Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/18900
標題: 董事會結構與高階主管薪酬關係之探討
The effects of Board Structure on Executive Compensation
作者: 林鈺棋
Lin, Yu-Chi
關鍵字: Board Independence;董事會獨立性;Board Size;Executive Compensation;Coporate Governance;Agency Theory;董事會規模;高階主管薪酬;公司治理;代理理論
出版社: 會計學研究所
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摘要: 
企業高階主管之薪酬合約係由董事會決定,董事會應設計一套合理的薪酬制度,以誘使管理當局以公司利益為優先並降低管理當局的代理問題與對股東之利益侵佔。近年來,金融風暴與景氣不振導致企業獲利不佳,然而許多績效不彰、甚而虧損之公司,其高階主管仍坐享高額薪酬,顯見董事會未能有效監督經理人薪酬,導致公司利益受到剝奪。職是之故,本研究旨在探討董事會結構與高階主管薪酬之關係,以2006至2008年國內上市櫃公司之為研究對象,期分由董事會規模、董事會獨立性、董事忙碌程度及高階主管兼任董事會成員之角度,探討董事會結構對高階主管薪酬之影響。

本文係採固定效果迴歸模型,在控制了公司規模、總資產報酬率、負債比率、成長機會、年資、公司複雜程度、外資持股比例及經理人持股比例後,實證結果顯示,董事會規模對高階主管薪酬並無顯著正向關係,究其原因,臺灣董事會規模普遍較小,較不存有董事會規模太大而無法有效監督高階主管薪酬之情事,故實證結果不具顯著性。實證結果亦顯示董監事獨立性未能顯著降低高階主管薪酬,可能係因為我國企業其董監事獨立性普遍偏低,使其監督高階主管薪酬之能力受到限制,未能有效發揮抑制超額薪酬的影響力。本研究結果支持當高階主管同時擔任董事會成員時,其高階主管薪酬顯著較高,顯示高階主管基於自利關係,使自己坐領高薪,產生了剝奪了股東財富的可能性。

Compensation decisions are generally made by the board of directors in publicly listed firms. Thus, the board characteristics play an important role in linking executive pay to firm performance, and as well aligning the interests of managers with shareholders. However, despite the fact that the firm''s earnings shrank during the global financial crisis, numerous top executives receive what many believe to be unreasonably high salaries and bonuses. As a result, firms have been under a lot of scrutiny for excessive executive compensation. This suggests that the boards fail to effectively monitor and evaluate the managers. To shed light on this issue, the purpose of this study is to examine the association between the board structure and the level of executive compensation by using a sample of listed companies in Taiwan from 2006 to 2008.

This study uses a fixed effect model to control for unobserved firm characteristic that might explain cross-sectional variation in executive compensation. In addition, this study also controls for standard economic determination of the level of executive compensation, e.g., proxies for the firm size, performance, firm complexity, growth opportunities, firm risk and executive's tenure. The results show that no positive association between the board size and executives compensation, partly because the boards of Taiwanese firms are very small and thus boards cannot exert influence on executive compensation. Additionally, board independence is shown to have no significant effects on executive compensation. That is, more independent directors are not associated with a reduction in executive compensation. This study finds that managers who also serve as the directors are positively associated with executive compensation. The evidence suggests that firms with entrenched managers reduce the effectiveness of directors' monitoring, which could lead to excessive executive compensation.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/18900
其他識別: U0005-1806201017290700
Appears in Collections:會計學系所

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