Counter-Actualization, Actualization, and Passability of the Event: A Response to Ian Buchanan’s Critique of Deleuzian Transcendental Empiricist Ethics

Hui-yu Huang*

Abstract

In Ian Buchanan’s discussion of Deleuzian transcendental empiricist ethics, actualization, as a level composed of states of affairs, may have two directions of development. On one hand, actualization may refer to actualized, defined states of affairs; on the other hand, actualization may point to reworked compositions put into effect in states of affairs. Counter-actualization involves both aspects of actualization: it transcends the rigidity of actualized states so as to launch reworked compositions in actualization. By means of Gilles Deleuze’s analysis of the concept of the event, Buchanan regards the attitude of willing the event as an expression of counter-actualization, whose resistance against actualized values and initiation of reworked actualization shape “an active mode of ethics.” While Buchanan’s elaboration reinforces the significance of counter-actualization and its positive effects in reworked actualization, the argument of this paper attempts to focus on the indispensability of a potential, virtual plane in processes of counter-actualization. This potential, virtual plane lays out in disjunctions and resonances between divergent series. If the confronted divergences, disjunctions, and resonances in processes of counter-actualization are taken into account, the operation of the will that wills the event is no longer confined to the activity or passivity of personal will. Distinguished from a pursuit of the autonomy of personal will, the argument of this paper proposes that the intensity of the will that wills the event relies on the extent of exertion of passability and traversability. Passability and traversability display a susceptibility to the immanence of divergent series. Meanwhile, passability and traversability enable the immanence of an individual to impersonally emerge from the “univocity of Being.”

Keywords: event, actualization, counter-actualization, passability, immanence, transcendental empiricism, univocity of Being

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* PhD student, Department of Foreign Languages and Literatures, National Taiwan University

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1. Ian Buchanan’s Argument: Counter-actualization as “An Active Mode of Ethics”

In a conversation with Toni Negri, Gilles Deleuze, when responding to a question about “a tragic note” arising in *A Thousand Plateaus* (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980) “at points where it’s not clear where the ‘war-machine’ is going” (Deleuze 1995: 171), mentions Italian Jewish chemist and writer Primo Levi’s account of his own personal experience as a Holocaust survivor by means of a concept of shame:

I was very struck by all the passages in Primo Levi where he explains that Nazi camps have given us “a shame at being human.” Not, he says, that we’re all responsible for Nazism, as some would have us believe, but that we’ve all been tainted by it: even the survivors of the camps had to make compromises with it, if only to survive. There’s the shame of there being men who became Nazis; the shame of being unable, not seeing how, to stop it; the shame of having compromised with it; there’s the whole of what Primo Levi calls this “gray area.” (Deleuze 1995: 172)

Ian Buchanan, in his discussion of Deleuzian transcendental empiricist ethics, elaborates on the three kinds of shame described by Levi. Buchanan calls the first kind of shame the “productive shame of despotism,” referring to “the appalling activities of the Nazis,” who exerted “useless violence” (Levi, qtd. in Buchanan 79) “intended only to cause suffering, not to further any strategic or tactical aim” (Buchanan 79).

The second kind of shame is termed by Buchanan “the inhibitive shame of humanism” (Buchanan 79). The humanist thinking is severely criticized as an accomplice of the violence of despotism, owing to the transcendence of its “idealism” that “fostered genocide” (79) as well as its “apathy and timidity” that “create an environment in which a tyrannical regime can flourish” (80). Moreover, the humanist thinking is denounced in terms of its dogmatic insistence on applying its identified humanitarian values to its confrontation with the suffering of Holocaust victims. This dogmatic insistence is the shame of “hypocritically holding others to a set of values that state it is better to die nobly than live ignobly while doing little or nothing oneself to save them” (80). It is the humanist “ressentiment” (80) of defending its “righteous glow” by indoctrinating people to feel their
shame “for doing what it takes to live, and in some extremes for the very fact of continuing to live,” while intentionally and evasively blaming any contradiction to its righteous glow on those who “actually endure” the shame, who “must live in the inhospitable shadow cast by the bright light of an idealism” (79).

Concerning the third kind of shame described by Levi, it refers to the guilt of shame felt by Holocaust survivors, who are shrouded in “the inhospitable shadow cast by the bright light of an idealism” (Buchanan 79) and tormented by their inability to abide by and carry out humanitarian values, with which they have acquainted themselves. This inability makes the survivors feel “they had somehow failed a test of their humanity because being human means having a care for others” (81).

The Holocaust survivors’ predicament by virtue of the contradiction between survival and human dignity on the one hand complicates accusations made against the violence of cruelties in concentration camps, and on the other hand traumatically illustrates the protective zone secured by “the inhibitive shame of humanism” (Buchanan 79). Regarding this predicament of the survivors, Buchanan points out “the terrible crux of Levi’s analyses”: “what he shows is that the one who turned his back on a fellow sufferer is not the same one who later felt mortified for having done so, although outwardly they may appear to inhabit the same body” (81). This disengagement from one’s self is proposed as a point of view specifically made for the sake of understanding the predicament of the survivors. The one with one’s own disengaged self diverges from clearly defined and categorized identities such as “‘man who kills’” and “‘man who creates or suffers injustice’” (Levi, qtd. in Buchanan 81). This divergence highlights the insufficiency of the given scope of acknowledged humanitarian value judgments in tackling the paradoxical predicament of the survivors. The Holocaust victims were reduced to “a barely coherent set of survival behaviours that in Levi’s view cannot be analysed, far less judged, by criteria established outside of the camps themselves” (Buchanan 81). The paradoxical predicament of the survivors demands an observation to the context and meanwhile capable of going beyond the restricted periphery of contemplation as well as opening up alternative trajectories for composition. This manner
of observing the traumatic event is where Levi’s conception of shame counts: “it is precisely a set of concepts Levi hoped to produce, because he offers his memoirs not ‘in order to formulate new accusations’ but rather to ‘furnish documentation for a quiet study of certain aspects of the human mind’” (81).

Buchanan encapsulates the significance of Levi’s conception of shame in terms of the Deleuzian philosophical thinking: “Levi counter-actualises his experiences and produces shame as a concept” (Buchanan 77). What are actualized refer to not only what are realized in effect but also to a further extent what are organized and solidified into creeds. Formations of beliefs, rules, and systems facilitate compositions and accumulations of experiences. Nevertheless, when experiences are governed by transcendentally predominant creeds to be undertaken in approved and definitive ways, what are actualized as states of affairs tend to lose the immanence of their effects stimulated from their encounters with experiences. Hence, experiences have to be counter-actualized not for the sake of their taking effects in the materiality of reality but for the purpose of preventing them from being undermined and coordinated by presupposed creeds of guidance. In the case of Levi’s contemplation about his personal experience as a Holocaust survivor, his conception of shame refuses to be inhibited from articulation by the constitive employment of actualized humanitarian values. Levi’s conception of shame alternatively introduces a “‘composite’ sense of shame constituting the “‘grey zone, with ill-defined outlines which both separate and join the two camps of masters and servants”’ (Levi, qtd. in Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 225, note 17). Levi’s conception of shame hence corresponds to what Buchanan calls, following Theodor W. Adorno’s critique of “a transcendent approach” to the event of Auschwitz, a required “purposely-wrought philosophy of immanence able to construct its own concepts, able therefore to produce a theory of Auschwitz on the basis of Auschwitz” (Buchanan 75).

