Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/18789
標題: 最終控制股東結構與股票市場績效之關聯性
The Relationship between Ultimate Controlling Shareholders and Market Performance
作者: 徐中原
Shiu, Jung-Yuan
關鍵字: Market Liquidity;市場流動性;Market Volatility;Ultimate Controlling Shareholders;Quality of Earnings;市場波動性;最終控制股東;盈餘資訊品質
出版社: 會計學研究所
引用: 一、中文部分 王嘉穎。民國89年。「我國上市公司財務危機與監理因素之關連性研究-實質所有權之探討」。國立台灣大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。 吳庭州。民國85年。「股權結構、盈餘管理與盈餘資訊性的研究」,輔仁大學管理研究所未出版碩士論文。 林玉霞。民國91年。「臺灣上市公司代理問題、公司治理與股東價值之研究」。私立中原大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。 林佳穎。民國91年。「財務危機公司特性與公司治理之探討」。國立台灣大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。 林明謙。民國89年。「股權結構、董事組成對大股東介入股市行為影響之研究」。私立輔仁大學金融研究所未出版碩士論文。 林詩韻。民國91 年。「台灣上市公司股權結構與盈餘資訊內涵之關聯性研究」。私立淡江大學會研所未出版碩士論文。 呂彥慧。民國88年。「股權結構、監督機制、轉投資、交叉持股與公司經營績效之關係 —以台灣新上市公司為例」。國立中山大學財務管理學系研究所未出版碩士論文。 柯承恩。民國89年。「我國公司監理體系之問題與改進建議(下)」。會計研究月刊。第174期:79~83 洪振。民國92年。「股權集中度與股價報酬率之相關研究-以電子產業與傳統產業為例」。國立成功大學企業管理研究所未出版碩士論文。 翁淑育。民國89年。「台灣上市公司股權結構、核心代理問題及公司價值之研究」。私立輔仁大學金融研究所未出版碩士論文。 高蘭芬。民國91年。「董監事股權質押之代理問題對會計資訊與公司績效之影響」。國立成功大學會計研究所未出版博士論文。 張國宏。民國91年。「透明度對台灣證券市場波動性、流動性及效率性之影響」。國立高雄第一科技大學財務管理研究所碩士論文。 陳柏融。民國92年。「股權結構監理機制及公司價值之研究」。國立中山大學企業管理研究所未出版碩士論文。 陳冠宙。民國93年。「上市公司資訊透明度影響構面之實證」。國立中興大學會計學研究所未出版論文。 陳彥豪。民國91年。「外資與投信法人持股比率變化對股價報酬率影響之研究-以上市電子股為例」。國立中山大學財務管理研究所未出版碩士論文。 曹瓊芳。民國89年。「集團企業與盈餘操縱關聯性之研究」。東吳大學會計學系未出版碩士論文。 彭政錦。民國90年。「董事會特性、股權結構及機構投資人持股與盈餘管理關聯性之研究」。國立嘉義大學管理研究所未出版碩士論文。 黃佩鈴。民國90年。「商業銀行股權結構、核心代理問題與盈餘傳遞效果」。國立中央大學財管所未出版碩士論文。 葉志成。民國93年。「公司治理與企業聲譽關係之研究」。私立靜宜大學企業管理研究所未出版碩士論文。 葉銀華、李存修、柯承恩。民國91年。公司治理與評等系統。台北:商智文化出版。 鄭菽萱。民國91年。「政府機構持股比率與型態對公司價值影響之實證研究」。私立中原大學會計研究所未出版碩士論文。 蕭天厚。民國89年。「企業財務危機因素認知之研究-從公司監理角度之探討」。國立台灣大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。 鍾俊華。民國83年。「股權結構變動對股票安定度影響之研究-台灣地區股票上市公司之實證」。私立東海大學企業管理研究所未出版碩士論文。 二、西文部分 Barnhart, S. W., and S. Rosenstein, 1998, “Board Composition, Managerial Ownership, and Firm Performance: An Empirical Analysis,” Financial Review, Vol.33, Iss.4, pp.1-16. Berle, A., and G. Means, 1932, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, MacMillan, New York, N.Y. Bloomfield, R., and M. O’Hara, 1999, “Market Transparency: Who Wins and Who Loses?” Review of Financial Studies, Vol.12, Iss.1, pp.5-35. Claessens, S., S. Djankov, J. Fan, and L. H. P. Lang, 2000, “The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporation,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.58, Iss.1-2, pp.81-112. ----, 2002, “Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings,” Journal of Finance, Vol.2, No.6, pp.2741-2771. Copeland, T., and D. Galiai, 1983, “Information Effects on the Bid Ask Spread,” Journal of Finance, Vol.38, No.5, pp.1457-1469. DeChow, P. M., R. G. Sloan, and P. Sweeney, 1996, “Cause and Consequence of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions be the SEC,” Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol.13, Iss.1, pp.1-36. Demesetz, H., 1968, “The Costs of Transacting,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.82, No.1, pp.33-53. Dubofsky, D. A., and J. C. Growth, 1984, “Exchange Listing and Stock Liquidity,” Journal of Financial Research, Vol.7, Iss.4, pp.291-302. Fan, J., and T. Wong, 2002, “Corporate Ownership Structure and the Informativeness of Accounting Earnings in East Asia,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol.33, Iss.3, pp.401-425. Flood, M. D., R. Huisman, K. G. Koedijk, and R. J. Mahieu, 1999, “Quote Disclosure and Price Discovery in Multiple-Dealer Financial Markets,” Review of Financial Studies, Vol.12, Iss.1, pp.37-59. French, K. R., and R. Roll , 1986, “Stock Return Variances: The Arrival of Information and the Reaction of Trader,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.17, No.1, pp. 5-26. Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling, 1976, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Cost and Ownership Structure,” Journal of Finance Economics, Vol.3, Iss.4, pp.305-360. Kamara, A., W. Miller, and F. Siegel, 1992, “The Effect of Futures Trading on the Stability of Standard and Poor 500 Returns,” Journal of Futures Markets, Vol.12, Iss.6, pp.645-658. LaPorta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer, 1999, “Corporate Ownership around the World,” Journal of Finance, Vol.54, Iss.2, pp. 471-517. Lyons, K. R., 1996, “Optimal Transparency in a Dealer Market with an Application to Foreign Exchange,” Journal of Financial Intermediation, Vol.5, Iss.3, pp.225-254. Madhavan, A., 1996, “Security Prices and Market Transparency,” Journal of Financial Intermediation, Vol.5, Iss.3, pp.255-283. Morck, R., A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny, 1988, “Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis,” Journal of Finance Economics, Vol.20, No.1, pp.293-315. O’Hara, M., 1995, Market Microstructure Theory, Basil Blackwell Ltd. Panago, M., and A. Roell, 1996, “Transparency and Liquidity: Acomparison of Auction and Dealer Markets with Informed Trading,” Journal of Finance, Vol. 51, Iss.2, pp.579-611. Pound, J., 1988, “Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.20, Iss.1-2, pp.237-265. Sharma, D. V., 2004, “Board of Director Characteristics, Institutional Ownership, and Fraud: Evidence from Australia,” Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, Vol.23, Iss.2, pp.105–117. Shleifer, A., and R. W. Vishny, 1986, “Large Shareholders and Corporate Control,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol.94, Iss.3, pp.461-488. Whittington, G., 1993, “Corporate Governance and the Regulation of Financial Reporting,” Accounting and Business Research, Vol.23, Iss.91, pp.311-319.
摘要: 
由於國內文獻主要探討最終控制股權結構與公司價值、盈餘資訊品質的影響,鮮少有研究探討控制股東剝削行為所造成的盈餘資訊透明度不足對市場流動性及波動性的影響。本文試圖探討股票市場績效,將市場績效區分為市場流動性與波動性指標,並將公司治理特性加入最終控制股東的概念 (LaPorta et al., (1999)),區分治理特性為最終控制股東之股權結構及最終控制股東董事會組成兩構面,分別探討控制股東可能引發的財富剝削行為是否降低公司會計資訊品質,進而是否會影響股票市場流動性與波動性。

