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Corporate Social Responsibility and Accounting Conservatism-With the Moderating Effects of Corporate Governance
|關鍵字:||Corporate Social Responsibility|
Propensity Score Matching
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|摘要:||Recently, firms have begun focusing on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). According to prior literature, social responsible firms have high-quality corporate governance, which enable firms have better accounting quality. Accordingly, social responsible firms prefer to use conservative accounting policies. This study aims to investigate the impact of CSR on conservative accounting. Due to accounting conservatism is one of corporate governance mechanisms. In addition to, this study explores the moderate effect of corporate governance on the relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility and accounting conservatism.
The sample of CSR firms is selected from CommonWealth, Global Views Monthly, and Taiwan Institute for Sustainable Energy through 2005 to 2014. This study uses propensity score matching (PSM) to construct the matched firms. This study uses two measures of unconditional conservatism:accrual-based method and skewness, and uses two measures of conditional conservatism: Basu's(1997) asymmetric timeliness of earnings and C-Score. Besides, this study uses the characteristics of the board (percentage of independent, board size, and CEO/chair separation)as a measure of internal monitoring device. Furthermore, we measure the external monitoringdevice based on the institutional ownership.
First, the empirical result shows that there is a positive relationship between CSR and unconditional conservatism. In other words, CSR firms intend to choose more conservative accounting methods. Second, there is a positive relationship between CSR and conditional conservatism, which means firms with CSR can recognize bad news more early; on the contrary, good news is recognized more slowly. Finally, the moderate effect of corporate governance on the relationship between CSR and accounting conservatism is not supported by this research.|
隨著社會的思想躍進，企業社會責任的風潮蔓延，其成為現今許多企業之重要課題。過去研究顯示具社會責任之企業擁有較好的公司治理成效，使企業有較佳的會計品質，其隱含著企業具有穩健性之意義，代表企業的財務報導資訊較為穩健。故本研究擬探討具社會責任之企業與穩健會計之關係。由於穩健會計為公司治理機制之一，因此本研究擬兼論公司治理內外部監督機制對於企業社會責任與穩健會計關係之影響。 本研究係以2005年至2014年我國較具公信力之天下、遠見雜誌、台灣永續能源研究基金會評選企業社會責任之企業為樣本，以傾向分數配對法選取配對樣本，以降低樣本企業自我選擇偏誤。本研究將穩健分為條件穩健以及非條件穩健，非條件穩健以應計數以及盈餘偏態係數衡量；條件穩健則以C-Score以及Basu(1997)盈餘時效性不對稱模型衡量。公司治理內部監督機制以董事會特性(獨立董事比例、董事會規模、董事長未兼任總經理)作為衡量指標，外部監督機制則以法人持股比率做為衡量指標。 實證結果顯示，社會責任之企業其非條件穩健程度較高，即具社會責任之企業會採用較為穩健之會計政策。其次，企業社會責任之企業其條件穩健程度較高，即盈餘反應壞消息較為及時，然好消息的反應速度較緩慢。有關調節效果之部分，實證結果顯示董事會特性以及法人持股比率對於企業社會責任與穩健會計之正向關係無調節效果，即公司治理內外部監督機制對於企業社會責任與穩健會計之正向關係無顯著影響。
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