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標題: 公司治理與創新活動之關聯性研究-以企業成長階段論析
The Association between Corporate Governance and Innovation Activity: A Test of the Business Growth Stage
作者: 葉家甄
Yeh, Chia-Chen
關鍵字: Corporate Governance;公司治理;Patent;Business Growth Stage;專利權;企業成長階段
出版社: 會計學研究所
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In recent years, the occurrence of a series of fraud cases let the issues of corporate governance mechanisms get more and more attention. The rapidly changing business environment let the enterprises must carry out innovation activities in order to maintain the competitive edge. This study attempts to explore whether the virtue or vice of corporate governance mechanisms have an impact on the output of innovation activities, and to further explore the relationship between corporate governance and innovation activities in the business growth stage.
In this study, we listed the electronic companies from 2006 to 2010 for empirical research. The empirical results show that without considering the business growth stage, the director also served as a manager and innovation activities show a significant negative correlation; the proportion of managerial ownerships and institutional ownerships show a significant positive correlation with innovation activities; no significant relationship between the proportion of independent directors and innovation activities. In considering the business growth stage, the director also served as a manager and the proportion of managerial ownerships have a significant correlation with innovation activities. However, the relevance between the proportion of independent directors and institutional ownerships and innovation activities aren't subject to the business growth stage.
其他識別: U0005-1806201202154900
Appears in Collections:會計學系所

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