實證結果發現:(1)最終控制股東所掌握的控制權越高,市場流動性越高,波動性愈低;最終控制股東所掌握的控制權與盈餘分配權偏離程度愈大,市場流動性越低,波動性愈大。 (2) 最終控制股東型態為家族或個人之公司,市場流動性較低,波動性較大;屬集團企業之公司,市場流動性較低,波動性較大。(3) 在考量剝奪誘因的同時,控制股東之董(監)事席次比率越高,市場流動性較低;控制股東之董(監)事席次與盈餘分配權偏離程度越大,市場流動性較低,波動性較大;董監事股權質押比率越高;市場流動性較低,波動性較大;最終控制股東的參與管理會使市場流動性降低,波動性變大。

Due to the fact that domestic literature review mainly discussed the effects of ultimate controlling shareholders ownership structures, firms' values, and quality of earnings, few studies have explored the effects of insufficient transparency of earnings caused by controlling shareholders' entrenchment effects on market liquidity and market volatility. This research examines market performance and distinguish market performance into market liquidity and market volatility, therefore, in terms of the concept of ultimate controlling shareholders that distinguishes the corporate governance of ultimate controlling shareholders' ownership structure and ultimate controlling shareholders board composition, this paper aims to explore whether or not the controlling shareholders' possible solicited wealth entrenchment effects would undermine the quality of financial statements that further influence stock market liquidity and volatility.

The evidences show that (1) The more control rights the ultimate controlling shareholders obtain, the higher the market liquidity is and the lower the market volatility is; the sharp divergence between cash-flow rights and control rights the ultimate controlling shareholders obtain, the lower the market liquidity is and the higher the market volatility is. (2) As for firms that are typically controlled by families or individuals, the market liquidity is lower but the market volatility is higher; as for firms that are typically controlled by group, the market liquidity is lower but the market volatility is higher. (3) When we also take into considerations the incentives of entrenchment effects, the higher proportion of the controlling shareholders' director numbers are, the lower the market liquidity is. Also, the larger divergence between cash-flow rights and the number of the controlling shareholders' directors, the market liquidity is lower but the market volatility is higher. Moreover, the higher the ratio of the Pledged Shares, the lower the market liquidity is but the higher the market volatility is; ultimate controlling shareholders' participation in management lowers market liquidity but enlarge market volatility.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/18789
其他識別: U0005-0307200611484400
Appears in Collections:會計學系所

Show full item record
 
TAIR Related Article

Google ScholarTM

Check


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.