Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/20362
標題: 以賽局理論觀點分析在資訊不對稱下供應鏈廠商之競爭策略行為
A Game Analysis of The Supply Chain Firms'' Competitive Strategic Behaviors In Information Asymmetry
作者: 張文瑞
Jui, Chang Wen
關鍵字: Supply Chain Management;供應鏈管理;Game Theory;Information Asymmetry;Opportunism;Strategic Behavior;賽局理論;資訊不對稱;機會主義;策略行為
出版社: 企業管理學系研究所
摘要: 
本研究是以靜態非合作賽局角度分析,在供應鏈中廠商與廠商之間進行互動時所可能產生的策略行為與策略思考進行分析。且在本研究中,我們透過完全資訊與不完全資訊的情境假設,分析廠商在各情境之下所可能產生的策略行為。
在研究結果中,我們發現焦點廠商與協力廠商在完全資訊下,會以優勢策略(成本領導)來進行互動;而在不完全資訊下,我們假定焦點廠商不清楚協力廠商的本質時,對於訊息較少的焦點廠商來說,其可以利用保持無知與篩選訊息來進行互動,;而對於訊息較多的協力廠商來說,其可以隱藏訊息與選擇性顯示正確訊息來做互動。此時我們發現,對於訊息較多的協力廠商來說,其可能會有機會主義的行為出現,其可能會以欺騙或是假裝的方式進行欺騙來獲取較高的利益。所以我們建議供應鏈中的廠商,當在進行互動時可以透過夥伴關係的發展進而建立雙方共同合作協定,來減少互動時不完全訊息的產生,而共同取得更高的利益。

In this research from the static and non-cooperative game view to analysis the strategic behaviors and strategic thinking in interactions within supply chain. And in this research, we suppose the conditions which are the complete information and incomplete information to analyze the strategic behaviors of the firms in supply chain.
In result, we find the focus firm and collaborative firm would have the dominate strategy (cost leadership) in complete information; and in incomplete information, we suppose a condition that is focus firm can not identify the type of collaborative firm. In this moment to focus firm, he would keep ignorant or screening the information to try to get advantage. And to collaborative firm, he would hide the information or display the information selectiveness. And we find that one with more information would have opportunistic behaviors and he maybe cheat or pretend to another one to get higher profit. So we suggest that the firms in supply chain in interactions, they can develop the partnership and establish the collaborative cooperative convention to reduce the incomplete information within interaction then get higher profit mutually.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/20362
Appears in Collections:企業管理學系所

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