1 Deleuze and Guattari mentions Levi’s conception of shame in their criticism of the manner of defending human rights “by forming a universal opinion as ‘consensus’ able to moralize nations, States, and the market,” without attending to “the immanent modes of existence of people provided with rights” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 107).
Buchanan deems this trajectory of producing theories the gist of Deleuzian transcendental empiricist ethics. Theories used to observe problematic propositions and express concerns for underestimated issues are formulated by inventing new concepts, which appeals to an empiricism “that can deliver concepts capable of disclosing their context” (Buchanan 75). This empiricism is transcendental, not because it adheres to a transcendentally ranked set of established values that may definitively define and specify the essence of states of affairs. Inversely, the empiricism to the context is transcendental because it transcends the given framework of evaluating contextual states of affairs. The act of transcending the given is not equal to denying or abandoning the required embodiment on the level of states of affairs in favor of an abstract, ideal, unoccupied, while also unavailable level of flight and freedom. The act of transcending the given aims to exceed the rigidity, instead of the materiality and expression, of the given. As Buchanan notes in his analysis of Deleuze’s exploration of 18th-century Scottish philosopher David Hume’s conception of empiricism, Deleuzian transcendental empiricism as a philosophy of immanence inquires into the following paradox: “how can a subject transcending the given be constituted in the given?” (Deleuze, qtd. in Buchanan 83). This subject who counter-actualizes the given by transcending the rigidity of the actualized given has to capacitate the act of transcending to take effects in actualization so that the act would not be compromised by its own rigidity of indulgently unchallenged excess. Nonetheless, the actualization in terms of the flight via counter-actualization is no longer stuck in the rigidity of the actualized, defined, and determined given. Effects of actualization in terms of counter-actualization are oriented toward reworkings that come up with diverse and divergent trajectories other than rigidly demarcated courses and frames.

To see how these reworkings take their potentially disruptive as well as creative effects in a distinctive sense of empiricism, Buchanan observes Deleuze’s conception of the event to illuminate how reworked actualization may effectively and intensely operate in terms of provocative and stimulating counter-actualization. Buchanan recapitulates Deleuze’s analysis of the event in The Logic of Sense (1969):
Becoming worthy of what happens to us amounts to reaching a detached perspective on things where what happens to us is willed by us, not merely endured. It is a matter of being equal to the event, and thereby being the sense of what happens. We cannot, of course, simply will things to happen to us which are outside our control—the actions of others, acts of God and Nature and so on—as though we possess the power of telekinesis and expect them to unfold according to our design. Such constraints as the real places on us are always to be respected, no matter how far our flights of fancy may conduct us. But what happens and the event are not the same thing. ‘The event is not what occurs (an accident), it is rather inside what occurs, the purely expressed. It signals and awaits us.’ The event is the sense we make of what happens. We might bemoan a misfortune, or resign ourselves to it, or take charge of it (become worthy, in other words) by saying, as Joe Bousquet did, we were born to embody it. To the extent we take charge of events we counter-actualise what occurs, we see beyond actions and live the purity of the event, the crystal of sense awaiting us in all phenomena. (Buchanan 78-79)

Buchanan’s recapitulation of Deleuze’s conception of the event notices the distinction between what happens in states of affairs and the event: the event counter-actualizes what happens. In other words, the event transcends the rigidity of conclusively determining the sense of what happens according to given frameworks of interpretation. Regarding this transcendental aspect of the event, what has to be heeded about Buchanan’s elaboration is his alignment of the act of transcending the given with a “detached” (Buchanan 78) and active attitude toward encountering given states of affairs as well as conventionalized interpretations of them. In Buchanan’s elaboration, it can be detected that he endows human will with considerable vigor and potential for reversing adversities. To counter-actualize what happens, to become worthy of the event extracted from its states of affairs, to be equal to the event, for Buchanan, refers to “reaching a detached perspective on things where what happens to us is willed by us, not merely endured” (78), to “the sense we make of what happens” (79), to “the extent we take charge of events” (79). Buchanan emphasizes the activity of transcending the given by laying stress on refusing to become submitted to the
passivity of rigidly given states of affairs. The refusal to be paralyzed by passivity is insisted by maintaining in a detached sense a disengagement from given interpretations of contextual circumstances. The key factor that leads to an active or a passive attitude toward what happens is the shift of human will. Buchanan attaches much weight to the shift of human will as the predominantly decisive factor to the extent that the act of transcending the given is crucially and exclusively concentrated on individual autonomy as the absolutely pivotal departure point. When Buchanan summarizes the primary concern about the conception of relation in Deleuze’s analysis of Hume’s empiricism, there is a similar tendency to attribute the vitality of creating relations external to their terms to the operation of individual autonomy: “This means that our way of experiencing the world—our actual apparatus for cognition—is distinct from our experience. As such, our construction of the world is an integral aspect of our experience of it; in fact, we experience it as we construct it” (84). Buchanan’s alignment of the act of transcending the given with an autonomous human will that facilitates detached constructions fleeing from the rigidity of given states of affairs furthermore leads him to accentuate how reworked actualization in terms of transcendental counter-actualization can be taken into effect as “creative acts” that are “deliberate and fully willed” (87). These creative acts, when situated in the “practices of everyday life,” make it possible that “the passively formed subject becomes active” (87). Buchanan regards this “‘mechanism’” of creative and effective actualization in terms of counter-actualization as “an active form of governmentality” (87). To recapitulate Buchanan’s elaboration on the Deleuzian conception of the event, autonomous human will and its purposeful command carry predominant weight in deciding an active or a passive role in the alternations of disruption and incorporation between counter-actualization and actualization.

2. An Alternative Argument: Counter-actualization in terms of Passability and Traversability

Buchanan’s analysis of Deleuzian transcendental empiricist ethics from the aspects of counter-actualization and actualization of the event proposes “an active mode of ethics”
Based on “a philosophy of immanence” (82), Buchanan points out two constituting angles that characterize the Deleuzian philosophy of immanence: “Deleuze set himself two tasks: the first was to understand man as he is; the second was to discover a mechanism by which he could become other than he is” (83). From processes of pursuing and fulfilling these two tasks emerges a philosophy of immanence that lays out variable reworked compositions in terms of both counter-actualization and actualization. Both tasks seek to transcend the given for the sake of becoming capable of being reworked instead of being passively incapacitated. Buchanan considers this pursuit a “fundamental ethical question”: “how must man be composed that he can be reinvented (where reinvented means precisely not replaced, but broken down into basic constituent parts and imagined differently, put together afresh)” (83). We can observe that Buchanan’s concern about the conception of ethics, based on the Deleuzian philosophy of immanence, lies in on the one hand how individuals may counter-actualize the given and on the other hand how individuals may thus become components susceptible to actualized reworkings and reinvented compositions.

While the paradox of transcendent empiricalism, equipped with both counter-actualization and actualization as its indispensable levels, is clarified by Buchanan through his elaboration on the Deleuzian conception of the event, a question profoundly related to the operativity of this paradox must be inquired: what makes it possible for the paradox of transcendent empiricalism to operate? Does it preeminently rely on the autonomy of human will to actively transcend the rigidity and passivity of the given and as a result become creatively reconstituted in a different sense of the given?

Even if the autonomy of human will plays an undeniable part in the paradox of transcendent empiricalist ethics, we still need to inquire: what capacitates this autonomy of human will to be consolidated?

