Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/18836
標題: 敵意併購下目標公司是否採取防禦措施對主併公司併購前後經營績效之影響
The Effects of Whether the Target Companies Take Defense Measures in Hostile Takeover on the Performances of Mergers and Acquisitions
作者: 黃愉涵
Huang, Yu-Han
關鍵字: Hostile Takeover;敵意併購;Anti-takeover Protections;Synergy;Cumulative Average Abnormal Return;反併購防禦措施;綜效;累積平均異常報酬
出版社: 會計學研究所
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摘要: 
隨著經濟全球化及貿易自由化的來臨,企業開始尋求與其他企業合併獲取新技術及資金以達到快速成長,併購活動儼然成為企業邁向國際的手段。有些企業為了節省協商時間,以公開收購或收購委託書等方式進行敵意併購。為了預防成為下一個被併購的目標,各企業也發展出一套反併購的防禦措施,如鯊魚驅逐、吞食毒藥丸、尋求白馬騎士等。本研究主要探討面對敵意併購時,目標公司是否採取反併購防禦措施與主併公司經營績效之關聯性,另外本研究也探討敵意併購能否為合併後企業帶來永續成長及增加股東利益。
本研究以1999年至2008年Security Data Company(SDC)中全球敵意併購事件為樣本,研究發現當目標公司採取反併購防禦措施時,主併公司與其合併後無法產生長期之綜效效果,而股票市場上對於此併購宣告雖有給予正向預期,但仍未優於目標公司無採取防禦效果之累積平均異常報酬。

With the economic globalization and the trade liberalization is coming, companies begin to seek to merge with other companies in order to access to new technologies and capital to achieve rapid growth. M & A activity has become the means for international companies. Some companies in order to save consultation time, to tender offer or acquisition of proxies to conduct a hostile takeover. In order to avoiding becoming the next acquisition targets, the companies have also developed a set of anti-takeover defense measures, such as shark repellent, poison pill, seeking white knight et al.. This paper studies the effects of the target companies taking the anti-takeover defense measures when facing hostile takeover on the performance of acquiring companies. In addition, this study also investigated whether the hostile takeover can bring sustainable growth and increase shareholder interests for the acquiring companies.
In this study, data were collected from Security Data Company (SDC), which contained the world''s hostile takeover events covering the period 1999-2008. We found that when the target companies adopt anti-takeover defense measures, the acquiring companies cannot produce long-term synergy effects. Although the stock market gives the positive expectations for the acquisition announcement, the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAR) do not perform better than the target companies which do not take the defense measures.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/18836
其他識別: U0005-1506201216141900
Appears in Collections:會計學系所

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