Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/18820
標題: 家族企業、董事會特性與穩健會計之關聯性
Family Control, Board of Director Characteristics and Accounting Conservatism
作者: 廖家卉
Liao, Chia-Hui
關鍵字: Family control;家族企業;Board independence;Accounting conservatism;董事會獨立性;會計穩健
出版社: 會計學研究所
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摘要: 
最近文獻指出企業大多數為家族型態,但卻很少有學者針對家族企業與會計穩健之關係進行研究。本研究探討台灣上市公司家族企業與穩健會計之關係,包括非條件式穩健及條件式穩健,並進一步分析董事會特性,包括董事會獨立性、董事會規模及董事長兼任總經理等特性,對家族企業會計穩健程度的影響。本研究採Givoly and Hayn’s (2000)之應計基礎觀點及Beaver and Ryan (2000)之市場基礎觀點,作為非條件式會計穩健之衡量。有關家族企業與條件式會計穩健之關係,則以Basu (1997)模型檢測盈餘反應訊息時效性不對稱程度衡量之。
本研究是以2007年至2009年國內上市公司為樣本,採追蹤資料之固定效果模型及逐年迴歸分析法,以控制不同年度及不同公司中之異質性。在控制了法人持股、公司規模、成長機會、現金流量、槓桿、訴訟風險及審計品質後,本研究實證結果顯示,家族企業會降低非條件式會計穩健程度,代表家族企業傾向採用較為寬鬆的會計政策,且家族公司盈餘對壞消息的認列並無及時性,表示家族企業盈餘報導亦無呈現條件式穩健。整體而言,家族企業的會計穩健程度相對上較低。然而當家族企業獨立董事比例愈高,可增加盈餘反應壞消息的時效性,提高條件式會計穩健。本研究顯示若家族企業提高董事會之獨立性,可增進董事會監督管理當局財務報導之功能,抑制家族企業美化盈餘報導,促使壞消息及時認列,使盈餘報導呈現穩健效果。

A recent stream of literature shows that family control is central in most countries of the world, but little research exists regarding family control and accounting conservatism. The primary objective of this study is to examine the association between family control and accounting conservatism including unconditional conservatism and conditional conservatism. Furthermore, this study investigates whether family control has impacts on accounting conservatism after controlled the effect of the board of director characteristics, measured by board independence, board sizes and duality. This study measures unconditional conservatism by using Givoly and Hayn's (2000) accrual-based model and Beaver and Ryan's (2000) market-value based model. In regard to conditional conservatism this study uses Basu's (1997) asymmetric timelines of earnings model.
Using a sample of firms listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange over the 2007-2009 period this study performs the fixed-effect model and year-by-year annual regression to control unobservable firm characteristic and reduce the heterogeneity in different years and different firms. After controlling standard economic determinants of the level of accounting conservatism, e.g., institutional ownership, firm size, growth opportunities, cash flow, leverage, litigation risk and audit quality, the result shows that a negative relation between family control and unconditional conservatism, indicating family control structure is inclined to adopt less conservative accounting policies. This sudy also finds no significantly positive association between family control and asymmetric timeliness of earnings. However, the greater the proportion of independent directors of the company is, the board is more capable of overseeing the managements and diminishing window dressing the finance report. As a result, independent directors contribute to the early release of bad news, and would be able to respond bad news promptly to be conditional conservatism.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/18820
其他識別: U0005-0906201201062300
Appears in Collections:會計學系所

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