To respond to these inquiries, I would like to propose that Deleuzian transcendent empiricalist ethics not operate by means of relative transmutations of points of view in terms of enclosed autonomy of individual will, but rather by virtue of divergent ensembles of points of view in terms of condensed composition of singularity. As revealed in Buchanan’s discussion of the Holocaust event, Deleuzian transcendent empiricalist ethics proposes to
produce concepts and theories based on contextual demands for an understanding of their immanence, which cannot be articulated if confined to presupposed value judgments and predetermined visions. Echoing this pursuit of immanence to attain the condensation of expressive concepts and theories, the emergence of a multiplicity of points of view seem to be the justified orientation of development. With this orientation toward creating and allowing as diverse points of view as possible, it appears that we may ethically transcend given rigidity in terms of the diversity while also encompassing a variety of contextual specificity that may respond to the concern about immanence. Undoubtedly, the continuous generation of a multiplicity of points of view does facilitate disruptive and reworked transfers between counter-actualization and actualization. Nonetheless, what needs to be treated with caution is that the concern about how we may observe the event with a multiplicity of points of view does not consist in a maximum expansion of personal scope of knowledge that engenders numerous points of view within enclosed individual epistemic horizons. Nor is this multiplicity of points of view demonstrated through insistent circulations revolving around compartmentalized and non-distributable contradictions. In addition to not being circumscribed by individual frames of observation and by identified organizations of contradictions, nor is this multiplicity of points of view advocated as if the issue of individual agency could be depreciated or disregarded to the extent that points of view seem to consist of domineeringly objective combinations necessitating no consideration for possible hesitation or obstruction stemming from conflict with established frameworks. The endorsed multiplicity of points of view may be impeded because of being delimited to the self-sufficiency of autonomous individual operation, whether it is demonstrated in the maximum expansion of individual knowledge scope within prescribed horizons or in the rigid divisions of contradictions. The avoidance of the delimitation of self-sufficiency by means of slighting the operativity of individual agency and privileging the dominance of objective combinations may similarly undermine the multiplicity of points of view now that this objectivity deliberately eschews and reduces its confrontation with accompanying effects generated from conflicts arising from processes of combinations. Both
the activity demonstrated through the autonomy and self-sufficiency of human will and the
objectivity established regardless of the working of individual agency, I would like to argue,
are not the operative trajectory advanced in Deleuze’s analysis of the conception of the event.
The operative trajectory propounded in the Deleuzian conception of the event to
counter-actualize the passivity of being fenced in by given parameters is rather a request for
passability and traversability, for a capability to become passable and traversable.

3. Passability and Traversability: Points of View “on Variation”

The request for passability and traversability emerges from a distinctive perspective
on point of view, disparate from that emanating from enclosed individual horizons and that
detached from the participation of individual agency. This distinctive perspective on point of
view, if we make reference to Deleuze’s exploration of Baroque perspective, distributes an
individual’s visions not in terms of “a dependence in respect to a pregiven or defined
subject” but in light of circumstances where “a subject will be what comes to the point of
view, or rather what remains in the point of view” (Deleuze 1993: 19). What disengages a
subject’s point of view from his/her given, identified, actualized states of affairs and prompts
a subject to diversely emerge from a multiplicity of points of view are an indispensable
coupling between point of view and “variation”:

A needed relation exists between variation and point of view: not simply because
of the variety of points of view (though, as we shall observe, such a variety does
exist), but in the first place because every point of view is a point of view on
variation. The point of view is not what varies with the subject, at least in the first
instance; it is, to the contrary, the condition in which an eventual subject
apprehends a variation (metamorphosis), or: something = x (anamorphosis). For
Leibniz, for Nietzsche, for William and Henry James, and for Whitehead as well,
perspectivism amounts to a relativism, but not the relativism we take for granted.
It is not a variation of truth according to the subject, but the condition in which the
truth of a variation appears to the subject. (Deleuze 1993: 20)
According to this distinctive perspective on point of view, the intensity of the multiplicity of points of view does not primarily depend on an act of listing accumulated and categorized points of view as acknowledged items that comprise the multiplicity. Rather, the intensity of multiplicity consists in how the variability of multiplicity may be encountered and sustained. For a subject regarded as a composite emergence from a multiplicity of points of view in terms of this variability, the role of a subject no longer clings to his/her enclosed interiority and organized completion. What counts for a subject engaged in this variability of observation is how the subject may become passable and traversable so as to encounter the multiplicity of points of view.

Since this variability of multiplicity is manifested through how “a point of view on variation” may be apprehended by a subject, may appear to a subject (Deleuze 1993: 20), the correlation between a subject and variability has to concern the intensity of passability and traversability rather than that of activity or of passivity based on the extent of exercising autonomous human will. Activity yoked within the dominant employment of autonomous human will may risk preventing a subject from perceiving and contemplating divergent resources of counter-actualization other than his/her recognized routes of accomplishing the performance of activity. Passivity as a result of a failure to exert the autonomy of human will may inversely inhibit a subject from becoming susceptible to chances and challenges of counter-actualization and hence leave the subject enmeshed in the stagnation of predicament. Instead of manipulating or dodging the confrontation with counter-actualization, the intensity of passability and traversability in terms of the variability of multiplicity crucially pertains to how a subject may be placed in junction with variability.

4. Passability and Traversability: Becoming: The “Tenor of Life”

This junction with variability may be explicated by considering its operation through the Deleuzian conception of becoming as a frame of reference. The Deleuzian conception of becoming seeks immanence by transcending given states of affairs and recognized identities so as to enter alternative encounters and constellations that may illuminate immanence as the
intensity of animating life rather than the rigidity of being stagnated in fixed states of life. This immanence consists in a capability to become passable and traversable, becoming susceptible to the potentiality of movement so as to release states of life from their rigidity and encounter the intensity of life in its most unembellished, most unorthodox, and most overwhelming form:

Artaud said: to write for the illiterate—to speak for the aphasis, to think for the acephalous. But what does “for” mean? It is not “for their benefit,” or yet “in their place.” It is “before.” It is a question of becoming. The thinker is not acephalic, aphasis, or illiterate, but becomes so. He becomes Indian, and never stops becoming so—perhaps “so that” the Indian who is himself Indian becomes something else and tears himself away from his own agony. We think and write for animals themselves. We become animal so that the animal also becomes something else. The agony of a rat or the slaughter of a calf remains present in thought not through pity but as the zone of exchange between man and animal in which something of one passes into the other. This is the constitutive relationship of philosophy with nonphilosophy. Becoming is always double, and it is this double becoming that constitutes the people to come and the new earth. (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 109)

To become by placing oneself “before” the world means to encounter the world, to “speak with, write with” the world via a coupling as a “conspiracy” but also a “collision,” instead of being “led to speak for,” being “in the place of” the world (Deleuze and Parnet 2007: 52). Becoming by virtue of the paradoxical affirmation of both cooperative conspiracy and conflictive collision produces a plane of “assembling” (52) that does not presuppose its constituting components though definitely tackling any rigidity imposed on its vitality of composition. This plane of assembling lays out a space “in the middle, on the line of encounter between an internal world and the external world” (52). The plane of assembling in the middle, on the line of encounter is never any objectively or vaguely suspended in-between stage. The plane of assembling, with a diversity of juxtapositions and superimpositions of divergences, entails intricate, perplexing, tough, and laborious processes,
in which time must be taken, effort must be made, and energy must be consumed to come up with and put into effect potential passages that may traverse the diversity and divergence of the world. The processes that must be undergone counter-actualize given organizations of states of affairs and actualize new combinations by extracting life out of miscellaneous encounters of the world. The potential passages that may lead us to traverse the diverse and divergent compositions of the world point to the emergence of life as the intensity capable of involving and permeating the world. This tendency to provoke the emergence of life is the orientation Deleuze adopts when talking about some extreme limits that seek to radically go beyond conventionally acceptable boundaries:

