Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/18779
標題: 公司治理與財務分析師預測行為之相關性研究
The Relationship between Corporate Governance and Analyst Forecasts Behavior
作者: 許明曄
Yeh, Hsu Ming
關鍵字: 公司治理;corporate governance;資訊透明度;股權結構;董監事組成;分析師預測;information transparency;ownership structure;the board of directors and supervisors;analyst forecast
出版社: 會計學研究所
摘要: 
隨著企業弊案的爆發與民眾公司治理意識抬頭,資訊透明度與公司治理機制相關問題再度受到重視,因而引發本文瞭解投資大眾之投資指標-財務分析師預測行為-是否會受到公司治理運作之影響。首先,本文探討公司治理機制與財務分析師預測意願之相關性。其次,本文進一步探討公司治理機制對財務分析師預測精確性之影響。最後,本文探討公司治理運作對財務分析師之樂觀預測或悲觀預測的影響。
實證結果發現:1. 資訊透明度越高之公司越能吸引證券商分析師對其進行預測; 且當期性資訊透明度越高,證券商分析師預測意願也越高。其他公司治理層面部份,非獨立法人董監事以及家族董監事席次比例越高,越會削弱公司治理之有效運作,故證券商分析師預測該公司之意願越低。2. 資訊透明度與證券商分析師預測精確性之間具有密不可分的關係,且不論當期性資訊透明度亦或年報資訊透明度皆會提升證券商分析師預測精確性。另外,本研究結果亦發現,處於知識經濟時代,非財務性資訊在提升證券商分析師預測精確度上更形重要。3. 大股東持股比率與董監事持股比率越高時,可能會進行傷害公司價值之活動,故證券商分析師傾向悲觀預測。外資持股比率越高之公司會傳遞未來經營績效良好的正面訊息,故證券商分析師傾向樂觀預測。當董事長同時兼任總經理(雙重性身份)時,公司發生財務危機機率將會增加; 另外,董監事規模越大將不易協調彼此意見進而無法制定對公司未來價值之最有利決策,故證券商分析師對總經理具雙重身份以及董監事規模較大之公司未來盈餘結果傾向悲觀預測。最後,內部董監事席次比例越高將使證券商分析師傾向樂觀預測。

Following the outburst of enterprises' fraud cases, people are more aware of the importance of corporate governance. The problems of information transparency and corporate governance mechanism have been back to the center of attention. Therefore, this study is interested in the relationship between corporate governance and analysts' forecasts behavior. First, this study investigates the relationship between corporate governance and analyst forecasts violation. Second, this study proceeds examine the influence of corporate governance to analysts' forecasts behavior. Finally, this study investigates the influence of corporate governance to analysts' optimistic or pessimistic forecasts.
Empirical results show that, 1. Firms that have superior information transparency and timely information transparency tend to have a larger group of analysts following. When firms' directors and supervisors are institutional shareholders, and the higher proportion of family-owned director and/or supervisor, the corporate governance mechanism will be weakened and hence fewer analysts will follow the company. 2. Firms that have superior timely information transparency and annual report information transparency will tend to have more accurate analyst earnings forecasts. Moreover, the results show that in a knowledge-based economy, non-financial information is more important for analyst earnings forecasts accuracy. 3. When blockholders, directors and supervisors have higher proportion of ownership, they may injure firms value, therefore, analysts prefer to issue pessimistic forecasts. Firms that have higher proportion of foreign institutional ownership tend to have better management of performance, therefore, analysts prefer to issue optimistic forecasts. When firms' chairmen possess duality, the probabilities of financial crisis will be higher, also, because larger size of board hinders the process effective exchange of ideas between directors and supervisors, therefore, analysts tend to issue pessimistic forecasts. Finally, when firms have higher proportion of insider directors and supervisors, analysts tend to issue pessimistic forecasts.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/18779
Appears in Collections:會計學系所

Show full item record
 

Google ScholarTM

Check


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.