Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/18806
標題: 薪酬結構與盈餘管理方法之選擇
The Impact of Compensation Structure on the Choice of Earnings Management Behaviors
作者: 黃婉婷
Huang, Wan-Ting
關鍵字: Accrual Management;形式盈餘管理;Real Earnings Management;Classification Shifting;實質盈餘管理;分類變動移轉;高階經理人之薪酬結構
出版社: 會計學研究所
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摘要: 
形式盈餘管理與實質盈餘管理間之替代關係為過去盈餘管理主要研究範圍,McVay(2006)提出新的盈餘管理手法---分類變動移轉,鮮少有研究探討此三種盈餘方法間之關係,故本研究以民國94年至民國98年台灣上市櫃公司為樣本,探討形式盈餘管理、實質盈餘管理與分類變動移轉間之關係。本文試從高階經理人薪酬結構來進一步分析,探討高階經理人之薪酬是否會對形式盈餘管理、實質盈餘管理與分類變動移轉三種盈餘方法間之關係產生影響。
實證結果發現:(1)實質盈餘管理對分類變動移轉有替代關係(2)實質盈餘管理對應計項目之操縱有替代關係(3)當估計之超額薪酬愈高時,相較於應計項目之操縱,經理人愈有誘因進行分類變動移轉之盈餘管理(4)當估計之超額薪酬愈低時,相較於實質盈餘管理,經理人較有誘因採行分類變動移轉之盈餘管理(5)當經理人之薪酬以股票薪酬為主時,相較於應計項目之操縱,經理人較有誘因進行分類變動移轉之盈餘管理(6)當經理人之薪酬以股票薪酬為主時,相較於實質盈餘管理,經理人較有誘因進行分類變動移轉之盈餘管理。

Prior research of earnings management has emphasized on the relationship of accrual management and the manipulation of real economic activities. McVay (2006) mention the new earnings management tool, and it is referred to as classification shifting. A little of literature has discussed the relationship of the three earnings management tools. The sample of our research includes all firm listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange from 2005 to 2009. And our research mainly discussed the relationship between accrual management, the manipulation of real economic activities and classification shifting. Beside, this paper aims to explore whether or not the executive's compensation structure would affect the choice of earnings management behaviors.
The evidences show that(1)Real earnings management and classification shifting have a alternative relationship.(2)Real earnings management and accrual management have a alternative relationship.(3)When the estimated excess salary is higher, managers have more incentives to use classification shifting than accrual management.(4)When the estimated excess salary is higher, managers have more incentives to use classification shifting than the manipulation of real economic activities.(5)when compensation contain is stock-based, managers have more incentive to use classification shifting than accrual management.(6)when compensation contain is stock-based, managers have more incentive to use classification shifting than real earnings management.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/18806
其他識別: U0005-0506201113115800
Appears in Collections:會計學系所

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