The same goes for lunatics, drug addicts, alcoholics. I hear the objection: with your puny sympathy you make use of lunatics, you sing the praises of madness, then you drop them, you only go so far... This is not true. We are trying to extract from love all possession, all identification to become capable of loving. We are trying to extract from madness the life which it contains, while hating the lunatics who constantly kill life, turn it against itself. We are trying to extract from alcohol the life which it contains, without drinking: the great scene of drunkenness on pure water in Henry Miller. (Deleuze and Parnet 2007: 53)

The focus on the extraction of life instead of the confirmation of attributes reinforces the disruptive potentiality and performance of the plane of assembling. The plane of assembling for the sake of extracting life is creation that “takes place in bottlenecks,” “tracing a path between impossibilities” (Deleuze 1995: 133). The crux of becoming as a plane of assembling lies in the request to pass and confront divergences of immanence other than its identified courses so as to become capable of inventing alternative trajectories that may illuminate immanence as the intensity of life. In terms of this subsistence on immanence, the disruptive potentiality and performance of becoming in assembling do not “break things open” (134) in order to pursue lines of flight in their catastrophic, apocalyptic visions. Rather, the immanence of becoming encourages disruption by appealing to the cause of “producing existence” (134), which seeks to “free earth’s vectors” (134), “becoming all the
more earthly by inventing laws of liquids and gases on which the earth depends” (133). The request for inventing laws and producing ongoing processes of existence is the Deleuzian manner of extending the scope of life, which transcends given frames of life and works extra-life compositions to disruptively and operatively animate and enhance life.

This manner of extending the scope of life finds its ally in the Deleuzian conception of literature. Daniel W. Smith points out that for Deleuze “the question of literature is linked not to the question of its textuality, or even to its historicity, but to its ‘vitality,’ that is, its ‘tenor’ of Life” (Smith xvi). For the “vitality,” the “tenor” of life to hold, a literary text is not enlivened and preserved by exercising multiple textual practices to play havoc with its given structure and delay its affirmation of meaning or to contribute as diverse interpretations as possible to its inherent dynamism. For Deleuze, it is instead “‘extra-textual practice’” (Deleuze, qtd. in Smith xvi) that extends the scope of a literary text and meanwhile sustains its immanence:

“As for the method of deconstruction of texts,” Deleuze once remarked, “I see clearly what it is, I admire it a lot, but it has nothing to do with my own method. I do not present myself as a commentator on texts. For me, a text is merely a small cog in an extra-textual practice. It is not a question of commenting on the text by a method of deconstruction, or by a method of textual practice, or by other methods; it is a question of seeing what use it has in the extra-textual practice that prolongs the text.” (Deleuze, qtd. in Smith xv-xvi)

What counts in Deleuze’s conception of a literary text is how operative a text is capable of becoming to participate in extra-textual practices. It is this operativity that makes it possible for a text to extend and preserve its intensity of life. This operativity that enables a text to become susceptible, passable, and traversable to an extra-textual extension and preservation of life does not rely on how a text may exert its influence by occupying a self-sufficiently authoritarian position. This self-sufficient sense of occupation confines the use of a text to its own manipulation. The operativity of a text, on the contrary, consists in how a text may disengage itself from its self-sufficient autonomy and unity and plunge into diverse passages.
between divergent points of view. Distinct from the use based on self-sufficiently autonomous creation, the operativity of a text is demonstrated via extra-textual points of view “on variation” (Deleuze 1993: 20), not through points of view projected from the enclosed particularity of a text.

5. Passability and Traversability: A Virtual Plane of Counter-actualization: The Plane of Immanence

This operativity on variation, as a result, needs to be contemplated not only from the aspect of how it is effected into reworked actualization but also from the aspect of how it opens up a virtual plane of counter-actualization, in other words, a virtual plane of extra-actualization: being exterior to actualized texts, transcending actualized states of life, as well as remaining not-yet actualized. This plane of extra-actualization is a potential plane characterized by processes of probing possible as well as latent compositions of reworked actualization. This plane of extra-actualization of counter-actualization entails the initiation of passability and traversability, a requirement for exploring and undergoing the extent of how susceptible, passable, and traversable an individual is capable of becoming. This plane of extra-actualization is virtual, since on the one hand it is a “non-actualized” (Deleuze 2001: 31) site that transcends given, actualized states and identities. Moreover, on the other hand, its non-actualized transcending relies on incorporeal encounters between divergent compositions, which have not yet been incorporated into actualized, recognized connections. The transcending, extra aspect of counter-actualization, of extra-actualization lies in its being non-actualized, being incorporeal, which points to its differentiation from the rigidity of given, actualized states instead of its detached ascendancy over the actualized. It is in terms of this double sense of the virtual plane that Deleuze presents a non-causal coupling between actualization and virtual counter-actualization: “What we call virtual is not something that lacks reality but something that is engaged in a process of actualization following the plane that gives it its particular reality” (31). The virtual aspect of counter-actualization, of extra-actualization is what enables a process of actualization to
produce its reality by virtue of divergent encounters on the plane rather than according to given, actualized frames.

This non-actualized, incorporeal, virtual plane of counter-actualization lays out a process of actualization by persistently launching the emergence of becoming in processes, exterior to actualized frames while remaining immanent in processes that may provoke reworked actualization. This virtual plane of counter-actualization delineates “the immanence of the transcendental field” (Deleuze 2001: 32), an immanence which transcends actualized practices of attribution. This immanence, according to Deleuze’s understanding of Baruch Spinoza’s philosophy, is not attributed to the framework of “the transcendent” (27) that designates existence on the basis of actualized and even universalized forms of subjective and objective qualities:

In Spinoza, immanence is not immanence to substance; rather, substance and modes are in immanence. When the subject or the object falling outside the plane of immanence is taken as a universal subject or as any object to which immanence is attributed, the transcendental is entirely denatured, for it then simply redoubles the empirical (as with Kant), and immanence is distorted, for it then finds itself enclosed in the transcendent. Immanence is not related to Some Thing as a unity superior to all things or to a Subject as an act that brings about a synthesis of things: it is only when immanence is no longer immanence to anything other than

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2 Deleuze proposes a different sense of the transcendental: “The transcendental form of a faculty is indistinguishable from its disjointed, superior or transcendent exercise. Transcendent in no way means that the faculty addresses itself to objects outside the world but, on the contrary, that it grasps that in the world which concerns it exclusively and brings it into the world” (Deleuze 1994: 143). Keith Ansell Pearson clarifies the difference between the Deleuzian sense of the transcendental and the transcendental that “measures the empirical operation of all the faculties according to that which pertains to each” (143): “The error of attempts to define the transcendent with consciousness for Deleuze is that they get constructed in the image of that which they are supposed to ground, running the risk of simply reduplicating the empirical (Deleuze 1969: 128; 1990: 105). Metaphysics and transcendental philosophy are only able to think singularities by imprisoning them within the confines of a supreme self (un Moi suprême) or a superior ‘T’ (un Je supérieur) (129; 106)” (Ansell Pearson 87-88).
This sense of immanence, which is “no longer immanence to anything other than itself,” is “not immanence to life” but is “itself a life” (Deleuze 2001: 27). According to Deleuze’s reading of Johann Fichte’s philosophy, this sense of immanence “presents the transcendental field as a life,” which is “no longer dependent on a Being or submitted to an Act,” which “no longer refers to a being but is ceaselessly posed in a life” (27). To describe this sense of immanence as a life, Deleuze takes a momentary vision from Charles Dickens’ novel *Our Mutual Friend* (1864-65) as an example:

