請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/92759
標題: 代理成本與內部人持股對融資決策的影響
The Effects of Agency Costs and Insiders' Shareholdings on Financing Choices
作者: Shiu-Chen Huang
黃秀真
關鍵字: Agency costs
Seasoned equity offerings
Debt financing
Private equity
Insider's shareholdings
關鍵字
代理成本
現金增資
負債融資
私募股權
內部人持股
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摘要: 對於融資決策而言,凡是與資金籌措相關的議題,必須考慮資金成本、財務風險、控制權、供應期間及可能產生的代理問題,並透過財務槓桿的運用,決定採取何種融資決策方式取得資金成本,進而影響公司價值。本研究主要係探討公司的負債及權益之代理成本對融資決策之影響。其次,驗證公司之內部人持股對負債及權益代理成本與融資決策的關係之影響。 實證結果發現,不論是前期或當期的負債代理成本愈高,公司愈傾向選擇現金增資來融資;不論是前一期或當期的權益代理成本愈高,公司愈傾向選擇負債方式融資。而在私募股權融資方面,也顯示不論是前一期或當期負債的代理成本愈高,公司愈傾向選擇私募股權來融資;前期權益代理成本愈高,公司在當期不傾向選擇私募股權來融資。 另一方面,若考慮內部人持股因素,前期或當期的負債代理成本仍與現金增資融資呈正相關;前期的權益代理成本仍與現金增資融資呈負相關,但當期權益代理成本則無關。而內部人持股因素會使前期權益成本與公司不選擇現金增資的關係減弱;內部人持股會使前期負債成本與公司採用私募股權融資無關,以及前期權益代理成本與私募股權融資無關。
This study investigates the effects of debt agency cost and equity agency cost on financing choices of a firm. We further examine the effects of the shareholdings of insiders on the association between debt and equity agency costs and financing choices. The evidences show that the firm with higher debt agency costs of current and lag-one periods tends to engage in seasoned equity offerings to raise capital, and the firm with higher equity agency costs of current and lag-one periods tends to adopt debt financing. Moreover, the firm with higher debt agency costs of current and lag-one periods tends to use private equity financing, and the firm with a higher equity agency cost of lag-one period do not tend to perform private equity financing. On the other hand, when considering the shareholdings of insiders, we find that, debt agency costs of current and lag-one periods are still positively related to seasoned equity offerings, and the choice seasoned equity offerings is still negatively related to equity agency cost of lag-one period but is unrelated to current equity agency cost. By the interaction term of agency cost and insiders' shareholdings, the findings show that, the shareholdings of insiders reduce the relation between prior equity agency cost and seasoned equity offerings choice, and induce that private equity financings are unrelated to debt agency cost and equity agency cost of lag-one period.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/92759
其他識別: U0005-2105201516521500
文章公開時間: 2018-07-15
顯示於類別:高階經理人碩士在職專班

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