Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/18912
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor蘇迺惠zh_TW
dc.contributorNai-Hua Suen_US
dc.contributor.author龔洺弘zh_TW
dc.contributor.authorKung, Ming-Hungen_US
dc.contributor.other會計學研究所zh_TW
dc.date2013en_US
dc.date.accessioned2014-06-06T07:05:23Z-
dc.date.available2014-06-06T07:05:23Z-
dc.identifierU0005-1307201319342500en_US
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dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11455/18912-
dc.description.abstract家族企業為當今台灣重要的企業型態,租稅成本乃為企業重要的成本支出。當企業進行租稅規避的措施時,對公司有節省成本的效益,但相對地,避稅之複雜性和隱避性可能會增加潛在的風險與成本,包括股票的折價、被國稅局潛在的查核和懲處,及企業聲譽的損害等非稅成本。本研究針對家族企業型態和租稅規避間之關聯性來作探討,家族企業相較於非家族企業會進行較多或是較少的租稅規避活動。 本研究以2005年至2008年台灣上市公司為研究對象,檢測企業家族化與租稅規避間的關係。有關租稅規避的衡量方法是以有效稅率、現金有效稅率、財稅差異及剩餘財稅差異四項作為衡量之代理變數。控制了獲利能力、財務槓桿、虧損扣抵、所得稅抵減、資本密集度、研發費用、投資收益、公司規模及前期財稅差異後,其結果顯示為家族企業和現金有效稅率呈顯著的正向關係,並和財稅差異呈顯著的負向關係,表示家族企業相對於非家族企業較不易進行租稅規避的活動,其實證結果與Chen et al.(2010)的結論一致。本研究認為家族企業會基於非稅成本的考量,避免被國稅局調帳查核的風險及維護企業的聲譽,故較不會從事租稅規避的活動。zh_TW
dc.description.tableofcontents目次 第一章 緒論............................................1 第一節 研究動機與背景..................................1 第二節 研究目的與貢獻..................................4 第三節 研究架構與流程圖................................5 第二章 文獻探討........................................7 第一節 租稅規避之成本與效益............................7 第二節 家族企業與非家族企業的代理問題..................9 第三節 家族企業租稅規避行為之探討.....................11 第三章 研究假說與研究方法.............................14 第一節 研究假說.......................................14 第二節 實證模型與變數衡量.............................15 第四章 實證結果.......................................26 第一節 樣本選取與資料來源.............................26 第二節 實證結果.......................................28 第五章 結論與建議.....................................50 第一節 研究結論.......................................50 第二節 研究限制及建議.................................51 參考文獻...............................................52 中文部分...............................................52 西文部分...............................................53 表目次 表3-1 家族企業(FAMILY)係數預期符號方向................19 表3-2 模型1&2下控制變數定義及預期符號.................24 表3-3 模型3&4下控制變數定義及預期符號.................25 表4-1 樣本觀察值分析表................................27 表4-2 產業別樣本觀察值分析表..........................27 表4-3 敘述性統計量....................................29 表4-4 平均數與中位數差異檢定..........................30 表4-5 應變數相關係數分析..............................31 表4-6 Pearson & Spearman 相關係數分析(ETR)............33 表4-7 Pearson & Spearman 相關係數分析(CETR)...........34 表4-8 Pearson & Spearman 相關係數分析(MPBTD)..........35 表4-9 Pearson & Spearman 相關係數分析(DDBTD)..........36 表4-10 家族企業與有效稅率..............................38 表4-11 家族企業與現金有效稅率..........................39 表4-12 家族企業與財稅差異..............................41 表4-13 家族企業與剩餘財稅差異..........................42 表4-14 家族企業與租稅規避之關係-敏感性分析(1)..........43 表4-15 家族企業與租稅規避之關係-敏感性分析(2)..........44 表4-16 家族企業與租稅規避之關係-敏感性分析(3)..........45 表4-17 家族企業與租稅規避之關係-敏感性分析(4)..........46 表4-18 家族企業與租稅規避之關係-敏感性分析(5)..........47 表4-19 家族企業與租稅規避之關係-敏感性分析(6)..........48 表4-20 家族企業與租稅規避之關係-敏感性分析(7)..........49 圖目次 圖1-1 研究流程圖........................................6zh_TW
dc.language.isozh_TWen_US
dc.publisher會計學研究所zh_TW
dc.relation.urihttp://www.airitilibrary.com/Publication/alDetailedMesh1?DocID=U0005-1307201319342500en_US
dc.subject家族企業zh_TW
dc.subjectFamily firmsen_US
dc.subject租稅規避zh_TW
dc.subject有效稅率zh_TW
dc.subject財稅差異zh_TW
dc.subjectTax aggressivenessen_US
dc.subjectEffective tax ratesen_US
dc.subjectBook-tax differenceen_US
dc.title家族企業與非家族企業租稅規避行為之探討zh_TW
dc.titleTax Agressiveness Between Family Firms and Non-Family Firmsen_US
dc.typeThesis and Dissertationzh_TW
item.languageiso639-1zh_TW-
item.cerifentitytypePublications-
item.grantfulltextnone-
item.openairetypeThesis and Dissertation-
item.openairecristypehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf-
item.fulltextno fulltext-
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