What is immanence? A life ... No one has described what a life is better than Charles Dickens, if we take the indefinite article as an index of the transcendental. A disreputable man, a rogue, held in contempt by everyone, is found as he lies dying. Suddenly, those taking care of him manifest an eagerness, respect, even love, for his slightest sign of life. Everybody bustles about to save him, to the point where, in his deepest coma, this wicked man himself senses something soft and sweet penetrating him. But to the degree that he comes back to life, his saviors turn colder, and he becomes once again mean and crude. Between his life and his death, there is a moment that is only that of a life playing with death. (Deleuze 2001: 28)

The immanence of a life is an “index of the transcendental” (Deleuze 2001: 28) as well as an “index of a multiplicity” (30). The immanence of a life is an index of the transcendental because it transcends actualized, attributed bounds and becomes passable and traversable to a life going beyond the rigidity of conventionalization and meanwhile eagerly sticking to the intensity of life:

The life of the individual gives way to an impersonal and yet singular life that releases a pure event freed from the accidents of internal and external life, that is, from the subjectivity and objectivity of what happens: a “Homo tantum” with whom everyone empathizes and who attains a sort of beatitude. [...] The life of
such individuality fades away in favor of the singular life immanent to a man who no longer has a name, though he can be mistaken for no other. A singular essence, a life ... (Deleuze 2001: 28-29)

The immanence of a life as an index of the transcendental is indispensably coupled with its being an index of a multiplicity. The “pure event” of an “indefinite,” “impersonal,” and “singular” life (Deleuze 2001: 28), as differentiated from the actualized life of individuality interpreted in terms of “accidents of the life” (29), embarks on a plane of “between-times, between-moments” (29), of “a meanwhile [un entre-temps],” of “that which happens in the interval between moments of time or actions” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 158):

It is no longer time that exists between two instants; it is the event that is a meanwhile [un entre-temps]: the meanwhile is not part of the eternal, but neither is it part of time—it belongs to becoming. The meanwhile, the event, is always a dead time; it is there where nothing takes place, an infinite awaiting that is already infinitely past, awaiting and reserve. This dead-time does not come after what happens; it coexists with the instant or time of the accident, but as the immensity of the empty time in which we see it as still to come and as having already happened, in the strange indifference of an intellectual intuition. All the meanwhiles are superimposed on one another, whereas times succeed each other. (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 158)

It is this virtual interval of a meanwhile, coexistent with the instant of an accident while differentiating itself from the actualized state by being lived in a process “still to come” as well as “having already happened” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 158), that enables events of impersonal singularities to emerge. Events of impersonal singularities affirm the existence of divergences, bifurcations, and ramifications by departing from actualized itineraries and complicating orientations of actualization. Moreover, processes of “singularization” (Deleuze 2001: 29) affirm the existence of divergences, bifurcations, and ramifications by putting them into encounters and resonances. As illustrated in the scene where the
immanence of a life affects everyone involved and permeates the whole surroundings in Dickens’ novel, the boundaries of “individuation” (29) that characterize and distinguish the rogue from other people around him are temporarily suspended for the sake of the intensity of life. The rogue and other people around him as mutually incompatible divergences identified in terms of the actualized boundaries of individuation, in the interval of a meanwhile, on the plane of immanence, become passable and traversable divergences that may encounter each other, resonate with each other, and provoke an event of impersonal singularity.

6. Passability and Traversability: Divergence and Resonance

The differentiation between incompatible divergences and passable divergences may be clarified by Deleuze’s analysis of incompossibility in *The Fold* (1988). There are two distinct observations of the incompossibility of divergences. One of the observations treats the issue of incompossibility by means of excluding incompatibility:

Leibniz, who strongly distrusts the Cartesian argument of the nonmalevolent God, gives him a new basis at the level of incompossibility: God plays tricks, but he also furnishes the rules of the game (contrary to Borges’s and Leblanc’s game without rules). The rule is that possible worlds cannot pass into existence if they are incompossible with what God chooses. (Deleuze 1993: 63)

The other observation regards the issue of incompossibility by reserving the independence of each divergence and the coexistence of divergences:

It is clear why Borges invokes the Chinese philosopher rather than Leibniz. He wanted, just as did Maurice Leblanc, to have God pass into existence all incompossible worlds at once instead of choosing one of them, the best. (Deleuze 1993: 62)

According to Daniel W. Smith’s elucidation of Deleuze’s analysis of incompossibility, the former observation focuses on ensuring and maintaining the existence of a “single
compossible world” (Smith xxvi), which “is defined by the set of convergent series that constitute it, and the set of monads that express it with varying degrees of clarity” (xxv-xxvi). This single compossible world is composed of convergent series and their corresponding expressions, which rigidifies the incompatibility between convergence and divergence and furthermore inhibits the intensity of divergence. The latter observation on incompossibility is not concerned with the solidification of a single compossible world. It instead lays out a virtual plane of “a pure Process that passes through all these virtual possibilities, forming an infinite web of diverging and converging series” (xxvi). This virtual plane of process makes it possible for divergences, bifurcations, and incompossibles to “belong to one and the same universe” (xxvi). On this virtual plane of process, divergences are not rendered subject to predetermined rules of compossibility. They belong to one and the same universe because processes of convergence and divergence consistently prompt them to become susceptible, passable, and traversable to alternative compositions. The intensity of divergence is reinforced by this virtual universe, in which “divergent series trace endlessly bifurcating paths” (xxvi).

Passable divergences belong to “the zone of exchange” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 109), to “zones of indiscernibility, of undecidability” (158), since they are not endowed with presumed and manageable meanings and positions by a predetermined framework. Their expressions of divergence do not rely on attributes entitled to qualify and orient the operation of divergence. As opposed to the practice of normative attribution, passable divergences express the intensity of divergence in processes. Events of singularities, as intervals of meanwhiles generating from compositions of passable divergences, are as a result “variations, modulations, intermezzi, singularities of a new infinite order” (158) that have to take place in processes of struggling and exploring. The intensity summoned via these processes engenders “composite becoming” (158), which differentiates from actualized effects of becoming but animates their operation and reworking:

Nothing happens there, but everything becomes, so that the event has the privilege of beginning again when time is past. Nothing happens, and yet everything
changes, because becoming continues to pass through its components again and to restore the event that is actualized elsewhere, at a different moment. When time passes and takes the instant away, there is always a meanwhile to restore the event. (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 158)

The becoming of a meanwhile is composite because it is a singular composition of passable divergences. The process of becoming accentuates the intensity of this singular composition, whose “variations, modulations, intermezzi” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 158) consistently launch intervals of becoming. This is a relationship of “inter-expressive” (Deleuze 1990: 177) passability and traversability between divergence and composite becoming. The process of becoming is not confined to practices of transformations from one actualized state to another. These actualized transformations, based on “a theory of qualities and their circular transformations” (178), tend to coop us up within similarly, relatively, or oppositely qualified scopes of identification without a leap that may rework these given bounds. Because of this enmeshed rigidity, we are apt to circumscribe ourselves from contemplation and movement in terms of a contradictory dilemma between occupying individual actualized, habitual states and connecting with other exterior, divergent states. The difficulty confronted in this contradictory dilemma arises from an assumption that the optimum sense, the maximum extent of connection, of unity consists in a harmonization that may encompass and coordinate a majority of divergences. The difficulty is primarily composed of a presupposed ideal of harmonization and a presumed range of majority, which in advance restrict the fluidity and potentiality of divergences. However, instead of demanding transformations of divergences by seeking to subsume them under identified categories and ideals, if we focus on the passability and traversability between divergences, that is, the capability to encounter and resonate with the intensity of divergence rather than the rigidity of incompatibility, we may discover alternative trajectories of expressing divergence and convergence via their consistent confrontation and resonance, actualization and counter-actualization on a virtual plane of immanent becoming. This expression of the singular intensity of divergence is also the singular intensity of multiplicity, which arises
from processes of a multiplicity of meanwhiles.

