Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/18911
標題: 家族企業、董事會特性與租稅規避之關係
Family Firms, Board of Director Characteristics and Tax Aggressiveness
作者: 黃詩硯
Huang, Shih-Yan
關鍵字: 家族企業;Family Firm;租稅規避;董事會特性;有效稅率;財稅差異;Tax Aggressive;Board Characteristic;the effective tax rate;Book-tax difference
出版社: 會計學研究所
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摘要: 
企業的租稅負擔一直是企業重要成本與費用,不僅會影響管理階層營運績效的好壞,更會影響企業未來資金的運用,例如投資或分配給股東。企業在進行任何的商業決策或投資活動時都會與租稅負擔有所牽扯。本研究針對台灣上市公司家族企業與租稅規避行為之關係,分別利用有效稅率與財稅差異探討,並進一步研究董事會特性,包含董事會規模、董事會獨立性及董事長兼任總經理等特性,探討其對家族企業之租稅規避行為之影響。本研究以有效稅率及財稅差異之衡量方法作為租稅規避之代理變數。

本研究以2005年至2008年台灣上市公司做為樣本,排除了證券、金融與保險業以測試家族企業、董事會結構與租稅規避之間的關係。實證結果顯示,家族企業與現金有效稅率呈顯著正相關且與財稅差異呈顯著負相關,顯示家族企業較不會進行租稅規避方面的行為,表示家族企業因擁有企業較大之所有權,因此會以較長遠的投資視野進行決策,且家族企業有世代傳承情況,為保全企業在市場上的聲譽以永久經營,將更關注自身企業在市場上之聲譽。家族董事會規模與(現金)有效稅率呈顯著正相關,表示家族企業的董事會規模愈大,家族企業之董事會較不會受管理階層所操控,能達到監督的效果,愈不會進行租稅規避之行為。此外,家族董事長兼任總經理與有效稅率呈顯著負相關且與財稅差異呈顯著正相關,顯示家族企業的董事長兼任總經理時,即家族企業之董事長涉入公司經營業務而兼具總經理之雙重身分時,將使得董事會獨立性與監督功能受到損害,使得經理人愈容易為了自身利益而進行租稅規避。

The tax burden is one of important operating costs and expenses for business. Tax cost not only affects the firms’ operational performance, but also affects the funds that firms can use in investments or distribution of dividends. This study investigates the relationship between the family firms and tax agressiveness by using a sample of Taiwaness listed firms. The study uses the effective tax rate and book-tax difference to measure tax agressiveness. With regard to board characteristics, this study uses the board size, the board independence and CEO duality as proxies.

Using a sample of listed companies in Taiwan during 2005 to 2008, excluding financial and insurance industries, the empirical results show that the relationship between the family firms and cash effective tax rate is significantly positive, and the relationship between the family firms and book-tax difference is significantly negative. That means that family firms are less tax aggressive. Family firms have larger corporate ownership and they are more concerned about firm’s reputation in order to operate permanently. The relationship between family board size and effective tax rate is significantly positive. As a larger board, family members do not control or affect board’s decisions easily, limiting family firms use tax aggressive activities to make self-interests. In addition, the relationship between the family CEO duality and the effective tax rate is negative and the relationship between the family CEO duality and the book-tax difference is significantly positive. When the chairman and CEO are the same person, the board independence and oversight function are weaker, therefore, it is more easy for management to do tax aggressive activities.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/18911
其他識別: U0005-2107201317303800
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