Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/92584
標題: 事務所規模、非審計服務與盈餘管理之選擇行為
Auditor Size, Non-audit Services and the Choice of Earnings Management
作者: Shiau-Ping Li
李筱萍
關鍵字: Auditor size
Non-audit services
Unexpected non-audit fees
Classification shifting
Accruals-based earnings management
Real earnings management
事務所規模
非審計服務
未預期非審計服務公費
分類變動
應計項目盈餘管理
實質盈餘管理
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摘要: The study explores the manager's choice among classification shifting, accrual-based earnings management, and real earnings management. Specifically, it examines whether firms with less flexibility in classification shifting would increase the use of accruals-based earnings management and the real earnings management, and whether firms with less flexibility in accrual-based earnings management increase the use of real earnings management. It also examines the effect of auditor size and non-audit services on the choice of earnings management mechanisms. The results show that if the choice of classification shifting is impeded, the company is more likely to use accruals-based earnings management and real earnings management. And if the choice of accruals-based earnings management is restricted, the company is more likely to use real earnings management. In addition, the empirical results fail to show that unexpected non-audit fees are associated with the choice of classification earnings management or accruals-based earnings management. The empirical results support that unexpected non-audit fees are associated with the choice of real earnings management. However, when the choice of classification shifting is impeded, the study finds that accruals-based earnings management is affected by unexpected non-audit fees and auditor size. If the choice of accrual-based earnings management is restricted, real earnings management is affected by unexpected non-audit fees and auditor size. When the choice of classification shifting is impeded, real earnings management is affected by unexpected non-audit fees. When the choice of classification shifting is impeded, accrual-based earnings management or real earnings management are affected by auditor size. When the choice of accrual-based earnings management is restricted, real earnings management is affected by auditor size.
本研究首先探討分類變動、應計項目盈餘管理、實質盈餘管理三種盈餘管理方法之選擇行為。討論當企業存在盈餘管理之動機時,在分類變動受限之情況下,是否會增加利用應計項目盈餘管理及實質盈餘管理;而在應計項目盈餘管理受限之情況下,是否會增加利用實質盈餘管理。另外,本研究再探討事務所規模及非審計服務,對於企業利用分類變動、應計項目盈餘管理、實質盈餘管理三種盈餘管理之選擇行為是否產生影響。 實證結果發現,當企業存在盈餘管理之動機時,會同時利用分類變動、應計項目盈餘管理、實質盈餘管理等盈餘管理方法。且在分類變動受限之情況下,企業會增加利用應計項目盈餘管理與實質盈餘管理,在應計項目盈餘管理受限之情況下,會增加利用實質盈餘管理。未預期非審計服務公費並不會影響企業分類變動盈餘管理或應計項目盈餘管理的程度,而未預期非審計服務公費影響企業實質盈餘管理之程度,則獲得支持。在分類變動受限之情況下,未預期非審計服務公費會影響企業增加利用應計項目盈餘管理,且會受到事務所規模影響。在應計項目盈餘管理受限之情況下,未預期非審計服務公費會影響企業增加利用實質盈餘管理之程度,且會受到事務所規模影響。在分類變動受限之情況下,未預期非審計服務公費會影響企業增加利用實質盈餘管理之程度。而在分類受限之情況下,事務所規模會影響企業增加利用應計項目盈餘管理或實質盈餘管理之程度,在應計項目盈餘管理受限之情況下,事務所規模會影響企業增加利用實質盈餘管理之程度。
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/92584
文章公開時間: 10000-01-01
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