7. Passability and Traversability: The Univocity of Being

The virtual plane of immanence, with passable divergences involved in its intervals of compositions, hence endows divergence and multiplicity with two levels of operation: on the one hand the heterogeneity of divergences and multiplicities, and on the other hand the intensity of divergence and multiplicity. The operation of the two levels is further illuminated in Deleuze’s analysis of the “univocity of Being” (Deleuze 1990: 179) with its “affirmation of a disjunctive synthesis” (178):

The univocity of Being does not mean that there is one and the same Being; on the contrary, beings are multiple and different, they are always produced by a disjunctive synthesis, and they themselves are disjointed and divergent, *membra disjuncta*. The univocity of Being signifies that Being is Voice that it is said, and that it is said in one and the same “sense” of everything about which it is said. That of which it is said is not at all the same, but Being is the same for everything about which it is said. It occurs, therefore, as a unique event for everything that happens to the most diverse things, Eventum tantum, for all events, the ultimate form for all of the forms which remain disjointed in it, but which bring about the resonance and the ramification of their disjunction. The univocity of Being merges with the positive use of the disjunctive synthesis which is the highest affirmation. It is the eternal return itself, or— as we have seen in the case of the ideal game— the affirmation of all chance in a single moment, the unique cast for all throws, one Being and only for all forms and all times, a single instance for all that exists, a single phantom for all the living, a single voice for every hum of voices and every drop of water in the sea. (Deleuze 1990: 179-80)

According to Deleuze’s analysis, the heterogeneity of divergences and multiplicities is demonstrated in a diversity and profusion of forms, while the intensity of divergence and multiplicity is in alignment with the univocity of Being and its affirmation of a disjunctive synthesis. It is in terms of the intensity, the univocity of Being that the heterogeneity of
divergences and multiplicities may “bring about the resonance and the ramification of their disjunction” (Deleuze 1990: 179). The ramification and resonance of a disjunctive synthesis are no longer “founded upon the identity of contraries” (179) but rather focus on the exploration and affirmation of “distances” between divergent events of singularities (178, 179) as well as on how the explored and affirmed distances may prompt “the bifurcating and ramified series to resonate within one another” (179). The ramification and resonance of a disjunctive synthesis affirm the immanence of an event of singularity diverging from its actualized state via its resonance with other events of singularities:

We do not raise contrary qualities to infinity in order to affirm their identity; we raise each event to the power of the eternal return in order that the individual, born of that which comes to pass, affirm her distance with respect to every other event. As the individual affirms the distance, she follows and joins it, passing through all the other individuals implied by the other events, and extracts from it a unique Event which is once again herself, or rather the universal freedom. (Deleuze 1990: 178)

The extraction of “a unique Event” as “the universal freedom,” “the universal communication of events” is a virtual process of “counter-actualization” (Deleuze 1990: 178), in which an individual event is no longer enclosed within its individually centered vision to observe its isolation from and incompatibility against other events. This enclosed vision may contribute to the generation of “vehement oscillations which upset the individual as long as he seeks only his own center and does not see the circle of which he himself is a part,” since “each [oscillation] corresponds to an individuality other than that which he takes as his own from the point of view of the undiscoverable center” (Klossowski, qtd. in Deleuze 1990: 178). The vehement oscillations resulting from an enclosed vision prevent an individual from sustaining his/her consistency in confrontation with the incompatibility of other individualities. Distinct from this enclosed vision, in the virtual process of counter-actualization, an individual event is not confined to its delimited actualized scope to observe the universe by following a self-sufficient set of rules, but on the
contrary affirms its individuality and distance “with respect to every other event,” by “passing through all the other individuals implied by the other events” (Deleuze 1990: 178). An individual event acquires a different sense of immanence other than that defined by its actualized state. It acquires its intensity of immanence by becoming a passable divergence that transcends its actualized attribution and continues its ramification by becoming capable to resonate with other events.

This intensity of immanence by virtue of a disjunctive synthesis is the univocity of Being, which is “extra-Being,” the “form of exteriority” (Deleuze 1990: 180) that counter-actualizes and transcends given, actualized states of Being in order that the immanence of Being may be intensely as well as extensively, rather than rigidly and self-sufficiently, strengthened: Univocity “wrests Being from beings in order to bring it to all of them at once, and to make it fall upon them for all times” (180). The exteriority of the univocity of Being is a kind of involvement that “surveys the whole of the lived no less than every state of affairs” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 34). This surveying is not based on a framework of transcendence that prescribes a “relationship of the ‘I-unity’ to the subjective sensation of a visual field” as that which “tempts us to imagine the ‘I’ as a kind of invisible center outside and situated in a supplementary dimension perpendicular to the whole of the visual field that it surveys from a distance” (Tomlinson and Burchell ix). Instead, this surveying is in processes, intervals, meanwhiles of passing through the whole visual field, of encountering and resonating with divergent compositions of the visual field, of becoming: “The immediate survey of the unity of the visual field made up of many different details takes place within the dimension of the visual sensation itself; it is a kind of ‘self-enjoyment’ that does not involve any supplementary dimension” (ix-x). The exteriority of the univocity of Being does not depend on a preexisting supplementary dimension as “a form of interiority” in alliance with “a form of universality” in order to accomplish “a whole consensus” by self-sufficiently manipulated compartmentalization and unification (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 375). Instead of conforming to models as ulterior standards of judgment, the exteriority of the univocity of Being follows processes in operation — “relays, intermezzos, resurgences” — “occupy[ing] without counting,” occupying not according to
measures of “the architectonic model or the monument” (377) but rather according to the extent of passability and traversability showing “distances and proximities that cannot be broken down and that express the density or rareness of what appears there” (Deleuze 2007: 299). Operations in terms of the extent of passability and traversability rather than predetermined models produce the consistent intensity of “the universal communication of events” (Deleuze 1990: 178). The exteriority and the univocity of Being in tandem affirm a disjunction as well as a synthesis between divergent events, which simultaneously counter-actualize given states of beings while inspiring the potential immanence of actualization.

