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標題: 中國股權分置改革與公司績效之探討
The Association between Non-tradable Share Reform And Firm's Performance In China
作者: 賴怡蓉
Lai, Yi-Jung
關鍵字: full circulation reforms;股權分置改革;ownership structure;institutional features;firm performance;股權結構;組織環境;公司績效
出版社: 會計學研究所
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研究結果發現,中國股權分置改革後,整體上市公司的經營績效較好。然而,中國法律環境制度與歐美國家相比並非完善,且中國各省份的組織環境的不一致性,地方政府往往能夠控制地方的經濟、資本市場和法律環境。此外,國有企業尚未完全私有化(privatization)而持續控制在政府(中央或地方政府)或所委任的官僚體系手中,而過去國有企業與地方政府官僚相互勾結的情況嚴重,可能無法全面透過股權分置改革達到改善公司治理的情況。此外,對於國有企業而言,若所屬省份之法律組織環境較好者,其經營績效較佳。研究結果進一步顯示,法律組織環境較好之省份,受中央政府控制之國有企業(CGSOE) 經營績效正向增加邊際效果大於受地方政府控制之國有企業(LGSOE)。

In the late 1980s the Chinese government established the securities market and privatized the state-owned enterprises by letting these enterprises go public. However, the equity shares of these enterprises were categorized into tradable shares and non-tradable shares. Non-tradable shares, usually held by state-owned companies or other institutional investors, were not allowed to trade freely on the stock exchanges. The split-share structure has caused many adverse consequences to China's securities market; for example, the price of non-tradable shares does not reflect firm performance, the magnitude of IPOs underpricing is apparently too large, and firms with a larger proportion of non-tradable shares tend to pay higher cash dividend and have poorer performance. In order to eliminate these drawbacks, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) launched full circulation reforms of non-tradable shares (FCR) of listed companies in earlier 2005. From 2005 to now, about 99% listed companies have conformed to the reform and change their non-negotiable shares to be tradable. The authorities expected that the reform would improve the corporate governance of the listed firms and strengthen the intermediary function of the stock market.
The research indicated that the overall performance of listed companies is better after the the FCR reforms.However, the institutional features of China, for instance, a state-dominant shareholding structure, dominant government power over external monitoring and market, and inadequate legal system, also give rise to distorted corporate behavior. Furthermore, after the FCR reforms, the authorities do not float state-owned shares on the market and still control the trading of the equity shares of state-owned enterprises. If government is still interfering with capital market, it is doubtful whether the FCR reform can be effective in improving corporate governance. Besides, for the state-owned enterprises, its performance are better if the laws of their organizational environment is good.The research result also shows that the marginal positive effect in performance of the state-owned enterprises controlled by the central government is bigger than the local government.
其他識別: U0005-0106201117555800
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