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標題: 中國家族企業對財務報表價值攸關性之研究
The Impact of Family Business on the Value-Relevance of Financial Reporting in Chinese Listed Firms
作者: Chiao-Lin Chi
關鍵字: Family business
Political connections
Legal environment
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摘要: Considering the localization study for family business in each country and region is more meaningful and valuable for deliberation than the study of international one. Therefore, I choose Mainland China as a key region for this paper. Due to the impact of Chinese planned economic system, private enterprises in China started its rapid development from 1978 and played an indispensable role in this golden development period. Given the importance of the family business in China's economic development, this article focus on the impact of family business on the value-relevance of financial reporting in Chinese listed firms and for the Chinese special political and economic system, I explore the relationship between family business and government, the different levels of legal environment in each region of China with value-relevance of financial reporting in this study. The samples are collected from the China A-share listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchange between 2004 and 2012. I use the Olhson model as a basic pricing model to testify the hypothesis. The empirical results show that Chinese family business financial reporting indeed have the explicit value-relevance. In addition, the relationship between family business and government, and the different levels of legal environment in each region of China also have the impact of pricing relevance of financial reporting. In the future, this paper has the reference value for measuring the value of enterprise and economic transformation of family business.
相較於國際性家族企業的研究,本文認為對於各國或各地方之本土化研究更具有意義與研討價值,而選擇了中國作為主要研究地區。由於中國過去受到計畫經濟的影響,私營企業自1978年改革開放後才開始快速發展,而私營的家族企業更是支撐著這段中國經濟奇蹟時期不可或缺的角色。 有鑑於家族企業在中國經濟發展的重要地位,本文將探討中國家族企業對財務報表價值攸關性之影響,並針對中國特殊的政經體制,考量了家族企業與地方及中央政府之關聯、中國各地區法律發展程度不同對財務報表價值攸關性之影響。 本文以2004年至2012年之中國在深圳及上海交易所發行的A股上市公司作為研究樣本。排除國營企業與金融保險與資料不全樣本後,採用Ohlson (1995)的評價模式為基礎發展實證模型,檢測本文之假說。實證結果發現,投資人於衡量企業價值時,中國家族企業財務報表確實具有價值攸關性,另一方面,中國家族企業與政府間的關係和中國各地區法律發展程度不同都會對企業財務報表攸關性有一定程度的影響。此結果對投資人未來在衡量企業價值,與中國家族企業之經濟轉型都有參考價值。
文章公開時間: 2017-06-04
Appears in Collections:會計學系所



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