8. Passability and Traversability: The Event in the Stoic Sense

The univocity of Being with its affirmation of a disjunctive synthesis is the core of Deleuze’s exploration of the conception of the event in terms of Stoic philosophy. To elucidate the event in the Stoic sense, Deleuze adopts French poet Joë Bousquet’s contemplation of his wound as an illustration. Bousquet’s contemplation of his wound attempts to build an unconventional connection between his actualized state of paralysis and the world outside so as to grasp a different sense of the event other than its defined actualized state:

“My wound existed before me, I was born to embody it.” [...] “Everything was in order with the events of my life before I made them mine; to live them is to find myself tempted to become their equal, as if they had to get from me only that which they have that is best and most perfect.” (Bousquet, qtd. in Deleuze 1990: 148)

For Bousquet, the way to live events, to become their equal is to long for the events, to will them:

“To my inclination for death,” said Bousquet, “which was a failure of the will, I will substitute a longing for death which would be the apotheosis of the will.”
According to Deleuze’s analysis, this will, which is capable of “willing the event,” of becoming “worthy” of the event, is opposed to “resentment of the event” (Deleuze 1990: 149): “To grasp whatever happens as unjust and unwarranted (it is always someone else’s fault) is, on the contrary, what renders our sores repugnant—veritable *ressentiment*, resentment of the event” (149). In addition to diverging from the attitude of willfully blaming misfortune or fault on others in order to encircle oneself within a protective covering away from unwilled influences, the will that wills the event is also opposed to the passivity of “resignation”: The way to will the event is not to “accept war, wounds, and death when they occur” (149). Neither, I would like to argue, does willing the event as a result point to the reverse side of actively, positively, autonomously confronting predicament without being vulnerably influenced and restricted. This activity and autonomy, which tend to privilege defined positive values and make their doctrines predominate while inhibiting the fluidity of exploring and cultivating values, still accentuate the “organic will” (149). The operation of organic will primarily depends on the direction of personal inclinations, which are frequently accustomed to or enmeshed in frameworks of actualized and identified values.

What Deleuze observes in Stoic philosophy and in Bousquet’s contemplation of his wound is a will of immanence. It is not a will of inclination, nor is it a will of transcendence, exerting its force on the basis of organic will or preexisting models. A will of immanence tries to pursue “something in that which occurs, something yet to come which would be consistent with what occurs” (Deleuze 1990: 149). This something in that which occurs points to the intensity of life: “to will and release the event, to become the offspring of one’s own events, and thereby to be reborn, to have one more birth, and to break with one’s carnal birth” (149-50). For a new life to emerge from the event, the consistency between what occurs and something in that which occurs cannot be explored and produced with one-sided reliance on actualization. The emergence of a new life needs to go through a virtual process of counter-actualization that transcends the rigidity of given, actualized states of affairs.
without being shackled by norms of actualization. This virtual process of counter-actualization is the way to undermine and rework the rigidity of actualized states and to produce alternative trajectories for a new life to exert its effects in actualization. The consistency between actualized states of affairs and the intensity of life is not a causal relationship between cause and effect as metrically corresponding coordinates. The consistency is instead demonstrated via a multiplicity of divergences, bifurcations, and ramifications as well as their encounters and resonances. The consistency is topologically formed via the univocity of Being with its affirmation of a disjunctive synthesis.

It is in terms of this affirmation of a disjunctive synthesis that we may comprehend Bousquet’s embodiment of his wound. The way Bousquet embodies his wound is not delimited by the actualized state of the wound in the form of paralysis, which along with its conventionally identified meanings and value judgments circumscribes the scope of his physical, mental, and social development. To counter-actualize this actualized circumscription, Bousquet endows his embodiment of the wound with a different sense other than that of an actualized event. His embodiment of the wound may be regarded as the involvement in processes of “the condensation of singularities” (178) that provoke the intensity of wound. The condensation of singularities requires an affirmation of both disjunction and synthesis. In other words, Bousquet’s embodiment transcends the recognized bounds of his actualized wound and places himself on a virtual plane that involves other events. These events are multiple beings of embodiment distinct from Bousquet’s event of wound. However, the virtual plane makes it possible for divergent events to encounter and resonate with each other, and in this sense to counter-actualize their individual actualized states and encourage diverse compositions of life. It is this virtual plane of encounters and resonances with its intensity that leads Bousquet to deem his embodiment of the wound always already participating in a multiplicity of life and meanwhile not yet embodied with its sense other than that of its actualized state.

This sense of embodiment for the sake of producing the intensity of life is the way the univocity of Being may orient an individual to immanently will the event by “becoming a
citizen of the world” (Deleuze 1990: 148):

If willing the event is, primarily, to release its eternal truth, like the fire on which it is fed, this will would reach the point at which war is waged against war, the wound would be the living trace and the scar of all wounds, and death turned on itself would be willed against all deaths. (Deleuze 1990: 149)

What has to be noted is that the univocity of willing the event, as Deleuze reminds us, is not a concern for encompassing a whole range of universality or particularity as a way to demonstrate and justify the supposed comprehensive extent of a specific argument or perspective:

There is, nevertheless, a good deal of ignominy in saying that war concerns everybody, for this is not true. It does not concern those who use it or those who serve it — creatures of ressentiment. And there is as much ignominy in saying that everyone has his or her own war or particular wound, for this is not true of those who scratch at their sores — the creatures of bitterness and ressentiment. (Deleuze 1990: 152)

Those who use war, who serve war and those who scratch at their sores are mentioned as examples of ressentiment not only because of their actualized deeds of violence and bitterness but furthermore in light of their rigid enclosure within their own self-sufficient contemplation of their wounds. Bitterness and resentment resulting from the wound inevitably find their ways of expression and discharge. However, when their expression and discharge are rigidly enclosed within an individual scope or confined to certain dogmatic visions, they imprison the wound within its actualized predicament and leave alternative orientations for life unattended and unexplored. This imprisonment makes life trapped in its fragility while ignoring the overwhelming intensity of life that remains non-actual and waits for being composed:

In one case, it is my life, which seems too weak for me and slips away at a point which, in a determined relation to me, has become present. In the other case, it is I
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who am too weak for life, it is life which overwhelms me, scattering its singularities all about, in no relation to me, nor to a moment determinable as the present, except an impersonal instant which is divided into still-future and already-past. (Deleuze 1990: 151)

When life is regarded predominantly and stringently in terms of self-centered conventions, its intensity tends to be overlooked and thus weakened once it exceeds its expected perimeters. Nonetheless, if the self-sufficiently enclosed periphery is rendered flexible, becoming passable and traversable to approach distances in relation to other divergences, an individual will not only observe other divergences in actualization but moreover will become impersonally involved in his/her resonance with other divergences in a virtual meanwhile of the intensity of life. This is an individual “in tune with divergent series” (Deleuze 1993: 137). This impersonal involvement in the intensity of life, by virtue of the affirmation of and resonance with other divergent series, does not subject an individual to the passivity of being acquiescently and unresistingly molded by and combined into the univocity of Being. The passivity of compliance or resignation cannot effectively contribute to the impersonal involvement in the intensity of life. The impersonality consists in extracting from the depth of actualization a plane of potentiality, of virtuality, which encourages compositions of a multiplicity of passages between divergences rather than divisions of isolated personal actualized states between incompatible divergences incapable of becoming passable and traversable to other ways of coexistence.

