Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/18792
標題: 股權結構對公司個別風險與籌資型態之影響
The Effects of Ownership Structure on Idiosyncratic Risk and Financing Pattern
作者: 陳立恆
Chen, Li-Hung
關鍵字: ownership structure;個別風險;idiosyncratic risk;seasoned equity;borrowing finance;現金增資;借款融資;股權結構
出版社: 會計學研究所
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摘要: 
雖然股票市場中可選擇的股票日漸增加,但投資人投資股票所欲獲得的報酬不見得相同,若能研究出股權結構對公司個別風險以及選擇融資型態的影響,或許能對公司治理以及投資者在投資股票時,提供一些有用的參考。本文將股權結構分為金融機構投資人、信託投資機構投資人、公司機構投資人、大股東、經理人和董監事,本文探討股權結構與公司個別風險、公司現金增資與公司借款融資的關係。以 1997 年到 2004 年台灣上市公司為研究對象。

研究結果發現:(1)在控制市場風險下,公司的個別風險大小與機構投資人持股比率呈負相關,與大股東、經理人和董監事持股比率呈負相關。(2)公司是否採用現金增資籌措資金方面,公司現金增資對資產總額比率與機構投資人持股比率呈正相關,但與大股東、經理人與董監事持股比率呈負相關。(3)公司是採用借款融資方面,公司借款融資對公司資產總額比係與機構投資人持股比率呈負相關,但與大股東、經理人和董監事持股比率呈正相關。

Although the optional stock increases in stock market day by day, the return that was obtained by investors may uncertain the samely, if we can understand the effects of ownership structure on idiosyncratic risk of the firm and the choice of the financial pattern, perhaps it offers some useful references to corporate governance and the decision making of investors. This paper classifies ownership structure into finance institution investors, firm investors, large shareholders, managers, and directors. This paper analyzes the relevance of ownership structure, idiosyncratic risk, and finance pattern. This paper adopts the samples from 1997 to 2004 listing firm in Taiwan.

The empirical results are that (1)Under controlling the system risk, the idiosyncratic risk of the firm is negative related to institutional investors, negative related to large shareholders, managers, and directors.(2)Whether corporate uses the seasoned equity method to acquire cash, the seasoned equity is positive related to institutional investors, and is negative related to large shareholders, managers, and directors.(3)Whether corporate uses the borrowing financing method to acquire cash, the borrowing finance is negative related to institutional investors, and is positive to large ahareholders, managers, and directors.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/18792
其他識別: U0005-0407200614433900
Appears in Collections:會計學系所

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