supplier holds more cash too. The positive association between bargaining power of major customer and cash holdings of supplier becomes strong when the accounting conservatism of the supplier is poor, indicating that the supplier will hold more cash in this case. Finally, this study uses corporate governance to replace the accounting conservatism of the suppliers, and the results are generally consistent with the results of accounting conservatism. If a supplier has weaker corporate governance, the interaction between bargaining power of major customers and cash holdings of the supplier becomes strong so that the supplier might hold more cash. On the other hand, grouping the samples based on differences of corporate governance are consistent with the above results. When a supplier's major customers have bargaining advantages, the supplier with weaker corporate governance will hold more cash. Otherwise, when a supplier's major customers have bargaining advantages, the supplier with stronger corporate governance might hold less cash. The results indicate that suppliers with lower accounting conservatism or weaker corporate governance will hold more cash for precautionary motive.
本文首先探討在主要客戶議價優勢較大的情況下,將如何影響供應商的現金持有情況。其次,探討在加入供應商的會計穩健程度作考量後,供應商的現金持有與其主要客戶的議價能力之間的關係是否受供應商會計穩健性的影響。接著探討供應商之治理制度是否能作為會計穩健性的替代衡量變數,以解釋對現金持有與主要客戶議價能力之影響。最後,在公司治理制度差異下對於主要客戶議價能力與現金持有產生何種效果作探討。 實證結果顯示,供應商的會計穩健性與其現金持有呈顯著的負向關係,說明當供應商的會計穩健程度越低,其現金持有會越多。另外,本文利用三種不同的方式衡量主要客戶之議價能力,結果皆顯示主要客戶的議價能力與供應商的現金持有呈現正向關係,表示主要客戶的議價優勢較大時,供應商將會持有較多的現金。其次,主要客戶之議價能力及會計穩健性的交互效果與現金持有呈現負相關,說明當供應商的會計穩健程度愈弱時,主要客戶之議價能力與供應商現金持有之正向關係轉強,即當主要客戶議價能力較大時,供應商也會受其會計穩健程度較低的影響,將會持有更多的現金。最後,本文將公司治理綜合指標作為供應商會計穩健性的替代變數,發現以公司治理為衡量變數之迴歸結果與會計穩健性之結果一致。這代表當供應商治理制度較弱時,將會增強主要客戶之議價能力與供應商現金持有之正向關係,亦即公司治理制度的強弱將會影響主要客戶的議價能力與供應商現金持有的關係,從而影響其現金持有的情況。 另一方面,藉由供應商公司治理制度之差異作分群,發現公司治理分組樣本的結果與前述所說一致,當供應商治理制度愈差,主要客戶之議價優勢較大時,供應商將持有較多的現金;反之,當供應商公司治理愈好時,若主要客戶之議價優勢較大,供應商持有的現金量會較少。此結果說明了,會計穩健程度或是治理制度較差之供應商,會因預防性動機而將持有較多的現金。
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/92561
文章公開時間: 10000-01-01
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