To become passable and traversable to alternative trajectories is a challenging process, a “zone of exchange” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 109) between divergent series, a zone of “indiscernibility” (158) where defined, identified actualized values are complicated and reworked. The operation of passability and traversability differentiates from the activity of autonomously managing, governing, and creating compositions, which tends to adopt a detached position to avoid being influenced by the limitation of actualized states and meanwhile inhibit its attention to the aspect of impersonality so as to ensure a full preservation of activity and autonomy. The operation of passability and traversability is a
kind of susceptibility to the impact of divergent series. To become capable of pursuing the singular, immanent intensity of life “in tune with divergent series” (Deleuze 1993: 137), passability and traversability belong to a not-yet-actualized, indiscernible, and potential form of existence “astraddle over several worlds,” which is “kept half open as if by a pair of pliers” (137). The agency of being prompted to exceed one’s boundaries of enclosure with difficulty as well as exigency works in the process of struggling and groping. This process of struggling and groping, I would like to argue, is the Stoic ethical sense of willing the event. The process of struggling and groping lays out a plane where divergent series, disoriented from their actualized direction and destination, may explore potential encounters and resonances in the process of counter-actualization. The process of struggling and groping may thus be regarded as a “quasi-cause” in the Stoic sense (Deleuze 1990: 94). According to Deleuze’s analysis, it is in terms of the sense of a quasi-cause that the “incorporeal” sense of the event (94) other than its actualized state may be manifested in “the full autonomy of the effect” (95):

The event has a different nature than the actions and passions of the body. But it results from them, since sense is the effect of corporeal causes and their mixtures. It is always therefore in danger of being snapped up by its cause. It escapes and affirms its irreducibility only to the extent that the causal relation comprises the heterogeneity of cause and effect—the connection of causes between themselves and the link of effects between themselves. This is to say that incorporeal sense, as the result of the actions and passions of the body, may preserve its difference from the corporeal cause only to the degree that it is linked, at the surface, to a quasi-cause which is itself incorporeal. The Stoics saw clearly that the event is subject to a double causality, referring on one hand to mixtures of bodies which are its cause and, on the other, to other events which are its quasi-cause. (Deleuze 1990: 94)

The incorporeal sense of the event points to the singular, immanent intensity of the univocity of Being as counter-actualization. The “irreducibility” (Deleuze 1990: 94) of this incorporeal sense of the event is preserved on a plane of quasi-cause that entails a non-causal
relationship—“the heterogeneity of cause and effect” (94)—and non-predestined encounters of divergent effects—“the full autonomy of the effect” (95). The event as an incorporeal quasi-cause is in this manner a virtual process of counter-actualization launched and insisted in the consistency of struggling and groping in order for the intensity of life to emerge. Hence, the embodiment of the event is not only produced in its actualized state, and moreover in its reworked actualization, but furthermore in its potential virtuality of grasping the sense of the event in processes. This is the manner of how the event as a quasi-cause “does not create,” but “operates,’ and wills only what comes to pass” (147). The will that wills the event is not based on a self-sufficient autonomy of personal will to decide its activity or passivity. Similarly, what comes to pass does not range according to the scope of personal will. Rather, the will that wills the event is a consistent synthesis of disjunctions, bifurcations, and resonances between immanence and its exteriority. This is the sense in which a Stoic sage is described as an archer. To reach the target, the archer not only focuses his/her eyes and mind on the designated destination but also has to involve himself/herself in the whole surroundings as “the surface of the target” (146).

The relation to the archer is closer to Zen: the bowman must reach the point where the aim is also not the aim, that is to say, the bowman himself; where the arrow flies over its straight line while creating its own target; where the surface of the target is also the line and the point, the bowman, the shooting of the arrow, and what is shot at. This is the oriental Stoic will as proairesis. (Deleuze 1990: 146)

It is in terms of the observation of “the surface of the target” (Deleuze 1990: 146) that the event of shooting arrows at a specific target not only involves the actualized destination but moreover entails a multiplicity of trajectories and targets to emerge in this process of approaching the event by provoking the intensity of shooting arrows. What counts in this process of approaching and grasping the sense of the event are passability and traversability that enable the archer to will the event by summoning divergent series into encounters and resonances.
9. Conclusion

Buchanan’s elaboration on Levi’s use of the conception of shame to contemplate the Holocaust event and on Deleuze’s exploration of the conception of the event expressively articulates the significance of producing concepts in pursuit of immanence via counter-actualization, which transcends the rigidity of actualized states so as to rework the given, defined sense of actualization. Buchanan deems this sense of counter-actualization in pursuit of immanence the kernel of Deleuzian transcendental empiricist ethics, which is “an active mode of ethics” (Buchanan 83) primarily accentuating autonomously and creatively willing the event to exert effects of counter-actualization. While Buchanan explicates the relationship between counter-actualization and an active mode of ethics that may effectively disengage an individual from his/her “armature of habits” (82) and enable an individual to acquire “governmentality” as well as “freedom” (87) from creative practices in actualization, I would like to put more focus on the passages that lay out on a virtual plane of counter-actualization and that contribute the intensity of immanence to the reworked actualization. This virtuality of counter-actualization is significant, since it gives potential access to a plane where the heterogeneity of divergent series may be affirmed and meanwhile their “disjunctive synthesis” (Deleuze 1990: 179) is also rendered indispensable. What facilitates the “univocity” (179) of a disjunctive synthesis is the intensity of immanence, which emerges from the “condensation of singularities” (178) produced via encounters and resonances between divergent series. Encounters and resonances are crucially concerned with the passability and traversability of and between divergent series. It is by means of passability and traversability that the virtual plane of counter-actualization may transcend the rigidity of actualization and recharge the immanence of actualization. This virtuality, as an “expression” of how “relationality” operates (Colebrook 85), consistently stimulates “the chance to go farther than we would have believed possible” (Deleuze 1990: 161), the chance to make it possible for actualization “accessible by other paths” (Burroughs, qtd. in Deleuze 1990: 161). The virtuality of counter-actualization consistently prompts the intensity of life, as the intensity of thought, to occur “at its edges” (Deleuze 1990: 160).
Works Cited


事件的反既成、既成／實現與能受面向
—— 回應艾恩‧布齊南對德勒茲「超越經驗法則的經驗主義」倫理的評論

黃惠瑜*

摘要

在艾恩‧布齊南(Ian Buchanan)對德勒茲(Gilles Deleuze)「超越經驗法則的經驗主義」(transcendental empiricism)倫理的討論中，由狀態所組成的「既成／實現」(actualization)面向包含兩種發展方向：一方面指的是既成的、已定義的狀態，另一方面則指向在狀態中發揮效果的重新組構。「反既成」(counter-actualization)面向同時包含這兩種既成及實現的方向：反既成面向超越既成狀態的僵化，並由此開設重新組構的實現狀態。藉由德勒茲對於「事件」概念的分析，布齊南將「追求事件意義」(willing the event)的態度視為一種反既成面向的表現，這樣的態度對於既成價值的抵抗，以及重新組構的實現狀態的開設，型塑出一種「主動積極型態的倫理觀」。布齊南的評論強化了反既成面向的重要性，以及這樣的面向在重新組構的實現狀態中所能發揮的正面效果。本論的論點則希望著重於反既成過程中不可或缺的潛在虛擬平面的存有。所謂的潛在虛擬平面展開於分歧序列之間所形成的斷裂及迴響。如果將反既成過程中所面對的分歧、斷裂及迴響納入考量，追求事件意義的意志運作便不侷限於個人意願的主動或是被動。有別於對個人意願自主性的追求，本文的論點認為追求事件意義的意志強度取決於能受(passability)與能跨越(traversability)的能力所展現的程度。能受與能跨越的能力所展現的是一種感受(susceptibility)分歧序列內在性的能力，同時也讓個體的內在性能夠不受限於個人框架，存在於「存有的合聲」(univocity of Being)之中。

關鍵詞：事件、既成／實現、反既成、能受、內在性、超越經驗法則的經驗主義、存有的合聲

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*黃惠瑜，臺灣大學外國語文學系博士生。
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