Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/18897
標題: 董事會獨立性、資訊揭露對權益資金成本影響之研究
The Impact of Board Independence and Information Disclosure on the Cost of Equity Capital
作者: 范夢苓
Fan, Meng-Ling
關鍵字: board independence;董事會獨立性;information disclosure level;cost of equity capital;corporate governance;資訊揭露水準;權益資金成本;公司治理
出版社: 會計學研究所
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摘要: 
近年來台灣證券主管機關積極地推動公司治理,特別係藉由法規之修訂,以改善企業之董事會結構及資訊揭露透明度,以期降低企業管理當局與外部投資人間資訊不對稱之情形,冀能提升公司價值。本研究藉由2006年至2008年的493個台灣上市上櫃公司為樣本訂,探討董事會獨立性、資訊揭露與權益資金成本間之關係,同時檢測董事會獨立性與資訊揭露的交互作用是否對權益資金成本產生增額降低效果。

在控制了淨值市值比、公司規模、系統性風險、負債比率、產業別、年度別等預期會對權益資金成本產生影響之變數後,本文實證結果發現:董事會獨立性、資訊揭露水準二者皆與權益資金成本呈顯著負相關,顯示董事會獨立性愈高、資訊揭露程度愈高,公司權益資金成本會愈低。唯揭露水準較低時,提升董事會獨立性對權益資金成本僅具微弱的增額降低效果,然而在董事會獨立性較低的情形下,公司提高資訊揭露水準並不具增額降低權益資金成本之效果,顯示董事會獨立性對權益資本成本較具影響力。本研究結果或能提供主管機關在訂定相關法規上之建議,例如加強董事會獨立性之規範,並使公司管理當局瞭解董事會獨立性及資訊揭露對提升公司價值之重要性。

Recently, competent authority of Taiwan securities are actively promote corporate governance base on the revised law and regulation to improve company board structure and the quality of information disclosure. Narrow the lack of information between investors and managers will increase the value of company. This study use 493 on market companies as study samples between 2006 and 2008 to demonstrate whether the interaction between board independence and information disclosure level will reduce the cost of equity capitals. After we controlled variables that will affect the cost of equity capitals, the result shows the board independence and information disclosure level correlate with the cost of equity capitals. The higher of the board independence and information disclosure level lower the cost of equity capitals. When the information disclosure level is low, the board independence have higher value there is a slightly decrease in cost of equity capitals. However, when we increased the information disclosure level it does not show there is any decrease in cost of equity capitals. Therefore, the result of this study shows enhance the board independence and information disclosure level it is important to reduce the cost of equity capitals and increase the value of company.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/18897
其他識別: U0005-1506201018155400
Appears in Collections:會計學系所

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